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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with one way in which political 
philosophy and international relations might co-operate more closely 
with one another. The approach so formed, international relations 
theory, is particularly important in order to analyse and try to 
resolve one of the more fundamental questions in modern politics. 
This question concerns the right ordering of two types of obligation, 
the one asserting that a man's obligations are first and foremost to 
the state of which he is a citizen, the other asserting that as a man 
he has obligations to the whole of humanity and that these have first 
claim upon him. 
The first part of this thesis is concerned with these two 
theories of obligations and the way in which they are embedded within 
the theory and practice of the modern state. The argument attempts to 
set out the basic structure of these two points of view in order that 
their evaluation may take place in later parts of the thesis. 
In the second place, the theories of Pufendorf and Vattel are 
considered in order to discover the manner in which they deal with 
these two points of view of obligation. Their theories are found to 
be unsatisfactory and a more adequate theory of international 
obligation is traced in the writings of Kant. 
The third part of the thesis attempts to build upon Kant in 
order to take some further steps towards a theory of international 
relations. This section begins with the argument that the philosophy 
of international relations is to be understood as part of a wider 
enterprise, namely a theory of societies with reference to their 
external relations. 	Accordingly, the thesis attempts to distinguish 
a variety of principles which might be at the heart of one society's 
relations with another. Through the use of a 'myth' the argument 
proceeds to arrange these principles into a hierarchy in order to 
represent their distance from or proximity to a condition where 
international relations are organised according to principles which 
have their bases in Kant's thought. 
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PART 	ONE 
4 . 
INTRODUCTION 
Political Philosophy and International Relations 
It was argued many years ago that the discipline known as 
political philosophy and the study concerned with the relations 
between states might begin to search for fruitful points of contact. 
Those who argued for a philosophical approach to international 
relations not only pointed to the absence of classic texts in the 
theory of international relations and to the traditional disinterest 
shown by the major political philosophers in the external relations 
of the state. 	They were also concerned to rebuke the practitioners 
of international relations for neglecting to formulate and discuss 
philosophical problems which were unique perhaps to their subject-
matter. 1 The claim for a philosophical approach to international 
relations, which would be comparable to the place of political philo-
sophy in the study of government, was not followed by specific 
discussions of particular issues which the theory of international 
relations had been summoned to contest. Consequently, two disciplines 
1. 	Main writings in defence of a philosophical approach to inter- 
national relations include H. Bull "International Theory: The 
Case for a Classical Approach" in K.E. Knorr and J.N.Rosenau, 
Contending Approaches to International Politics, Princeton, 1969, 
pp. 20-38; M. Wight's "Why is there no International Theory?", 
in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, 
London, 1966; A.Wolfer's "Political Theory and International 
Relations" in Discord and Collaboration, John Hopkins, 1962, 
pp. 233-251. Somewhat earlier G.D.H.Cole maintained 'Political 
theory has been Cartesian in method. It has sought to define the 
nature of the state by the analysis of the consciousness of a 
typical state'. Moreover 'this introspective philosophy ... is 
fatal to political theory because it shuts up the state in the 
circle of its own ideas, and prevents philosophers from confront-
ing the problem of the relations of state to state'. See "The 
Nature of the State in View of its External Relations", Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XVI, 1915 -16, p.311. 
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which are so approximate to one another have continued to develop 
without any particular regard for each other's interests and 
activities. 
Various reasons might be offered for the continued separation 
of moral and political theory from the study of international relations. 
In the first place, many of the more important approaches within the 
study of international relations have not been favourably disposed to-
wards the discussion of normative questions. This is not to say that 
the normative dimension is all that a philosophical approach could 
consider. On the other hand, most if not all the classic texts in 
political theory began with a set of questions or problems regarding 
human conduct and the principles which might govern it. 	Some 
approaches to international relations have excluded this whole range 
of inquiry on the grounds that inter-state conduct differs substant-
ially from the conduct of domestic politics by taking place within a 
unique context, one marked by the absence of government. The 'realist' 
mode of analysis, for example, has consistently tended to overlook or 
deny the place of moral values in inter-state conduct. 	Alternative 
approaches within the tradition of descriptive social science have 
either positively encouraged or uncritically conveyed some version of 
skepticism about ethics which is hostile to the development of a 
theory of international relations along classical lines and proportions. 1 
In addition, a cursory glance at almost any major text in 
1. 	For example, E.H.Carr, The Twenty Year's Crisis, London, 1962, 
p.79. Strategic theory is discussed in E.B.F. Midgley, The 
Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations, 
London, 1975, Ch.12, Part I. Representative of social-scientific 
theory is E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, 1964, 
see below p.11. 
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political philosophy will serve to show that the traditional range 
of problems with which it is concerned arise from reflection upon 
human conduct within the state. Political philosophy has been 
decidedly state-centred by preferring to reason about those relation-
ships and institutions held characteristic of the separate, sovereign 
state. This tendency of political philosophers to direct their 
discipline to the discussion of the separate state may simply be a 
reflection of dominant cultural assumptions which regard the separate, 
political association as the legitimate form of political organisation. 
Many political philosophers simply have not found it necessary to 
give any philosophical account of a humanity divided into separate, 
sovereign states. Indeed, the work of John Rawls, who more than any 
other single writer represents the rise of political philosophy from 
its recent slumbers, proceeds, as has been noted, without any signifi-
cant' focus upon the problems of states in their external relations. 
It is of course, true that some political philosophers have 
proposed major ideas which have a considerable bearing upon the valid-
ity of the separate, sovereign state. Montesquieu, and later 
Rousseau and Hegel, held that the civic virtues could only be upheld 
within a limited political community which did not appear likely to 
develop on an inter-state level. Whether or not the theory and 
practice of federalism contributes greatly to the problem of govern-. 
ing large, political associations, it is undeniable that the problem 
of community on an international scale has deterred political thinkers 
1. 	J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard, 1971. Only pages 378- 
379 deal with the principles of international relations. For a 
criticism of Rawls see B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, 
Oxford s 1973, Ch.12 and appendix two below, pp. 319-324. 
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from considering ambitious international arrangements which might 
replace separate, sovereign states. Hegel is undoubtedly the major 
exponent of the view tha._ philosophy should be conr_erned with under-
standing what is rational within existing political associations and 
institutions rather. than within ones which some think ought to be 
although they appear to lack any ability to stir men to bring them 
into existence. It is arguable that Hegel made explicit what has 
remained implicit for the most part within the writings of all but a 
few political thinkers. 1 
What then is the justification for wishing to indulge in a 
mode of inquiry which mainstream political philosophy has wished to 
avoid? We may begin by considering some aspects of the contemporary 
world which have led thinkers to take a fresh look at the nature of 
international relations. 	One of the most significant developments 
in the contemporary study of politics has been the search for a closer 
co-operation between the academic study of its domestic and inter-
national dimensions in response to the nation-state's diminished 
immunity from events having their origins beyond the national frontier. 
The concern with international economic relations and transnational 
relations within the broader focus upon interdependence reflects the 
nature of the change in contemporary political life. Let us consider, 
for example, Mitrany's remark that: 
'If one were to visualise a map of the world 
showing economic and social activities, it 
would appear as an intricate web of interests 
and relations crossing and recrossing 
political divisions - not a fighting map 
of states and frontiers, but a map pulsating 
with the realities of everyday life.' 2 
1. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, Oxford, 1952, Preface, 
esp. pp. 11-13. 
2. D. Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organisation" in 
C.A. Cosgrove and K.J. Twitchett, The New International Actors, 
London, 1970, p.74. 
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These attempts to reconsider the nature of international relations 
and efforts at re-assessing the capacity of the separate, sovereign 
state to deal with them would appear to cast doubt upcn any political 
philosophy which addresses itself merely to the separate, sovereign 
state. 	Since Hegel 'painted his grey upon grey' the nature of inter- 
national relations has changed substantially and it is worthwhile 
considering whether or not such changes should now be reflected within 
the way in which we conduct our political philosophy. It has been 
stated for example that: 
'The architectonic role Aristotle attributed 
to the science of the polls might well belong 
today to international relations, for these 
have become in the twentieth century the very 
condition of our daily life. To philosophise 
about the ideal state in isolation, or to 
theorise about political systems in the 
1 1 abstract, has become almost meaningless. 
In short, a political philosophy which considers only legitimate 
relationships and associations within the state risks excluding some 
of the more fundamental forces affecting the state, forces which have 
their origin within the international environment. The development 
of international relations theory may be seen as part of a larger 
enterprise which attempts to overcome, where necessary, the separation 
of domestic and international politics. 
The interdependence of the domestic and international dimensions 
of political life requires the expansion of the scope of political 
theory. In the first place, a political theory which focusses upon 
the state with regard to its internal character alone conveys the idea 
that the international aspect of political life is without meaning or 
rationality. It is involved in suggesting that the nature of the 
1. 	S. Hoffman, Contemporary Theory in International Relations, 
New Jersey, 1960, p.4. 
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state's external relations does not need to be integrated within a 
broader, more complete theory of politics. Now this is very unsat-
isfactory where citizens of different communities are increasingly 
causally connected and where the ability of the state-system to 
manage shared global problems is more evidently a question. For 
these reasons study of the relationships within the separate political 
community needs to be considered within a broader context which in-
cludes the 'intricate web of interests and relations crossing and re-
crossing political divisions'. It has been said, for example, that: 
'Nations have not yet learned to take the 
role of the other, and to participate 
consciously and morally in the wider social ,1 processes which they are in fact engaged in. 
International relations theory has to consider the fact that while men 
are increasingly causally connected they are divided into separate 
sovereign states which are not at this stage manifestly willing to 
ground their relations upon shared moral principles. 	International 
relations theory may reasonably be charged then with considering anew 
the status of the sovereign state as a separate entity, a consideration 
which is intensified by the scope of international interdependence. 
It may reasonably be concerned with rethinking the basis for political 
obligations among members of a separate political association and 
'integrating these obligations with obligations owed to the rest of 
humanity. It is no longer 'utopian' to set forth an account of the 
obligations of the citizen to humanity or of one body politic to 
another. For, as we have said, contemporary international relations 
point to the obsolescence of any political philosophy which takes for 
granted the acceptability of that condition where humanity is divided 
1. G.H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, 1934. See 
introductory remark by C.W. Morris, p. xxxv. 
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fundamentally into separate, sovereign states. 
Periods of flux and upheaval have often occasioned new 
political theories which reconsider the foundations of social and 
political life. Such periods occasion the development of different 
systems of concepts which seek to explore alternative methods of 
harmonising different aspects of human experience. 	And so it has 
been within the study of international relations. There is now a 
considerable body of literature within the functionalist tradition 
of thought which has as its main objective a move 'beyond the nation-
state'. Even so, this is a move beyond the nation-state to an alter-
native means of organising international relations which can proceed, 
it is thought, without the active involvement of political philosophy. 
Mitrany himself appears to have thought that political philosophy 
was not an essential part of the reconsideration of social and 
political life: 
'The immediate issue is nothing less than 
breaking away from a concept and practice 
which since the end of the Middle Ages had 
been inculcated as an ideal, the near worship 
of the national-territorial state. But if we 
are to wean our minds and our ways away from 
that centuries-old political acceptance, the 
objectives must make sense to the vast 
generality of the peoples everywhere, and 
therefore be stated in language which people 
everywhere can understand. Esoteric constructions 
and idiosyncratic academic codes are the 
surest way to make nonsense of the whole 
argument for a new way of political life.' 
There is, of course, a lesson in this to those who might be inclined 
to assign too great an importance to the role of philosophical ideas, 
among others, in bringing about political change. 	However, deeply 
embedded within functionalist thought is a view of man which would 
1. 	D. Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective", 
International Affairs, London, July 1971, p.543. 
11. 
seem opposed to any intellectual reconsideration of our obligations 
to the state and to the rest of humanity. The most radical challenge 
to the state-system disappoints in that while it sees possibilities 
for a rearrangement of international relations in the interdependence 
of societies, it refuses to offer any normative system of concepts 
for the guidance of human conduct - even in only the broadest of 
terms - within this changing condition. And indeed one of the import-
ant functions of traditional political philosophy was to seek to 
redefine the goals of political life within circumstances where pre-
viously acceptable values had begun to lose their appeal. But this is 
an option which functionalist thought has been reluctant to employ. 
Functionalism approaches international co-operation, so it 
has been suggested, 'without any utopian assumptions'. 1 Since 
'personal loyalties are the result of satisfaction with the performance 
of critical functions by an agency of government' functionalism aims 
to demonstrate that the interests of men would be better satisfied 
through the creation of international institutions which would replace 
sovereign states. 2 Accordingly, it has assumed a view of man which 
stresses the utilitarian side of his nature and the instrumental side 
of his institutions. The neo-functionalist in embracing an interest 
group theory of politics emphasises man as a utilitarian calculator: 
'Co-operation among groups is then the result 
of convergence of separate perceptions of 
interest and not a spontaneous surrender 
to the myth of the common good.' 3 
The move 'beyond the nation-state' will take place not through any 
reconsideration of the obligations of the citizen to the state and to 
1. Haas, op.cit., p.33. 
2. ibid., p.49. 
3. ibid., p.34. 
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citizens of other states but through an appeal to 'hard facts' which 
demonstrate the inefficacy of the state. 
The theory or international relations, in addition to aiming 
to produce alternative conceptual schemes in the light of changed 
circumstances, is concerned with investigating the presuppositions 
of other interpretations of contemporary international relations. 
And the main objection to functionalist thought regarding its view of 
man is that it is too ready to emphasise man as a self-interested 
creature and too ready to discount his view of himself as a being to 
whom obligations are due and to whom rights are attached. 	It is 
this one-sided account of man which has led functionalism to consider 
methods of producing social and political change at the cost of re-
flecting upon the character of the institutions which might develop 
alongside and even replace the separate, sovereign state. The task 
of an international relations theory is then to explore the possibili-
ties of grounding international institutions upon rational principles, 
of accounting philosophically for some of the ends which might be 
valued within the context of contemporary international relations. 
The fundamental objective of this thesis is then to consider 
whether or not the justification or invalidation of a humanity divided 
into separate, sovereign states may proceed not simply in terms of 
the efficacy of the nation-state and its consequences for our interests, 
but in terms of the moral obligations which may be shown to exist 
between men. 1 The thesis is concerned, in short, with the question 
1. 	These two ways of regarding the state-system are discussedin 
M. Wight, Power Politics, London, 1946, pp.67-68, and in G. 
Goodwin and A. Linklater (eds.), New Dimensions of World 
Politics, London, 1975, especially pp. 16-19. 
Typical of the 'interest' approach is C.B. MacPherson's remark 
that given the fear of nuclear war "an acceptable theory of 
obligation of the individual to a wider political authority 
[over] 
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of whether or not there are international obligations - obligations 
between the citizens of different states - which might serve to 
criticise the dominance of the state-system as we !:.now it and 
justify its evolution towards the establishment of international 
institutions to supersede the jurisdiction of states over substantial 
areas of social and political life. 
should now be possible". The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, Oxford, 1962, pp. 276-277. Typical of the 
'moral' approach is T.H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 
1906, esp. 'The Extension of the Area of Common Good', pp.237- 
253.. For example: "We only know that the earliest ascertainable 
history exhibits to us communities, relatively very confined, 
within any one of which a common good, and in consequence a 
common duty, is recognised as between the members of the community, 
while beyond the particular community the range of mutual 
obligation is not understood to extend. Among ourselves, on 
the contrary, it is almost an axiom of popular Ethics that there 
is at least a potential duty of every man to every man - a duty 
which becomes actual as soon as one comes to have any dealing 
with the other." p.238. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Main Dimensions of International Theory 
In the absence of a developed tradition of theorising about 
international relations it is necessary to begin with a description 
of the central characteristics and purposes of the kind of inter-
national theory to be advocated here. Initially, two main dimensions 
require consideration. In the first place, there is a need to present 
an account of the main conceptual schemes to be employed. To assist 
the development of international theory it is useful, so I shall 
argue, to formulate two points of view of the relationship between 
the separate state and the remainder of humanity. These two contrast-
ing points of view will be known as the 'internal' and 'external' 
points of view of obligation. 1 Once these perspectives have been 
described fully it will be necessary to consider their implications 
for the modern state and its external relations. 2 Here it will be 
argued that both the internal and external points of view are deeply 
rooted in the character of the modern state and that a theory of 
international relations must attempt to evaluate their competing 
directives. The second main dimension, then, will be concerned with 
an analysis of the arguments adopted by representative thinkers within 
each of the two perspectives. 3 But let us begin first of all with a 
discussion of the conceptual problem in international theory and the 
manner in which the two points of view can overcome this difficulty. 
1. These two perspectives are discussed in chapters 2-4. 
2. See below chapter 5. 
3. See part II, chs. 6-8. 
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The Conceptual Dimension in International  Theory 
Recent political theory has emphasised the need to study the 
main concepts of political argument, attempting to distinguish where 
there is confusing or ambiguous usage, to define in order to arrive 
at a clearer understanding of the terms of argument, and to create 
where ordinary language fails to conceptualise a distinguishable 
aspect of social and political life. Concepts and conceptual schemes 
must be sufficiently precise before any international theory can get 
off the ground. 	The problem of the main concepts to use in inter- 
national theory is a particularly acute one. Referring to this pro-
blem Martin Wight wrote of 
'a kind of recalcitrance of international 
politics to being theorised about. The 
reason is that theorising has to be done 
in the language of political theory and law. 
But this is the language appropriate to man's 
control of his social life. Political 
theory and law are maps of experience or 
systems of action, within the realm of 
normal relationships and calculable results. 
They are the theory of the good life. 
International theory is the theory of 
survival. What for political theory is the 
extreme case (as revolution or civil war) 
is for international theory the regular 
case. ' 1 
Martin Wight goes on to maintain that the typical events of inter-
national politics are 'constantly bursting the bounds of the language' 
used to handle them. 	Once again, it is the seemingly unique nature 
of international relations, the decentralised or 'anarchic' condition 
of states, which prevents international theory from developing along 
the sophisticated lines of a philosophy which explores the character 
of the state. But, as Bull has said in his appraisal of Wight, this 
1. 	Wight, op.cit., p.33. 
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is, if anything, 'a reason for trying to find a language that is 
appropriate. 1 The introduction of conceptual schemes is therefore 
one of the central priorities for international relations theory. 
It is arguable that Wight's contrast between domestic and 
international politics is overdrawn, and that indeed to highlight 
them in too dramatic a fashion is to be in danger of overlooking 
possibilities for theoretical inquiry. Wight himself appears to have 
thought that the role performed by political theory in the study of 
domestic politics can be best performed by historical interpretation 
in the study of international relations. Whatever the interpretation 
of this is to be, it is not evident that it, historical interpre- 
tation, can properly investigate two fundamentally important functions 
of the theory of international relations - the examination of the 
rapports between the theory of the state and the organisation and 
ordering of the state-system (the examination of this area is of 
particular importance since any 'domestic' political theory will have 
implicit if not explicit implications for the organisation of world 
society); and secondly, the examination of the philosophical account 
of man and society which will necessarily underlie the theory of the 
state and influence any implicit or explicit account of the proper 
organisation of world society. A discussion of these two issues forms 
an important part of the theory of international relations. Indeed, 
the exploration of the concepts of an internal and external point of 
view is one of the means by which this thesis proposes to investi-
gate more fully some of the rapports between the theory of the .state 
and the theory of the organisation of international relations. 
1. 	H. Bull, "Martin Wight and the Thecry of International 
Relations", British Journal of International Studies, no.2, 
1976, p.114. 
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Any theory of state will, it has been stated, indicate or 
contain implications for the way in which world society might be 
organised. 1 To consider an extreme example, a philosophy which 
understands the state as the highest ethical community will preclude 
the organisation of world society in such a way as to allow substant-
ial jurisdiction to rest in the hands of international institutions. 
In this sense the relationship between the theory of the state and 
the theory of international relations is direct, the latter being 
already contained within the former. 	In other theories of the state 
the implications of the theory may be implicit and not necessarily 
evident to its author. 
Let us consider this latter point with regard to Sir Robert 
Filmer's criticism of social contract theory. 2 Central to that 
theory is the idea of a state of nature comprising individuals who 
are not bound at all by political obligations. It is further main- 
tained that political power cannot be exercised without the individual's 
consent to submit to political authority. Now, in the case of Locke 
for example - who later exemplifies this theory - there is no detailed 
discussion of the processes whereby men come to establish separate, 
sovereign states. 3 
	
It is at this point that Filmer's criticism of 
contract theory is of interest to us. For, according to Filmer the 
1. "A theory of the state must be, from one angle, a philosophy 
of international Law." H. Laski, The State in Theory and 
Practice, London 1949, p.218. 
2. The following paragraph relies heavily on J.P. Plamenatz. 
Man and Society, vol.1, London 1963, pp. 178-179. 
3. Locke, The Second Treatise on Government (ed. P.Laslett), 
Cambridge 1960, especially chapters 2 and 8. Other writers 
within this contractarian tradition did attempt to explain the 
separation of humanity into sovereign states. See the discussion 
of Pufendorf and Vattel below, pp.124-138, and pp. 151-152. 
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division of men into separate, sovereign states would itself 
require the consent of the whole of mankind: 
'If they understand that the entire multitude 
or whole people have originally by nature 
power to choose a King, they must remember 
that by their own principles and rules, by 
nature all mankind in the world makes but one 
people, who they suppose to be born alike to 
an equal freedom from subjection; and where 
such freedom is, there all things must of 
necessity be common: and therefore without 
a joint consent of the whole people of the 
world, no one thing can be made proper to any 
one man, but it will be an injury, and a 
usurpation upon the common right of others. 
From whence it follows that natural freedom 
being once granted, there cannot be any one 
man chosen a King without the universal consent 
of all the people of the world at one instant, 
nemine contradicente.' 1 
Before the individual could consent to have a particular government 
exercise control over him the whole of mankind would have to consent 
to the movement from the natural condition of undivided humanity to 
the formation of separate, sovereign states. So Filmer argued. 
It might be argued in opposition to Filmer that it is 
submission to a particular government rather than the creation of a 
condition of divided humanity that traditional contractarian theory 
is concerned to ground on consent, and that theorists within this 
tradition may reasonably treat the former without the latter. The 
process of separating from humanity is not one with which they need 
to concern themselves. This is indeed a plausible argument where 
individuals do not have transactions at the 'global' level. Where 
individuals are relatively confined in their movements and where the 
effects of their actions are confined to their immediate neighbours 
it is stretching it a little to refer to men separating from humanity. 
1. Sir Robert Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or . Mixed Monarchy in 
Patriarcha and Other Political Works (ed.P.Laslett), Oxford 1949, 
p.285. 
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There is in a sense no humanity from which to separate. Nevertheless, 
it would be possible to refer to the formation of separate, sovereign 
states as separating from humanity where this concept is understood 
philosophically rather than empirically. According to this second 
sense a number of individuals separate from humanity where they estab-
lish some association among themselves which totally denies the exis-
tence of moral obligations towards the rest of humanity. If within 
the state of nature, where men do have moral obligations to one 
another, some men proceed to establish a political community among 
themselves and refuse to regard themselves as morally bound to out-
siders, they are, so to speak, separating themselves from humanity. 
Separation here takes place not merely through the severance of 
connections with an ongoing world society, for example, but through 
the rejection of a system of moral obligation which is capable of 
embracing all men. Should one man submit to a government, which is 
to have jurisdiction over the whole of known society, and later become 
aware of other societies that man could be said to be separating him-
self from humanity were he not prepared to recognise the moral obli-
gations due to them as men and, indeed, reconstitute his own political 
society so that these moral obligations might be more easily honoured. 
In this sense, the unilateral establishment of a separate, sovereign 
state is of concern to the remainder of mankind, not least of all 
because of its capacity to influence the lives of men elsewhere. The 
idea that political affairs should be grounded on consent can hardly 
be reserved for the condition where men submit to government. This 
principle of consent requires then a commitment to the argument that 
the division of men into separate, political communities would need 
the consent of the whole of mankind. Otherwise any group which 
20. 
unilaterally established itself as a sovereign s ∎-.ate would be 
illegitimate insofar as it usurped 'the common right of others'. 
In this way, the contractarian argument for the state has clear 
Implications for a theory of international relations. They may not 
be as evident as in the argument for the state as the supreme 
ethical association, but they are there nevertheless. 
Let us now consider this argument from a different perspective, 
one which will give a clearer indication of the role of the internal 
and external points of view in exploring the relationships between 
the theory of the state and the theory of international relations. 
Contract theory begins with a discussion of the state of nature which 
is a pre-political condition where all men are governed by a law of 
reason. Here it is employing one of the central ideas of Western 
thought, namely that a man has moral obligations to every other person 
on the face of the earth. These are obligations attached to them as 
men and not as participants in a common society. They are evidently 
natural obligations and more fundamental than the obligations which 
men might create for themselves through law and custom within parti- 
cular societies. But if men can be conceived of establishing separate, 
sovereign states then this natural morality will be frustrated. One 
of the central assumptions of the separate, sovereign state, as we 
know it, is that a citizen is obliged first and foremost to his 
separate political association, that obligations to humanity are 
necessarily secondary by virtue of his membership with others of a 
society - an idea which is equally central to Western thought. There 
are in other words two separate perspectives within contract theory, 
the one maintaining the existence of a universal community 'higher' 
or more fundamental than the state, the other maintaining that the 
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fundamental community and source of obligation is the separate 
state. The first perspective is central to the external point of 
view; the second perspective is central to the iLternal point of 
view. At a later stage I shall argue that these are two fundamental 
responses to the division of mankind into separate states and two 
important viewpoints to consider in the elaboration of an inter-
national theory. 	At this stage, however, it is sufficient to say 
that we have two conceptual schemes, two ways of considering the 
relationship between the separate state and humanity, with which to 
begin a fuller discussion. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Internal and External Points of View 
of Obligation in the Theory of 
International Relations  
PART ONE 
'The history of the human species as a whole 
may be regarded as the realisation of a 
secret plan of Nature for bringing into 
existence a political constitution perfect 
both from the internal point of view and, 
-so far as regards this purpose, from the 
external point of view also: such a 
constitution being the sole condition under 
which Nature can fully develop all the. 
capacities she has implanted in humanity.' 
(Kant) 
'They moralise from without instead of under-
standing the nature of the state from within.' 
(Friedrich Meinecke) 
I 
In the following section I propose to clarify a distinction 
I have made between two fundamental conceptions of the nature of 
obligation in a world of separate states. I have selected the terms 
the 'internal' and 'external' points of view to stand for two con- 
trasting theories about the relative standing of obligations to members 
of one's society and of obligations to members of other societies 
(hereafter to be called 'insiders' and 'outsiders' respectively). 
Through these conceptual schemes it is possible, I believe, to begin 
a discussion of the relationships between the theory of the state and 
the theory of international relations - an area of considerable import-
ance to international relations theory. I shall briefly indicate 
the nature of the distinction between these two outlooks before offering 
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a more detailed inquiry into their respective internal composition. 
The internal point of view indicates the way to resolve any 
possible conflict between obligations to insiders and outsiders, or 
indeed to prevent such a conflict arising. It attempts to kindle 
the emotion or foster the thought of one's society as the highest 
and most embracing moral community. Outsiders are either placed 
beyond the boundaries of moral consideration altogether or, where a 
society does recognise certain obligations to them, it is clearly 
understood that these are secondary or residual. Either way a clear 
priority is established among the individual's obligations and 
primary moral responsibility to insiders is reinforced. 
At this stage I do not propose to make distinctions between 
types of society which manifestly enact an internal point of view. 
Suffice it to say that the concept refers to an awareness and desire 
to preserve limitations upon the extent of moral community. I do not 
propose then to discuss the many ways in which the internal point of 
view may appear. Every society which wishes to preserve its cohesive 
and separate moral community will illustrate this point of view in 
one way or another. The precise articulation of the internal point 
of view, or the particular content it is given, will vary with the 
cultures and structures of particular societies. An early society 
with an ethnocentric bias will illustrate an internal point of view at 
variance with any underlying the modern state. Among states themselves 
the internal point of view will take different expressions. It is 
certain that Greek city-states, the states of Renaissance Europe or 
the states of China in the Warring Period, and modern nation-states 
will reveal nuances in their respective statements or enactments of 
this point of view according to their different methods of organising 
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society and their different cultural perspectives including those 
which relate directly to outsiders. 	These differences are not in 
doubt, but there is certainly a common identifiable theme, namely 
that obligations within the separate community, owed by members to 
one another, take precedence or override obligations to any actual or 
possible group of outsiders. Their common ground is a belief, impli- 
cit or explicit, in a morally relevant distinction between the insider 
and the outsider, and in a supposed justification for treating the 
two groups differently. Now it is clear that all insiders are rarely 
if ever treated as absolute equals in any society, and it would be 
possible to discuss varying moral standards within any separate 
community. 	It would therefore be a mistake to assume that the 
internal point of view presupposes equal treatment for all insiders. 
It merely assumes that insiders take priority over outsiders, ^r that 
the separate community takes precedence over outsiders, and is there-
fore inherent in any community which wishes to build, maintain or 
assert its separateness. 	Nor does the internal point of•view assume 
that all outsiders share the same status and are to be treated in much 
the same way. An internal point of view may discriminate between 
outsiders and structure its external social environment in particularly 
complex ways. 	It may distinguish, for example, between those out- 
siders who are on its plane of civilisation and those who are no more 
than barbarians. This structuring of the world of outsiders may have 
interesting effects on the way in which a society conducts its 
external relations. Nevertheless as long as the separate community 
wishes to preserve its separateness as a moral entity it will have at 
its core an internal point of view. This point of view is firmly 
entrenched in the theory and practice of the separate political 
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association of the West. 	Indeed its recurrence in the thought and 
behaviour of other cultures (as in Kautilya in Indian thought) 
allows us to form the judgment that every political, society which is 
not co-extensive with humanity, or which is exclusive, will give rise 
to an internal point of view shaped by its traditions and experience. 
The internal point of view is necessarily related to the idea 
of the value of the separate moral and political community. There 
is no separate community without its internal point of view. 	The 
external point of view, however, is not necessarily a feature of the 
separate moral and political community, but arises and makes its 
presence felt only in those societies which develop a particular 
ethical perspective. In short the external point of view makes an 
appearance only in those societies which develop the idea that there 
is a moral community among the whole of mankind. When this latter 
understanding comes to have a bearing upon a society's idea of what 
it ought and ought not to do in its relations with outsiders, that 
society takes its first steps into an external point of view. The 
separate community is now faced with a vision of responsibilities 
and obligations extending beyond the moral community as it has been 
traditionally understood. Faced with the idea that there is a moral 
community among the whole of mankind, the separate community has to 
reconsider its place in the larger social world. 	This reconsider- 
ation is not something which the separate community must necessarily 
experience. Separate communities can and have continued to exist 
without any belief in the moral unity of mankind and without any 
attempt to bring this idea to bear upon the manner of their external 
relations. 
A society's understanding of the moral community of mankind 
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can have a number of different expressions. The Christian idea of 
the unity of mankind differs from the Kantian idea of the 'kingdom 
of ends', and both differ from the Confucian idea of jen. Similar-
ly, the external point of view, which seeks to bring this idea to 
bear upon the actual conduct of a society's or state's external 
relations will take various forms. The shape taken by the external 
point of view will depend certainly on the manner in which the unity 
of mankind is conceived. 	The external point of view will also bear 
the mark of the historical experience and imagination of the society 
concerned. The moral unity of mankind, however conceived, is compat-
ible with a variety of different conceptions of the right way of 
organising that humanity at the social and political level. Again, 
the external point of view will develop various nuances and offer 
different accounts of the right way of organising humanity or 
conducting relations between separate communities. 
Let us consider some of the forms the external point of view 
might take. A society which adopts this perspective may criticise 
other societies which infringe the rights of their own members or 
conduct practices held to be contrary to some universal law. The 
former society may feel obliged to intervene or use pressure to per-
suade other societies to change their ways. At a more sophisticated 
level, the former society may attempt to limit its claims on others 
or take the interests of other communities into account because of 
its moral convictions. 	It may believe that states should engage in 
greater co-operation to assist each other or to reconcile conflicting 
aims according to moral principles. Or, a society may believe that 
the most perfect formulation of the external point of view requires 
that the moral unity of mankind receive political expression in a 
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world•wide association which supersedes the division of humanity 
into separate political groupings. 	Undoubtedly, these interpre- 
tations will be dependent to some extent on the cultural perspective 
of the time. For example, the traditions and experience of a parti-
cular community may preclude it from thinking along the lines of the 
political unification of mankind. The external point of view will 
therefore reflect the culture and experience of a particular society. 
Since the external point of view arises within particular 
societies which take the view that mankind forms a moral entity it 
will, at least in its initial formative stages, compete with the 
directives of the internal point of view. There will he, in these 
early developments, a competition between the opposing requirements 
of the two points of view. Once again, the nature of the society's 
culture and experience will make its presence felt. For if cui.ture 
shapes the ways in which the two points of view are articulated then 
it is equally likely to shape the responses of a society to the 
tensions its members feel when faced with these competing moralities. 
At a later stage this thesis will consider the place of philosophy in 
attempting to decide a rational approach to the problem of an indivi-
dual who may feel the pull of these two conflicting points of view. 
While the internal point of view presents the individual with obli- 
gations designed to preserve the separateness of the political commun-
ity, the external point of view asserts that individuals are bound 
by a common morality which can regulate the relations of the separate 
political associations to which they belong. 	And while the internal 
point of view stresses the obligations of membership and the exclusive-
ness of the community, the external point of view maintains the 
inclusiveness of a moral community which embraces all men. 	When we 
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disregard the various articulations and supposed justifications of 
each point of view we can regard them as two fundamental modes of 
experience, the former asserting the obligations incurred through 
involvement in shared social life, the latter asserting that the 
obligations a man should honour extend beyond the community, with 
which his everyday life is bound, to embrace the whole of humanity. 
II 
I propose now to begin a discussion of the presuppositions 
and implications of those two points of view. In order to do this I 
wish first to clarify some other expressions which will be used in 
this thesis. I shall call a world society characterised by separate 
political associations each enacting its internal point of view a 
diplomatic society. And I shall call a world society in which separate 
communities act out an external point of view (by regarding each 
other's interests and through a willingness to move towards their 
political unification) an international society. Diplomatic society 
and international society are two terms which refer to a world where 
one of the two points of view is predominant in providing the funda-
mental values. Corresponding to this are two possible types of inter-
national relations theory. A theory which explores the first 
kind of world society, and recommends courses of action appropriate 
to it, will be called a diplomatic theory; and a theory which considers 
the kinds of consideration which ought to prevail in a world society 
founded on external points of view will be called an international 
theory. According to these terms, Machiavelli is an example of a 
diplomatic theorist while Kant is an example of an international 
theorist. 
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The theory and practice of diplomatic society is concerned 
with the external relations of states primarily in a technical rather 
than in a moral sense. Since the obligations of individuals are to 
the separate state, since the obligations of membership are primary, 
the problems of international relations are essentially technical. 
For any one state the problem of international relations is to ensure 
an environment in which it is able to preserve its separateness and 
exclusiveness. The separate community is concerned fundamentally 
with its own advantage and 'has not yet learned to take the role of 
the other'. But this is not to say that it is prepared or willing 
to sacrifice the interests of other societies to its own wherever 
possible. While some variations of the internal point of view refer 
to political associations which are motivated solely by an aggressive 
manifestation of their national interests, the variant to be c,nsid-
ered in this thesis does not desire to infringe the separateness and 
independence of other states. In this variant states may evolve rules 
for themselves through diplomatic methods and so exist in a type of 
society, a diplomatic society or state-system. It is essential, how-
ever, that such rules have the consent of separate states. It is 
contrary to every formulation of the internal point of view that a 
state should be bound by rules or principles to which it has not 
consented albeit tacitly. 	By making this condition, the internal 
point of view according to this formulation is not setting out to 
deliberately ignore the interests of others or to flaunt some inter-
national morality. We are concerned here with a state which is ego- - 
 centric, whose major point of view is its own, but which is albeit 
dimly aware of a morality that might regulate the relations between 
political associations. 
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It is not possible to say that a state with this point of 
view will avoid all moral problems in the conduct of its external 
relations. But the moral problems of a society with this perspective 
reflect simply its belief in the validity of its own cultural norms. 
To explain this let us think of one society where men eat dogs and 
another where men do not eat dogs. It is conceivable that the latter 
might refuse to have relations with the former on account of its 
'barbaric' customs. It may simply feel a repugnance towards this 
practice, but may not feel any inclination to attempt to make the 
other society change its ways. The feeling it has for the other 
community may prevent that society from engaging in relationships 
characteristic of states which constitute a diplomatic society. Their 
relationship is to that extent a pre-diplomatic one. Even here, 
however, it is arguable that one community is bringing a univc - sal 
standard to bear on its judgment of the practices of another society, 
a universal standard in the sense that it appears to postulate, how-
ever implicitly, a general rule to the effect that no man should eat 
a dog. In that sense the separate community broaches the external 
point of view at a fairly simple level. 
There is, however, a sense in which a society may experience 
a moral dilemma without in any way supposing there is a morality 
which embraces the whole of mankind. Let us assume the existence of 
a society where the internal point of view is based on a doctrine of 
racial supremacy. The separate society refuses to recognise any 
obligations in its relations with outsiders on the grounds of its 
racial superiority. This belief necessarily precludes the acknowledg-
ment of a morality which transcends the division of men into separate 
states. One of the basic moral problems which could arise for a 
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society of this kind would involve the question of inconsistency. 
Let us assume that this society did not normally engage in relation-
ships with outsiders, or stood in a pre-diplomatic condition with 
them, solely on the basis of its principles of racial supremacy. 
Let us assume further that this society is threatened by an external 
power and for reasons of survival it proposes to collaborate with a 
racially inferior society. Here, and assuming the belief in racial 
supremacy. is genuine, the former may experience a moral problem which 
arises over its proposed inconsistency. 1 The moral tension which 
exists is concerned simply with the primacy of the internal point of 
view and the problem of its applicability. 
To simplify the course of the argument of this thesis I shall 
focus principally upon only one of the possible formulations of the 
internal point of view. I shall for the most part ignore those formu-
lations which depend upon racial supremacy or some aggressive form 
of nationalism. The thesis is not concerned with communities which 
are prepared to exist in only a pre-diplomatic condition with others. 
The following discussion is concerned with that formulation of the 
internal point of view which exhibits three main characteristics: 
in the first place, it stresses obligations to fellow-citizens not 
on account of racial affinity or national sentiment, but in terms of 
rational principles which defend the primacy of obligations of member-
ship. 	Secondly, it arises within a community which is not as a 
matter of fact hostile to the interests of other states, which 
1. 	Morality here is, of course, defined sociologically to refer to 
particular beliefs within society. Only at this level can it be 
said, on the basis of the discussion so far, that the society 
experiences a moral problem. According to a second sense of 
morality, where it refers to a philosophically established set 
of principles, there may be no real moral problem here at all. 
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respects the separateness and independence of other states, and is 
prepared to engage in diplomatic procedures to develop principles 
for the regulation of their relations. It is an internal point of 
view which is then prepared to take part in a diplomatic society or 
a state-system. Thirdly and lastly, it is a perspective which while 
not denying the possibility of rules of international intercourse 
nevertheless maintains its right to decide whether or not to respect 
these rules and to honour the obligations involved in them. 
I shall be concerned with the following three areas as under-
stood by the above point of view: firstly, the concept of the rights 
of the state; secondly, the morality of the private person and the 
statesman; and thirdly , the implicit theory of international co-
operation. An investigation of these areas will provide a fuller 
discussion of some of the relationships between the theory of the 
state and the theory of international relations. 
III 
The attempt to discuss all the variations of the internal point 
of view would be a mammoth task, as would the attempt to discuss all 
the ways in which a community might distinguish between types of out-
siders. There are certainly many ways in which these two features 
are related. From these I propose to discuss principally one version" 
of the internal point of view and one image of the external social 
environment which is linked with it. The discussion will focus prin-
cipally upon the theory of the separate state as argued within the 
contractual tradition in Western political thought. Obligations to 
the separate state are understood to arise through the consent of indi-
viduals to form a government among themselves. Individuals have 
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freely consented to withdraw from the state of nature in order to 
seek the security of government. The internal point of view arises 
then from their desire to preserve the separate community and so 
avoid the dangers of the original state of nature. The view of the 
outsider is relatively simple within this contractual tradition. It 
is normally argued that there is a morality which embraces all men 
in the state of nature and which does to some extent survive the 
division of men into separate political communities. This theory 
then, which is central to the theory of the modern state, puts forward 
an internal point of view which arises from the contract to form the 
separate community; but it also has within it a view of the moral 
equality of all men which could, according to the earlier account of 
the external point of view, give rise to an alternative account of 
the organisation of world society. 	A fuller account of the apparent 
ambiguity within these theories of the modern state will be given in 
later sections on the theory of the state and international relations 
put forward by Pufendorf and Vattel. 	At this stage, however, it will 
be sufficient to discuss some of the main features of the internal 
point of view which underlies one of the important theories of the 
modern state. 
The Rights of the State 
I propose to begin with the rights of the state as these are 
understood within the contractual version of the internal point of view. 
To discuss these it is useful to refer to Walter Ullman's view that 
the move from medieval society and politics to the modern state is 
a move from a 'descending' to an 'ascending' theory of government. 1 
1. W. Ullman, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle 
Ages, London 1961, p.24. 
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According to the medieval principle of government 'governmental 
authority and law-creating competency descend from one supreme 
organ; power is distributed downwards, again in the shape of a 
pyramid, but so that whatever power is found "down below" at the 
base of the pyramid is not, as in the ascending theme, an original 
power, but one that is derived from above'. 1 According to the 
modern theory of politics 'governing authority and the law ascend 
from the broad base in the shape of a pyramid'. 2 The theory of the 
internal point of view underlying the modern state has to be under-
stood against the context of 'the supersession of the descending by 
the ascending theme'. 	In particular the rights of the state are 
not granted by some higher authority which retains the prerogative 
of withdrawing them. These rights result from the consent of individ-
uals who grant the government authority over them. 
The account of the state as a product of the act of individuals 
is present in the writing of Grotius, a figure normally regarded as 
transitional between the medieval and modern period, but fundamental 
to the theories of Pufendorf and Vattel. According to this theory 
man in the state of nature is self-governing and responsible first 
and foremost to himself. However, there are weaknesses in acting 
alone and to overcome these men associate to form a collectivity 
sufficiently large to take care of their needs. Through this act 
of association men submit to a sovereign which is authorised to pro-
tect their interests. 	The rights individuals had to govern themselves 
now rest with governments responsible first and foremost to the indivi-
duals who have created them. The right of the individual to advance 
his own interests gives way to the right of the state to advance the 
1. 	ibid., pp.20-2l. 	2. 	ibid. 
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interests of its citizens. Its legitimacy is not dependent upon 
any external source and consequently the state owes no responsibili-
ties to those who have not contracted to form it. 
To give effect to this principle it is necessary that the 
separate state should retain control of its sovereign power. It 
would infringe the conditions under which it was established were it 
to surrender its power to another political association. It is an 
important part of the internal point of view that the community retains 
its sovereignty in order to take decisions concerning its welfare. 
It is then able to act in the interests of insiders (in this case, 
contractors or citizens) without having to recognise any fundamental 
obligations to outsiders (in this case, non-contractors or non-
citizens). The possession of sovereign power institutionalises the 
distinction between insiders and outsiders - that one set of standards 
will apply to the relations between insiders while a quite different 
set will apply to the relations between insiders and outsiders. 
According to this theory the community has the right to sovereign 
power,a right which stems from the antecedent choices of individuals 
and which cannot be qualified or annulled by the actions of outsiders. 
Now the right to possess sovereign power is only the first in 
a series according to the internal point of view. It is of course a 
fundamental right since, if individuals are to advance their interests 
as a collective entity they must possess sovereign power as a 
guarantee of their rights against the rest of mankind. But if the 
community has a right of independence, a right which is epitomised 
but not completed by the possession of sovereign power, it must have 
the right to take political action to preserve and defend itself. 
And so the community must have the right to have recourse to war in 
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order to preserve its separateness. However, the right to go to war 
would be worthless without the right to do what will win the war, 
and so the community must claim the right to do whatever is necessary 
to win the war. 	In this way the community builds up a series of 
rights which are fundamental to it if its initial right, that of 
possessing sovereign power, is to be meaningful. Subsequent rights 
in a sense fill out what is already implicit within the first and 
fundamental right - the right of separateness. 
This is a necessary method of proceeding where the theory of 
the state begins with the individual. A theory which begins with the 
right of individuals to advance themselves must proceed to develop a 
system or series of rights which will facilitate the attainment of 
individual ends. Thus the right to associate politically and the 
right of sovereign power follow from the individual right to advance 
his interests, and the right to war and to use techniques which will 
win the war follow from the right to live in a sovereign association. 
It is characteristic of an internal point of view shaped by an 
individualistic ethic to develop a theory of the state and a theory 
of international relations according to an 'ascending' method of 
proceeding. It is also clear that the manner in which the state is 
constituted carries clear implications for the manner in which it will 
conduct its external relations. This entailment becomes clearer in 
the following two sections. 
The Morality of the Private Person and the Sovereign  
Sovereignty, it has been maintained, institutionalises the 
intention to apply one standard to relations between insiders while 
a separate standard will apply to the relations between insiders and 
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outsiders. When individuals leave the state of nature they submit 
to a system of government with some men ; but not with the whole of 
mankind. Individuals therefore agree to give particular guarantees 
to some men (which is made concrete by their submission to government 
and the authority of positive law) while continuing to remain with 
outsiders in a state of nature. The relationships between insiders 
are qualitatively different from the relationships between insiders 
and outsiders. The bond between the citizen and the state is prior 
to other bonds according to the individualistic version of the 
internal point of view. This is made quite plain in the thought of 
Bodin. He writes that the sovereign: 
'has the exclusive right to demand 
unqualified oaths of submission, for 
the relations of the subject to the 
sovereign are unique in that all his 
other obligations, as vassal of his 
lord, for instance, are subject to ,1 the prior obligations to his sovereign. 
Bodin adds: 
'It is not the rights and privileges 
which he enjoys which makes a man a 
citizen, but the mutual obligation 
between subject and sovereign, by which 
in return for the faith and obedience 
returned to him, the sovereign must do 
justice and give counsel, encouragement 
and protection to the subject. He does 
not owe this to aliens. 2 
This reciprocal relationship between the citizen and the sovereign is 
exclusive. It does not extend to the welfare of the 'alien' as he 
does not stand to the sovereign in the same way as the citizen. There 
is, as a result, a clear difference in the standards which will apply 
in 'internal' and external' relations, a difference which is inherent 
1. J. Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (translated by . 
 M.J.Tooley), Oxford 1955, p. xxv. 
2. ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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in the concept of sovereignty. 
Let us now consider the respective positions of the citizen 
and the sovereign. The citizen has withdrawn from the state of 
nature by virtue of a contract establishing special obligations with 
other members of a society. It is essential that participants do 
not maintain or create special ties with outsiders such as to cause 
a tension between the obligations of citizenship and the obligations 
of humanity. Through involvement in a particular community the 
citizen is bound first and foremost by the obligations of membership. 
These take priority over claims on the individual which have their 
source outside the state. The private individual is obliged to share 
in advancing the interests of the separate community, an obligation 
which demands that international obligations become residual. He 
has no right to disobey the sovereign state on the grounds that it 
has ignored its fundamental international obligations. The sovereign 
state alone decides whether or not it can respect either the obliga-
tions it has created for itself or certain civilised standards of 
behaviour which states ought to respect. This is, however, an area 
which lies outside the scope of the individual's judgment. In ex-
change for membership of the state the individual recognises the 
priority of his obligations to the state and forsakes any particular 
claim for an international personality. His fundamental obligations 
are those which arise from having the status of a member. 1 
1. 	One particular formulation of the internal point of view 
(although substantially within this tradition) does allow some 
scope for the expression of individual conscience. It may, for 
example, respect the pacifist conscience, or any international 
ideal which creates obligations for the individual at odds with 
those which stem from membership. A society which holds this 
formulation is necessarily more liberal-individualist than the 
one discussed above since it allows the individual some scope to 
[over] 
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Let us now consider the obligations which define the role of 
the sovereign. The general nature of these obligations is defined 
by the following principle. The individual members of a community 
take part in it in order that their welfare may be more secure. The 
community has the right of advancing its interests and indeed possess-
es a number of rights to enable it to advance its ends. But these 
rights are essentially the rights of the sovereign body which is en-
trusted through the contract with the responsibility of acting in the 
interests of the separate community. The sovereign is a trustee who 
is under a specific obligation to enact his role in the community 
interest. His role as sovereign denies him the right of taking 
decisions which are hazardous to the state as a self-contained politi-
cal entity. He must recognise that certain choices cannot be made 
without crossing the boundaries established by the internal point of 
view. According to the present interpretation of the internal point 
of view he is not, however, entitled to pursue the interests of his 
state mercilessly. 	He is not entrusted with the role of acting in 
ways which are as detrimental as possible to the interests of other 
communities. But he is obliged first and foremost by the obligations 
of his role as trustee for a particular community, and it follows that 
he may have to impose high costs on outsiders if he is to serve his 
state well. 
To illustrate the sharp difference between the morality of 
enact his international ideals. This type of society raises 
some interesting questions which cannot be gone into here. 
It is arguable that a society can grant the individual only 
the privilege of behaving this way and not the right. Were 
it to give him the right to disobey the state on his account 
of his international obligations or ideals it would be taking 
some steps in the direction of the external point of view. To 
recognise the individual right of disobeying the state is to 
recognise the existence of certain moral standards which over-
ride the obligations of citizenship. 
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private persons and the morality of sovereigns lot us consider the 
case of a society which has conceded the liberty of some individuals 
to have their pacifism respected. 1 This society ,Illows the individ-
ual to choose a course of pacifism which will receive the recognition 
of the community as a whole. However, a society which adopts the 
internal point of view can never allow the sovereign to adopt a paci-
fist outlook while a trustee for the community. No individual can 
be allowed to commit the state to pacifism even though he may be 
allowed to choose pacifism as an individual ethic. The sovereign is 
necessarily under what Weber called 'an ethic of responsibility' and 
it is certain that his responsibilities are owed not to his conscience 
but to those who have entrusted him with the office of sovereign. 2 
Any individual who thinks otherwise had better, according to the 
internal point of view, turn his back on politicS as there is no place 
there for a man unprepared to make 'sacrifices of value' in order to 
preserve or enhance the security or well-being of the separate 
community. 3 	It is clear then that irrespective of the scope society 
gives to the individual it must specify exactly the nature of the 
obligations which are attached to the role of sovereign. 
1. This particular issue is of course at the heart of arguments 
about the two standards of morality - the morality of the private 
person and the morality of the statesman. It is not crucial to 
the internal point of view as such, but only to that formulation 
which has conceded that the individual's choice of pacifism should 
have the respect of the community. Since only particular 
societies admit this claim it is an issue which arises only within 
particular cultural contexts where the individual is free to 
make a choice which is radically at odds with his community. 
It is a problem then for a society which wishes to articulate 
some version of the internal point of view within a culture which 
has a strong individualistic current and where certain individ-
uals may choose a morality which sets them at odds with the state. 
2. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", From Max Weber, 
(ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills), London 1948, esp.pp. 118-128. 
3. A. Wolfers, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice", Discord and 
Collaboration, op.cit., 	p.58. 
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The Co-operation of the States  
Let us now turn to our main formulation of the internal 
point of view and its bearing upon actual relations between states. 
I have maintained that this formulation is compatible with the exist-
ence of a diplomatic society. The state which adopts this point of 
view is egocentric but it does not necessarily exclude the possibili-
ty of diplomatic arrangements with'other societies whereby rules are 
articulated for the regulation of their relations. It is necessary 
however that the state takes the view that it will not tolerate the 
existence of those rules which are detrimental to its own interests. 
What this means then is that the state will take upon itself certain 
obligations through creating rules which establish an order in the 
state-system. The state can co-operate with others for the articu-
lation of rules which enable it to pursue its interests within a 
stable environment. It is not inconceivable that one state may make 
concessions to the interests of others in order to arrive at a 
condition of international stability. 	Obligations will be created 
through diplomatic procedures. There is no incompatibility between 
this version of the internal point of view and the establishment of 
international obligations through the free consent of separate states. 
In this way a number of states, each possessing an internal point of 
view, can co-exist within a diplomatic society. 1 
1. 	It should be recalled that the internal point of view under 
discussion is not deliberately hostile to the interests of 
other societies, and that some level of co-operation is possible 
between them as a result. Arnold Wolfers used the term 'milieu 
goal' to refer to the fact that separate states 'find themselves 
sharing common interests' such as improving their environment 
'by making it more peaceful or more conducive to social or 
economic progress'. Discord and Collaboration, op.cit., pp.74- 
77. The formulation of the internal point of view under 
discussion is clearly capable of promoting these 'milieu' 
goals. 
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Nevetheless the level of international cc-operation is 
limited by the concept of obligation contained within the internal 
point of view. Individuals simply co-operate with each other in 
order to improve upon the condition in which they find themselves 
in the state of nature. There is no need and no obligation to co- 
operate with all men - simply with a sufficient number to facilitate 
the attainment of individual ends. 	Similarly there is no obligation 
for one state to co-operate with another. Co-operation will only take 
place to the extent that it satisfies a calculation. Moreover the 
obligations which a state may incur through co-operation with others, 
say by the establishment of rules, can never bind the state against 
its will. Although the state may accept certain obligations it will 
deny any challenge to its right to decide whether or not to recognise 
or honour them. In this way any act or scheme of co-operation is 
necessarily limited by another right crucial to the state as an 
independent entity - the right to decide for itself. 
There are however two ways whereby states, each adopting an 
internal point of view, can co-operate without fundamentally infring-
ing the system of obligation which binds citizen and sovereign together 
into a separate and exclusive community. In the first place one state 
may co-operate with others in order to directly derive some advantage 
for itself. An act of co-operation will therefore be judged in terms 
of its usefulness to the separate state and there will be an unwill-
ingness to continue co-operation should it become unfruitful to do so. 
To maintain co-operation or to continue obedience of international 
law when this is no longer profitable is contrary to the idea of a 
political association which seeks to be independent and self-contained. 
Because of this the burden of proof always rests with the argument 
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for international co-operation. The state has to be convinced that 
co-operation will prove to its advantage and therefore recognises 
no need to co-operate without this assurance. 
On the face of it any successful attempt at international 
co-operation within a diplomatic society would have to satisfy the 
interests of all not only at the time of its establishment but 
throughout its existence. There is however a second reason why a 
state may co-operate with others, a reason which facilitates co-
operation in a diplomatic society. It may co-operate with another 
in order to preserve some 'good faith' so that an immediate and identi-
fiable disadvantage may later be balanced by some, presently unspeci-
fiable, advantage. In this context the preservation of a particular 
milieu, one with good faith, is essential for the attainment of like-
ly future objectives. Here too some calculation has been made and 
the conclusion has been reached that co-operation will later produce 
particular advantages. However, it is not necessary within a diplo-
matic society that each state should fully maximise its interests 
there and then before it will engage in any acts of co-operation. 
It is important-to add at this stage that the second of the 
arguments for co-operation does not stem from a moral point of view 
(from the type which underlies the external point of view). The state 
'has not yet learned to take the role of the other', but judges its 
actions, even where these are to the advantage of another, in terms 
of the eventual gains it will derive from co-operation. Although one 
state may co-operate with another (perhaps to soften the blow of some 
foreign policy action), it does so only under the expectation of some 
future benefit. It would be contrary to the internal point of view 
to acknowledge an unconditional obligation to assist another, just 
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as it would be contrary to its directives to gran:-. that the pacifist 
had a right, as opposed to a privilege or liberty, to behave as he 
did. Co-operation takes place within the contract•ial framework. 
Individuals co-operate to derive advantages which would not fall to 
them in the state of nature. Similarly states co-operate to derive 
particular advantages, but, unlike the co-operation of individuals, 
theirs is merely ad hoc and ancillary, the main advantages having been 
derived from the social contract which establishes the state. For 
a community to step outside this framework,and engage in co-operation 
purely for the sake of assisting another society, would be to adopt 
an external point of view. And this in turn would require that it 
have adopted the view that there is at least in principle a morality 
which embraces the whole of mankind. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Internal and External Points of View 
of Obligation in the Theory of  
International Relations. 
PART TWO 
'The most decisive change in political 
thinking ... which came some time between 
the days of Aristotle and Cicero, and pro-
claimed the fundamental equality of men.' 
(A.J. Carlyle) 
According to the internal point of view world society is to be 
understood as a diplomatic society or state-system. The fundamental 
unit in world society is the state, and the emphasis upon the rights 
of the state is a reflection of the view that the state is regarded 
as the highest political association. 	Obligations to outsiders and 
respect for the international ideals of the individual are respected 
only at the state's discretion. The state then is the fundamental 
focus of obligation and source of action. 
With the external point of view it is quite different. It 
understands world society as an international society, a society con-
stituted by individuals bound together in one system of moral rights 
and obligations. It holds this underlying unity is more fundamental 
than the division of mankind into separate sovereign states, or at an 
earlier stage of history, more fundamental than the division into 
Greek city states, or even earlier, more fundamental than the division 
of men into separate tribal groups. Obligations at the international 
level take priority over the obligations of membership. According 
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to the external point of view, progress takes place when the under-
lying moral unity of mankind breaks through the allegedly arbitrary 
distinctions which underpin social differences or political separate-
ness. For Saint-Simon 
'The most salient fact observable in history 
is the continual extension of the principle 
of assocation, in the series of family, city, 
nation, supernatural Chtrch. The next term 
must be a still vaster association compre-
hending the whole race.' 1 
In this way one can classify historical periods according to the degree 
to which they approach or recede from the realisation of the allegedly 
more fundamental moral unity of the human race. 
For a theorist of the external point of view the state is not 
the fundamental unit in world society. As a matter of observable 
fact it may be the fundamental source of obligation and the main 
initiator of action, but at a moral and philosophical level the more 
profound fact is the capacity of men (whether realised or not) to take 
part in more extensive schemes of co-operation and unification. The 
objective then is a condition where the obligations of membership in 
separate states are amended or superseded entirely by international 
co-operation and institutions which express the moral unity of mankind. 
The external point of view will be most perfectly expressed when. new 
associations corresponding to more fundamental obligations become the 
major units in an international society. 
The external point of view too is capable of a variety of 
formulations. While the main differences between formulations of the 
internal point of view are concerned with the degree to which inter-
national co-operation is possible and the international ideals of the 
1. 	Quoted by J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, New York 1932, 
p.287. 
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individual respected, the main formulations of the external point 
of view are concerned with the extent to which lesser associations 
such as the state are held to be capable of incorporation within a 
more embracing international society. To explain this further let 
us consider the following remarks. 	According to Baron d'Holbach: 
'True morality should be the same for all 
the inhabitants of the globe. The savage 
man and the civilised; the white man, the 
red man, the black man; Indian and European, 
Chinaman and Frenchman, Negro and Lapp have 
the same nature. The differences between 
them are only modifications of the common 
nature produced by climate, government, 
education, opinions, and the various causes 
which operate on them. Men differ only in 
the ideas they form of happiness and the ,1 means which they have imagined to obtain it. 
But the view that social differences are wholly arbitrary, that they 
can be adjusted through changing the nature of the environment which 
operates on man, lends force to the idea that previous social insti-
tutions and practices should be superseded entirely. According to 
this view there is no reason why societies should maintain their 
traditions and distinctiveness while taking their place in a more in-
elusive form of human association. 2 This is not however the articu-
lation of the external point of view that will be discussed in this 
section. 	Of the many which could be selected I shall focus particu- 
larly on that one which aims at the inclusion of the state within 
some broader international community constituted on moral principles: 
1. ibid., pp.166-167. 
2. "D'Alembert said that it would be well if history could be 
destroyed." ibid., p.171. Of the Enlightenment one recent author 
has said: 'Given the view of a common, intuitable human nature, 
Enlightenment politics can give no satisfactory account for the 
plurality of states. How can it be that, given this universality 
of human nature, man has divided himself into all these separated 
polities? The basic answer is 'irrationalism' - loyalty to dynasties, 
outmoded religions, foolish customs. In the final end of history, 
when man realises his universality, there will be a universal 
state.' 	G.D. O'Brien, Hegel on Reason and History, Chicago 1975, 
p.113. 
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The fundamental aspect here is the focus upon particular 
international obligations which tie the individual to an internation-
al community. The individual may have a series of loyalties includ-
ing his loyalties to the family and the state, but he is at the same 
time a member of an international society and his state is merely one 
of the associations included within it. The state is not permitted 
to conduct itself in ways which violate international morality, or to 
demand of. the individual that he perform acts which contravene the 
obligations of his membership in a universal society. Let us now 
consider the ways in which this concept of international obligation 
leads to a particular account of the rights of the state, the morality 
of private persons and statesmen, and the theory of international 
co-operation. 
The Ri hts of the State 
The external point of view is so-called because it is concern-
ed with the obligations which link the members of different communities 
together. It is not the perspective of any single community and it 
does not look at external relations from the vantage point of any 
community which is concerned simply with its own interests. To adopt 
the external point of view is to adopt a position of impartiality 
which attempts to take the welfare of all men into account irrespect-
ive of the societies to which they belong. As such, a defender of 
the external point of view is necessarily incapable of total identif i-
cation with his community. In order to pass an unfavourable judgment 
upon his community in its relations with others, a man must to some 
extent stand outside his community. The consideration of the obli-
gations which bind different communities together requires then person-
alities which are not totally identified with a separate community. 
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For this reason it is not surprising that most of the 
earliest writings which adopt an external point of view should belong 
to the Christian tradition. Earliest formulations were. concerned 
principally with the justice of war and especially with placing con-
straints of a moral nature upon the right of the state to initiate 
and conduct war. Kowever the ideas involved in these arguments were 
extended in the writings of Vitoria and Suarez in order to provide a 
more comprehensive account of an international society than had 
existed previously. Vitoria discusses a law for the whole world in 
the following terms: 
'International law has not only the force of 
a pact and agreement among men, but also the 
force of a law; for the world as a whole, 
being in a way one single state, has the 
power to create laws that are just and fitting 
for all persons, as are the rules of inter-
national law. Consequently, it is clear that 
they who violate international rules, whether 
in peace or in war, commit a mortal sin; 
moreover, in the gravest of matters such as 
the inviolability of ambassadors, it is not 
permissible for one country to refuse to be 
bound by international law, the latter having 
been established by the whole world.' 1 
It is clear from this remark that there is no sovereignty orthe state 
as understood within the terms of an internal point of view. The state 
can indeed be bound by the consent of the whole world, the ius gentium, 
and owe a moral responsibility to the rest of the world. These ideas 
find no greater expression than in Vitoria's attempt to extend the 
principles of Christendom to the newly discovered American Indians. 
Vitoria denied the distinction between one standard of treatment among 
the Christians and another standard for relations between Christendom, 
in particular the Spanish conquerors, and the American Indians. In 
1. De Potestate Civile in J.B. Scott, The Spanish Origins of Inter-
national Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations, 
Oxford 1934, Appendic C, p. xc. 
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this way Vitoria contended that the principles of Christian morality 
should apply to relations with non-believers. 1 And this I understand 
to be an extension of moral community made possible by the adoption 
of an external point of view. 
For Vitoria the whole world is a moral unity with a common 
good which may override the particular good of any one state. This 
is given clear expression in his remarks on the reasonable use of 
force: 
'Since one nation is a part of the whole 
world, and since the Christian province 
is a part of the whole Christian state, 
if any war should be advantageous to one 
province or nation but injurious to the 
world, or to Christendom ... for this 
very reason, that war is unjust.' 2 
Vitoria, then, regards communities as obliged to consider the welfare 
of each other and to avoid courses of action which are harmful to each 
other's welfare. Because of this obligation, the state can have no 
sovereign rights to act against the welfare of others - rights which 
are entrenched in the internal point of view by contrast. However, 
the argument for the supremacy of an international society is not 
complemented by an argument for international institutions to preserve 
the common good of the whole world and to balance that good with the 
ends of particular communities. Surarez puts forward the following 
account: 
'just as within the state some lawful power 
to punish crimes is necessary to the preser- 
vation of domestic peace; so, in the world as 
a whole, there must exist, in order that the 
1. De Indiis, in Scott, ibid. 	See also B. Hamilton, Political 
Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain, Oxford 1963, ch.6. 
2. De Potestate CiviZe, op.cit., p. lxxxii. 
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various states may dwell in accord, some 
power for the punishment of injuries 
inflicted by one state upon another; and 
this power is not to be found in any 
superior, for we assume that these states 
have no commonly acknowledged superior; 
therefore, the power in question must 
reside in the sovereign power of the 
injured state, to whom, by reason of that 
injury the opposing prince is made subject; 
and consequently war of the kind in question 
has been instituted in place of a tribunal 
administering just punishment.' 1 
Suarez maintains that the movement towards international institutions 
is 'hardly possible ',2 but at the same time he recognises that the 
existence of the condition where 'the same party in one and the same 
case is both plaintiff and judge' contains the danger that the avenger 
may 'exceed the bounds of justice'. 3 Nevertheless, it can be said 
that there is in the writings of. Vitoria and Suarez the philosophical 
basis for arguing that states sho_ld submit to a higher authority if 
favourable conditions present themselves. 4 In this way the imperfections 
of a world where the external point of view was administered by states 
would be avoided, and its moral unity would become more complete. 
According to the external point of view the rights of the 
state, or of any separate community, have to be in conformity with a 
higher moral law. This view of politics is quite clearly expressed in 
Kant's writing: 
'The problem of the establishment of a perfect 
civil constitution is dependent on the problem 
of the regulation of the external relations 
between states conformably to law; and without 
the solution of this problem it cannot be solved. ,5 
1. On Charity, Selections from Three Works, (ed. J.B.Scott), 
Oxford 1944, p.818. 
2. ibid., p.376. 	3. 	ibid., p.819. 
4. See Midgley, op.cit., pp. 92-93. 
5. Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitical Point of View, 
in M.G.Forsyth, H.M.A. Keens -Soper and P. Savigear, The Theory 
of International Relations, London, 1970, p.183. 
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The universal law is supreme standing as it does above all political 
relations and providing the standards whereby these are judged. And 
the fact that men have moral entitlements, which no association can 
frustrate either in its internal organisation or external relations, 
becomes the judge of the content of any rights a separate political 
community might claim. 
The Morality of the Private Person and the Sovereign 
The challenge to the rights of the state is part of a larger 
concern with denying the absolute and inviolable autonomy of the state. 
And the denial of the absolute autonomy of any separate political 
community is equivalent to the assertion of a wider moral community 
which embraces all states. The members of a separate state do not 
have obligations to each other only. They have obligations to the 
whole of mankind. And the trustee of the separate community also has 
obligations to other communities and cannot claim that there is one 
morality for relations between insiders and another for relations be-
tween insiders and outsiders: 
'Now what Plato and those expounders of the law 
say of private citizens we feel justified in 
applying to sovereigns and nations, since the 
rule which governs a private citizen in his 
own state ought to govern a public citizen, 
that is to say a sovereign or sovereign people, 
in this public and universal state formed by 
the world.' 1 
This necessarily places particular obligations upon the sovereign 
to attempt to establish an enlarged moral community at the inter- 
national level. As the external point of view denied that states have 
the right to be constituted as separate entities with absolute rights 
against each other, it follows that the sovereign should be especially 
concerned with his role as the cultivator of an enlarged moral community. 
1. A.Gentili, Three Books on the Law of War, Oxford 1933, p.68. 
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This 'double function' is concerned with just relations within as 
well as between states. 1 
Certainly the external point of view believes that the 
internal point of view is mistaken in thinking that the most important 
moral problems arise within rather than between states, and that inter-
national relations are to be regarded as creating problems only of a 
technical or pragmatic order. On the contrary the former asserts that 
all politics are of moral importance, as a violation of right anywhere 
in the world cannot be'an isolated affair but plays its part in making 
a civil society for the whole of mankind more or less possible. The 
statesman is not at liberty to concentrate exclusively on his role of 
promoting the interests of his community while taking account of the 
international milieu only insofar as it directly or indirectly affects 
these interests. He is not at liberty in other words to apply one 
standard of morality within the state while applying another in 
relations between states. Similarly, the individual, although a 
member of a particular community owing special obligations to it, has 
international obligations which grant him the reasonable right of dis-
obeying the state when in conducting its external relations it asserts 
itself as an independent or autonomous unit without responsibilities 
to an international society. This challenge to the moral autonomy of 
the state depends upon the denial of one standard of morality for 
'domestic politics' while another standard is said to apply to 
international relations. 
1. 	This concept is employed by M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell 
and I.A. Vlasci, Law and Public Order in Space, Yale, 1963, 
p.97. 
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The Co-operation of States 
Let us now consider the relationship between the theory of 
international co-operation and the external point ui view. States 
are denied the right to separate themselves from the rest of mankind 
or to consider that they have inherent, unchanging and inviolable 
rights against each other. The focus is upon the wider international 
community and there is a concern to avoid the individualistic view of 
the rights of the state, a view which is most manifest in an internal 
point of view resting upon an ascending theory of government. Now 
it is more difficult to find systematic versions of the external point 
of view than versions of the internal point of view, a point noted by 
Ginsberg when he writes of: 
'a lag in applying to the relations between 
states many of the criticisms which, in 
the course of the nineteenth century, were 
effectively directed against individualism 
in its bearing upon the internal economy of 
states.' 1 
The individualism inherent in the internal point of view makes it 
clear that states are not obliged to seek an enlarged moral and legal 
community even though circumstances would make such enlargements 
possible. The rights of the state preclude any obligation to estab-
lish a legal system for the whole of mankind. However, as the extern-
al point of view denied the validity of such rights it follows that 
it is prepared to give a different account of co-operation, one which 
rests not on any calculation upon its effects upon state interests, 
but based upon fundamental moral obligations. 
Kant and sometimes Fichte put forward the idea that a state 
1. 	M. Ginsberg, "The Persistence of Individualism in the Theory 
of International Relations" in R. Fletcher, The Science of 
Society and the Unity of Mankind, London 1974, p.167. 
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which did not allow for any movement towards an international legal 
system would be intolerable. Fichte in direct opposition to the 
individualistic theories I shall consider later maintained: 
'A small state of two or three persons, 
therefore, would be in contradiction with 
the concept of right. There is not perfect 
security - and perfect security that concept 
demands - possible in it. Nor is any such 
security possible in any absolutely limited 
state. A commonwealth which is to afford 
perfect security must embrace the whole globe, 
or at least, in order to be conformable to 
the concept of rights, must contain the 
possibility of uniting the whole of mankind. ,1  
According to this view, the establishment of a limited political 
system founded on the idea of rights can only be the beginning of a 
processwhichwould culminate ideally in a moral and legal system which 
embraced the whole of mankind. It would appear then that the best 
state was one in which members' human rights were respected. A state 
constituted on the principle of defending rights would be better pre-
pared to be included within an international society. This kind of 
state is not established on the basis of improving the interests of 
members alone. It is established on the basis of seeking to ground 
the relations among men on principles of morality. 	Its limitation 
to a particular territorial area is a contingent element in its char-
acter, and not a natural and necessary part as in the theory of the 
state founded upon the internal point of view. When circumstances 
alter and it becomes possible to extend these principles over greater 
areas the state can be included within a wider assocation which pre-
serves the rights of a greater number of men. While the internal 
point of view regards the territorial state as a fundamental right 
1. J. Fichte, The Science of Rights (translated by A.E. Kroeger), 
Philadelphia 1869, p.215. Compare Pufendorf, below pp.129-130. 
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belonging to those who wish to pursue their interests together, the 
external point of view regards it as only a temporary association 
existing as it does only because it is impossible to secure the pro-
tection of rights over a greater area. Should circumstances alter 
then the state would be obliged to apply the principles of justice 
in a more inclusive manner. 
The external point of view rests upon a moral philosophy which 
points to the need to protect the rights of men. It is argued that 
states should co-operate, or attempt to make co-operation with out-
siders possible, so that the protection of these rights will be 
secured at the international level. Co-operation, or the attempt to 
bring it about, is an obligation since no man can reasonably place 
his rights at the disposal of others or reasonably expect to override 
the rights of other men. International co-operation is desiraDle then 
because it is fair that equals should have their rights respected by 
each other. 
According to this perspective, international co-operation 
ought not to be subject to a calculation whereby more or less egotisti-
cal states decide how to satisfy their interests. The burden of proof 
does not rest with arguments for co-operation. On the contrary there 
is an obligation to co-operate or to seek to fashion the conditions 
which are favourable to co-operation, and the burden of proof rests 
with the state which refuses to make an effort in either direction. 
This is particularly the case where states are causally connected, 
where their separate actions impinge on each other's interests, as 
there is a particular obligation to seek to conduct their interdepend-
ence on right principles. It is illegitimate then for the state to 
wish to place the advancement of its own interests before its obligations 
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to the rest of mankind. There is no justification for concluding 
the establishment of civil society at the domestic level while inter-
national relations are left ungoverned by law. Civil society ought 
to be entered by individuals and states alike, indeed all human 
associations, since the regulation of human relations by the moral 
law is the supreme obligation. What is required, according to this 
argument, is the recognition of the obligations which bind men as 
men, or the members of separate communities together, and which re-
quire the transition from a diplomatic to an international society. 
The external point of view maintains that we ought to begin 
with obligations to humanity, with what each man owes to every other, 
and proceed to work down, as Gierke put it, to the kind of political 
association which would be compatible with an international society 
while limited to only one section of mankind. 1 Filmer is of interest 
to us here because he points to the fact that the establishment and 
management of a separate political society ought to be of concern to 
the whole world, if we hold the prior commitment that all men are moral 
equals. 2 And Kant too thought the obligation of establishing a civil 
society among the whole of mankind placed limitations upon man's free-
dom to establish a local or territorial political association. 3 
These ideas are a challenge to one of the fundamental ideas of the 
internal point of view, namely that the state has a right to its 
1. Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500-1800, 
Cambridge 1934. Gierke was concerned with tracing the historical 
evolution of an individualistic natural law which placed the state 
at the centre of social life and considered it as a mechanism 
for the promotion of individual objectives. 
2. See above, pp. 17-18. 
3. See below, ch. 8, especially pp.205-209. 
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sovereignty, or that the only legitimate state is one that has been 
created by the consent of its citizens. For the opposing point of 
view the legitimacy cf the state does not depend upon some antecedent 
decision whereby individuals transfer their power to the sovereign. 
The external point of view may admit that the legitimacy of a govern-
ment is dependent upon the prior or continuing consent of citizens, 
as it may be linked to a democratic political philosophy. 	But it 
must insist that the legitimacy of the state as a separate political 
association depends upbn its coherence with the emergence of an inter-
national society. It must conduct itself then according to criteria 
which will not jeopardise the possibility of its inclusion within a 
larger moral community. And here it differs fundamentally from the 
internal point of view. That perspective allowed the separate state 
to act in ways harmful to the interests of outsiders; indeed, in 
situations where the very independence of the state was threatened it 
would be its duty to preserve itself albeit at the sacrifice of the 
interests of others. While the internal point of view allows courses 
of action which are detrimental to the interests of outsiders, the 
external point of view requires courses of action which will eventually 
extend the boundaries of moral community so that they eventually in-
clude the whole of mankind. While the former permits only diplomatic 
society between communities, the latter requires the emergence of 
international society. These points of view therefore conceptualise 
quite different ways of experiencing moral obligations in a world of 
separate societies and states. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Idea of Progress 
in the  
Internal and External Points of View 
I 
In an Important essay on the relative immaturity of the theory 
of international relations, Martin Wight wrote: 
'If St. Thomas More or Henry IV, let us say, 
were to return to England and France in 1960, 
it is not beyond plausibility that they would 
admit that their countries had moved domesti-
cally towards goals and along paths which 
they could approve. But if they contemplated 
the international scene, it is more likely that 
they would be struck by resemblances to what 
they remembered ... International politics is 
the realm of recurrence and repetition, it is 
the field in which political action is most 
regularly necessitous.' 1 
And of course the discontinuity between domestic and international 
politics is reflected in the different degrees of development of their 
respective political theories. Modern thought recognises that 'inter-
national politics differ from domestic politics in being less suscept-
ible of a progressivist interpretation'. 2 Nevertheless there are 
differences within the theory of international relations on the idea 
of progress, and it is possible to focus primarily upon two contrast- 
ing approaches which deserve attention in this thesis. In this section 
I shall be concerned with discussing these two ideas of progress as 
inherent characteristics of the internal and external points of view. 
As the internal point of view is a defence of the separate 
state it is natural that it should be concerned with progress within 
1. 	Wight, op.cit., p.26. 	2. ibid. 
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the state. Insofar as the internal point of view has a concept of 
progress it is, as we have seen, of very limited horizons. Progress 
at the international level can be no more than the move towards the 
establishment of an international order which will be most advantageous 
to the welfare of the separate, sovereign state. 1 It is incompatible 
with the internal point of view that its theorists should be drawn 
towards enlarging its political theory by exploring another type of 
international order, one which expresses and institutionalises import-
ant obligations to humanity. Progress might he understood as the 
improvement of international order so that the separate state may more 
readily achieve its ambitions; progress is not understood in terms 
of the movement of the state-system towards an enlarged moral community 
or international society. 
Now it is arguable that the absence of a developed tradition of 
international relations theory is explicable in terms of the virtually 
unchallenged supremacy of the internal point of view. Conversely poli-
tical thought's concentration upon the sovereign state (the fact that 
it has 'not been attracted by the possibility of maximising the field 
. of political theory through establishing a world state') 2  is explic-
able given its existence within a culture which is marked by acceptance 
of the internal point of view. Those political theories which impli-
citly or explicitly assert the priority of the separate, sovereign 
state simply recreate at the level of philosophy ideas normally taken 
1. 	Since there are as many internal points of view as there are 
separate states the possibility of agreement on the best type 
of international order is rather remote - and indeed the fact 
that the internal point of view is compatible with a wide range 
of political ideologies further complicates matters. 
2, 	ibid., p.32. 
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for granted by ordinary citizens and deeply embedded in the tradition 
of Western statecraft. 
To clarify this let it be said that the holder of the internal 
or external viewpoints does not simply have a view of a world which 
is independent of him. A man may have a particular view of nature or 
some aspect of it, but whatever his viewpoint should be the object 
always remains independent of it. His viewpoint may change but the 
things he views do not. The internal and external points of view do 
not stand to some independent reality in this way. They refer not 
simply to the perspectives of an observer but to his 'social and cul-
tural situation'. 1 Accordingly, to adopt the internal point of view 
is not to adopt a particular perspective of some independent object. 
And in changing from the internal to the external point of view one 
is not giving a different account of the same independent object. 2 
One is rejecting or criticising the way in which one's culture struct-
ures the social world and embodies its perspective in particular insti-
tutions. Therefore to reject the internal point of view is to reject 
the fact that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is funda-
mental to the way in which the social world is to be structured, and 
it is also to reject the way in which this distinction is embodied in 
the exclusive nature of the separate state. The rejection of the 
internal point of view also entails criticism of those political 
theories which presuppose the validity of this form of structuring 
the social world. To reject the internal point of view would also be 
to reject predominantly state-centred political philosophy which is too 
1. This phrase and the ideas iulediately preceding it are consider-
ed in J.P. Plamenatz's Earl Marx's Philosoithy ofMan, 
Oxford 1975, p. 74. 
2. One could say that the type of viewpoint I am discussing pro-
duces the world that it knows, a Hegelian idiom discussed by 
Plamentaz, ibid., p.78. 
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dependent on underlying cultural assumptions. It 	arguable then 
that it is the impact of the internal point of view that accounts for 
the absence of a developed tradition of international relations theory. 
It has produced instead in the predominant ideas of Western political 
thought an argument for the separate and exclusive political association. 
The dominance of the internal point of view has prevented the 
development of a yardstick by which•to measure progress at the inter-
national level. The lack of a concern with the articulation of a pro-
gressivist view of international politics depends not so much upon the 
view that it is empirically impossible to reach an enlarged moral com-
munity as upon the view that it is more desirable that men attempt to 
cultivate morality and humanity within the separate community. If it 
were merely supposed empirical impossibility which explained the failure 
to reason about international relations and associations then the move 
towards an enlarged moral community would appear only unlikely and not 
undesirable. While a large number of modern writers are concerned with 
the conditions which have to be satisfied before an international com-
munity can emerge, a great number of writers have been content to say 
that the nature of diplomatic society was not conducive to the enactment 
of moral principles. But the lack of any consideration about the condi-
tions to be staisfied before the state-system as we know it might be 
superseded reflects more than a pessimism about the possibility of pro-
gress in international relations. The absence of writings with this 
objective, at least until comparatively recently, reflects in large 
part a satisfaction with the sovereign state and the formulation of the 
internal point of view which underlies it. 
According to the internal point of view, the state-system is a 
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'climax' rather than a 'dominant'. 1 The state is not merely the 
dominant association which men have so far formed as they have grad-
ually enlarged their 0.ommunities in the course of their history; it 
is the climax of their powers of associating. 	There is as a conse- 
quence no need to consider ways in which the state might be included 
within a larger association, just as the family and other modes of 
association have been accommodated and integrated within it. The state 
stands at the end of a chain of associations and is not to be superseded 
by any larger political association. 
The fact the state-system is a climax is reflected in the moral-
ity of roles within the sovereign state. As we shall see in our dis-
cussion of Pufendorf and Vattel, representative thinkers of the internal 
point of view, the individual is obliged to consider the common gocd 
of his state first and foremost while the sovereign is under a binding 
obligation to act as trustee for the welfare of his community. What 
is more the morality of roles as understood by these theorists is 
frozen. 	There is nothing to suggest that these roles may be amended 
in order to move beyond the state-system to an international society 
with its own structure of obligations and rules. The description of 
obligation in these terms provides a seal to the separate state. It 
not only indicates that it is a climax; it prevents it from being any-
thing otherthan a climax, which in turn removes the possibility of 
thinking philosophically about progress at the international level. 
The internal point of view provides an account of roles and morality 
which freezes the separate state and makes the discussion of progress 
possible only in internal terms. 
1. These concepts are used by L. Mumford, The Transformation of 
Man, London 1957, p.14. 
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II 
According to tLe external point of view the existence of obli-
gations to humanity 1:f.!quires that progress be identified not only as 
improvement within states but as progress in the relations between 
them. Progress within the state is desirable, indeed, but is simply 
one stage which ought to be accompanied by the attempt to expand the 
area of moral community. The external point of view defines progress 
in terms of the extended application of principles of morality. The 
attempt to perfect 'humanity' within the state is regarded as desirable 
in itself, but it is also regarded as desirable since a state consti-
tuted by such moral principles will be more able to take its place 
within a civil society for the whole of mankind. And this can only 
be accomplished when the state recognises a particular set of rights 
- the right of the individual to have an 'international personality', 
the right of the citizen to disobey the state should it infringe parti-
cular international obligations, and finally by defining and increas-
ing the area of rights attached to outsiders. A state with this 
character is capable of considering progress as the continual enlarge-
ment of international community, a progress which requires an increas-
ingly morally and politically unified humanity. 
Accordingly, the state-system is a 'dominant' rather than a 
'climax', and its supercession requires a reconsideration of the obli-
gations which bind a man to his separate political association while 
separating him from the rest of mankind. This point of view clearly 
denies that the state-system cannot be transformed. The adoption of 
this latter idea would, so it would be argued, constitute a denial of 
human freedom, especially the freedom of men to order their affairs 
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in accordance with rational principles which enable them to rise 
above the particular interest and sentiments which tie men to their 
separate political co,o.munities. The external pointy of•view has to 
acknowledge however that the state-system is a 'dominant' although 
it may not be a 'climax'. 	Accordingly, it has to consider not only 
alternative concepts of obligation but the manner in which these con-
cepts are to be brought to bear upon the particular situations in 
which states find themselves. It has to recognise, in other words, 
that the agents of change or the initiators of an enlarged community 
are the governments of those associations which, presently constituted, 
appear to make this change impossible or unlikely. It is important 
that the adherent to the external point of view should not only speci-
fy what would count as structural improvement in the organisation of 
world society. He is obliged too to relate his principles to the 
more particular situations in which states find themselves in order 
to indicate in some detail what would count as a progressive manage- 
ment of the state-system. It is important to relate the external point 
of view to the actual relations between states, it being recognised 
that any enlarged community at the international level must develop 
gradually through the activities of states themselves, through the 
development of trust and the greater experience of adopting each 
other's perspectives. 
With this in mind it is understandable that Kant should have 
thought that the problem of 'lawful, external relationships' would be 
the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race.. 
This is undoubtedly so because the idea of a moral law which is 
1. 	Kant in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, 
Cambridge 1971, p.46. 
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universally applicable - and the concept of equality underlying it - 
develops only in the course of a considerable amount of social develop-
ment and moral sophistication. Moreover, it has in the course of 
history developed within separate societies where there have been 
major injustices and inequalities which the concept of moral equality 
has been summoned to contest. It is understandable that the application 
of the principles it involves should be restricted to relationships 
within particular societies. It requires, as Mumford puts it, an 
imaginative leap - 'a larger conception, a new territory of the mind ,1 - 
to regard the moral law as a basis for the transformation of man's 
division into separate political associations which recognise only 
residual obligations to one another. Progress consists then in the 
emergence of wider communities made possible by the recognition of a 
principle of equality and the recognition of a universal morality: 
'It opened up the possibility of progress, 
novelty, emergence, unexpected creativity. 
Evolution thus created a new kind of hier-
archy, continually shifting in place and 
power, based not on past stratifications 
but on future emergents.' 2 
The main objective becomes the gradual extension of rights and duties, 
once the property of privileged groups, not only to the whole of society 
but to the 'members of a universal society'. 3 And in time states 
are charged with gradually bringing this ideal to fruition through the 
establishment of a universal civil society with the state playing the 
role of one of man's associations, though clearly not the central and 
highest one. In a similar way the Aristotelian must have imagined 
1. Mumford, op.cit., p.95. 
2. ibid., p.112. 
3. ibid., p.156. 
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families readjusting their responsibilities and obligations in order 
to be integrated at a higher level, namely the village; and villages 
in turn reconsidering their place in the realm of human associations 
in order to be integrated in a more perfect association, the polis. 
The theorist of the external point of view adds progress at the inter-
national level, the final step in the process of associating, where 
men integrate their separate political associations in a universal 
community and so reach an association where their equality is most 
decisively expressed. 
III 
The internal and the external points of view take, so it has 
been argued, opposing positions on the meaning of progress. There is 
however despite their apparent compatibility and mutual exclusion an 
area of overlap between one formulation of the internal point of view 
and the external point of view. When it is said there is some overlap 
this refers simply to that theory of the internal point of view which 
gives an account of the modern state in contractual terms. There is 
then an overlap between this formulation of the internal point of view, 
represented particularly in the writings of Pufendorf and Vattel, and 
the external point of view. And this overlap has, I believe, one 
important implication for the theory of international relations. 
The individualistic approach to the internal point of view 
(which will be considered in much greater detail later) begins with a 
discussion of man in the state of nature, or in a pre-political condi-
tion. It is argued that the individual is capable of recognising a 
rational morality and that he can apply this to the conduct of his 
relations in the state of nature and in future political society. It 
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is also argued that men are equal - equal simply as men - and that 
the establishment of political society is impossible without consent. 
Now it is undeniable that Pufendorf and Vattel were abstracting 
a concept of man from a specific social condition. They did not begin 
with the assumption that individuals could once be found in a solitary 
condition. And presumably they would have admitted, if pressed, that 
there was a historical process leading up to or preceding the nature 
of the man they proposed to employ in their philosophical reasoning. 1  
The idea of men as equal and capable of recognising a rational morality 
is after all not the original condition of man, as far as we are aware. 
It came to be articulated and held fundamental after a considerable 
amount of social and political development, and received its first 
philosophical expression in Stoicism. 2 Pufendorf and Vattel simply 
overlooked the historical background of the ideas they proposed to use. 
These ideas became a starting point and they clearly discounted at 
least for the purpose at hand the historical setting in which these 
ideas had appeared. 
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason refers to the need to move 
from the 'conditioned to the unconditioned', that is to extract from 
anything its presuppositions, and to find the presuppositions of the 
presuppositions until one is left with a set of propositions which 
1. Pufendorf was perfectly explicit about this; see below pp.125-126. 
2. If this paragraph is correct Vico's attack on Pufendorf in the 
New Science is misdirected. Vico criticised Pufendorf for por-
traying pre-social, primitive man as a being capable of appreciat-
ing moral equality. It was wrong to suggest that 'natural 
equity in its perfect form had been understood by the gentile 
nations from their first beginnings' 	since 'it took two 
thousand years for philosophers to appear in any of them'. 
The New Science of Giambattista Vico (translated and 	• 
introduced by T.C. Bergin and N.H. Fisch), Cornell 1970, 
p.51. 
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require no further explanation. In that event the starting point 
of Pufendorf's or \Tattel's theory cannot simply be taken for granted. 
Their starting point evidently has its presuppositions - it presup-
poses that the ideas which developed into Stoicism in the course of a 
historical development are substantially correct - and we can reason-
ably be concerned with the development of these ideas in their histori-
cal and cultural context in order to pose some questions which would 
not have been considered vital in Pufendorf's time but have since be-
come so particularly through the influence of philosophies of history 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is, I shall try to 
show, an agreement between one formulation of the internal point of 
view and one formulation of the external point of view (in particular 
between the theory of Pufendorf and the theory of Kant). Where they 
differ substantially is over the question of what is to be made of 
the theme on which they substantially agree, this theme being the 
moral equality of men which was first put forward by the Stoic philo-
sophers. Pufendorf understands Stoic equality as the starting point 
of his theory and proposes to employ it in his argument for the state 
without going into its historical background and development. Kant, 
on the other hand, sees the development of the idea of moral equality 
as part of a grand historical process which will culminate in the 
organisation of mankind according to rational, moral principles. To. 
illustrate their difference and its importance for the development 
of international relations theory, let us consider the development 
of moral ideas prior to the development of Stoic philosophy. 
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IV 
The method of dealing with the opposition between the internal 
and external points of view depends upon our understanding of the 
ways in which they come into conflict with one another. By looking 
at the development of some early ethical ideas - particularly in 
Ancient Greece - we can discuss some important points which will be 
built upon in the third part of this thesis. 
Let us begin, however, by considering the fact that anthropo-
logical writings on 'primitive war' have established a general tendency 
among early societies to be antagonistic towards one another. The 
author of an early work on this subject wrote: 
'There are two codes of morals, two sets of 
morals, one for comrades inside and another 
for strangers outside, and both arise from 
the same interests. Against outsiders it is 
meritorious to kill, plunder, practise blood 
revenge, and steal women and slaves, but 
inside the group none of these things can 
be allowed because they would produce discord 
and weakness.' 1 
That is to say, group morality is exclusive since there is at that 
stage no conception of a morality which might embrace both insiders 
and outsiders alike. There is a double standard of morality embedded 
in the cultural perspective - one standard pertaining to relationships 
between members of the community while another standard (or no stand-
ard at all) applies to the relations between insiders and outsiders. 
It would be erroneous to portray all simpler societies in this light. 
Many are far from as bellicose as this suggests, others recognise 
various restraints in their relations with strangers, but a consider- 
able amount of evidence substantiates the claim that simpler societies, 
1. M.R. Davie, The Evolution of War - A Study of its Role in 
Early Societies, New Haven 1929, p.18. 
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based as they are on kinship, are exclusive and devoid of the pers-
pective which I have entitled the external point of view. 1 The 
Internal point of view based on the kinship bond is supreme and takes 
preference before or disallows any more inclusive loyalties. An 
individual is treated at this stage according to his membership or 
generic qualities. What one is, the group one belongs to - these 
determine the way in which one is treated. And this is fundamental in 
simpler societies. As Hobhouse puts it: 
'In the early stages of ethics, rights and 
duties do not attach to a human being as 
such. They attach to him as a member of 
a group ... Morality is in its origin group 
morality. This division between the community 
and the stranger cuts deep into the ethical 
consciousness.' 2 
The distinctions between groups according to their respective kinship 
bonds engulf the individual. It is his membership before all else 
which will determine how he is treated. 
Leaving aside the more exclusive type of 'primitive' internal 
point of view, but still considering societies where the kinship bond 
is primary it is interesting to recall the reforms of Cleisthenes 
Prior to his reforms the prevailing social ties were based upon kin-
ship connections and each Athenian belonged to one or other of the 
four main tribes. Cleisthenes' reforms included the replacement of 
the four ancient tribes with ten new 'tribes' (which were not related 
to common descent, however), the formation of small townships (called 
demes), and the dispersal of the various denies which formed one tribe 
so that no alliance could form 'based upon mere contiguity'. 3 Nisbet 
1. For a fuller account see H.H. Turney-High,Fimitive War: Its 
Practice and Concepts, University of South Carolina, 1971. 
2. L.T. Hobhouse, The Evolution ofHT.'orals, London 1925, p.233. 
3. Cleisthenes' reforms are discussed by R. Nisbet, The Social 
Philosophers, St. Albans 1976, pp. 38-44. 
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describes these reforms in the following words: 
'Instead of the traditional, kin-based 
pluralism of Athenian authority, there is 
now a monolithic unity that arises from a 
governmental system reaching directly down 
to the individual citizen. Instead of a 
system of law based upon immemorial tradition, 
its interpretation subject to the elders of 
kinship society and always slow and uncertain, 
we have now a system of Athenian law that is 
prescriptive, that is made, rather than merely 
interpreted out of tradition, and that is 
deemed binding upon all Athenians irrespect-
ive of kinship lineage.' 1 
Although there is a break with the kinship system here, the 
Athenian polis in common with other city-states developed its own 
internal point of view. We are familiar with this at two levels of 
Greek political life - first of all, among the city-states themselves 
and in the relations between the Greeks and barbarians. The polis, 
based though it was on the extension of community, was incapable 
itself of being included within a larger political association. 
Thucydides says of the Spartans: 
'The Spartans behave habitually towards 
non-Spartans as the Athenians behaved 
among themselves during the worst time 
of the plague.' 2 
And Thucydides' discussion of the Melian dialogue indicates the 
attraction of the principle 'might is right' to the Athenians themselves• 
Of course, the city-state thought the highest morality was exhibited 
by the good citizen performing his allotted social function - a concept 
which Plato builds into his definition of justice. Aristotle too 
regarded goodness very much in terms of civic virtue. Nevertheless 
1. ibid., p.42. 
2. Quoted by L. Strauss, The City and Man, Chicago 1964, p.188. 
3. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (translated by R. Warner), 
London 1972, pp. 400-408. 
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within the writings of Plato and Aristotle the idea of a morality 
between Greeks does become apparent. Plato has Socrates say: 
'Then when Greeks and barbarians fi.,01t, we 
shall say that they are natural enemies, 
warring against one another, and this . 
enmity is to be called war; but, when 
Greeks fight with Greeks, we shall declare 
that naturally they are friends, and that 
when anything of this kind occurs, Greece 
is sick and affected by sedition, and this i 
kind of enmity is to be called sedition.' 
Socrates maintains then that 'a difference with Greeks is to be a 
difference with kinsmen'. 2 Aristotle similarly has a view of morality 
which would specify what is to count as honourable or dishonourable 
conduct in international relations: 
'Yet it cannot, perhaps, but appear very strange, 
to a mind which is ready to reflect, that a 
statesman should be expected to lay his plans 
for ruling and dominating border states without 
any regard for their feelings. How can a thing 
which is not even lawful be proper for a states-
man or lawmaker? And how can it ever be lawful 
to rule without regard to the right or wrong 
of what you are doing?' 3 
There was then a view that Greeks simply as Greeks ought to respect 
certain standards in their relations with each other, and this was 
most evident in the view that it was wrong to subject another Greek 
to the indignity of slavery. But although there was some loyalty 
to the common stock as well as the polis, the former was never power-
ful enough to provide a basis for the complete transformation of 
Greek political life. Phillipson wrote: 
'The Greeks as Greeks cherished aspirations 
for unity, but as citizens their constant 
1. Plato, The Republic, (translated by A.D.Lindsay), London 1920,p.184. 
2. ibid., p.185. 
3. Aristotle, The Politics (ed. E. Barker), Oxford 1948, 
p.334. 
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aim was decentralisation; and the claims 
of citizenship invariably triumphed over 
those of kinship.' 1 
This dualism, such as it was, was resolved in favour (,f the particular 
and conflicting rather than the shared and potentially unifying. 
Undoubtedly, the views that the polis was the highest possible 
association and that citizenship was the most pr: . zed of possessions 
account for the Greek's inability to establish long-lasting inter-
national bodies or seriously reconsider their division into separate 
city-states. These views account for the poverty of international 
relations theory in the ancient world just as the primacy of the sover-
eign state hinders the development of this kind of theory in the 
modern world. What would appear to be necessary not only to an in-
creased sensitivity to the 'international' and to its theoretical 
discussion is the development of the idea of shared human identity. 
With the development of this idea of human nature and with the view 
that a man simply as a man has certain rights attached to him, the 
exclusiveness of group morality must fade of necessity. Albericus 
Gentili, the seventeenth century international lawyer, indicated 
that the exclusiveness. of group morality had to take account of the 
essential unity of man. Gentili quoted Philip of Macedon's belief 
that Greeks and barbarians are eternally enemies by nature. Gentili 
observed the same opposition between other peoples, the Palestinians. 
and the Jews, the Christians and the Saracens, and the Romans and 
foreign nations. He would not accept that such differences were 
natural and eternal 'for, on the contrary, we are by nature all akin': 
'The Greeks and the barbarians were trained 
1. 	C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient 
Greece and Rome, London 1911, p.37. 
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to be enemies one of the other. That 
is a different reason, and perhaps it 
is not very far from being a natural 
one, for it is the result of education, 
which is a second nature.' 1 
There was then to Centili's mind a deeper level of the understanding 
of man which discovers a shared human identity more profound than the 
cultural and social differences which exist between peoples. Gentilis 
asserted that men are to be treated not in accordance with their 
membership or group origin but as men who share a common human nature 
and deserve treatment in accordance with a common morality. A man's 
racial or cultural characteristics are regarded as less fundamental 
as this understanding of man develops. And it is this development 
which is fundamental in this thesis for the elaboration of an inter-
national relations theory which challenges the primacy of that state-
system, just as it was fundamental in the social and moral development 
of the ancient world. Let , us in concluding this short section focus 
upon its development there. 
One of the fundamental developments consisted in the fact that 
Hellenism came to be regarded as 'a thing of the spirit and not depend-
ent on the race to which a man belonged or the place he was born ' . 2 
One of the important thinkers in this transitional stage on the way to 
Stoicism was Isocrates who writes in his Panegyricus: 
'And so far has our city distanced the rest 
of the world in thought and in speech that 
her pupils have become the teachers of the 
rest of the world; and she has brought it 
about that the cause 'liellenes' suggests no 
longer a race but an intelligence, and that 
1. Gentili, op.cit., p.55. 
2. G. Murray, quoted by J.B. Scott, Law, the State and the 
International Corrffnunity, Columbia 1939, p.52. 
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the title 'Hellenes' is applied rather 
to those who share our culture than to 
those who share a common blood.' 1 
This is an important move whereby Hellenism becomes not an attribute 
of birth but an individual achievement, no longer the exclusive 
possession of a group but a set of characteristics which any man can 
develop in himself through his own efforts. There was in this develop-
ment an imaginative breakthrough which could not be contained within 
the narrow preserves of the city-state. 	Stoic thought would emphasise 
the primacy of individual and intellectual virtues over the civic 
virtues so characteristic of the morality of the separate city-states. 
The view that all men possessed reason brought men to think less of 
the exclusiveness of their city-states, more of the whole inhabited 
world (Oecumene) and of their loyalty to the whole of mankind. This 
expansion of the imagination led to the dual loyalties of Stoic thought: 
'There are for every man two laws, the laws 
of his city and the law of his world-city, 
the law of custom and the law of reason. 
Of the two the second must have the greater 
authority and must provide a norm to which 
the statutes and customs of cities should 
conform. Customs are various but reason is 
one, and behind variety of custom there ought • 
to be some unity of purpose. Stoicism tended 
to conceive of a world-wide system of law 
having endless local branches. Localities 
might differ according to circumstances without 
being unreasonable, while the reasonableness 
of the whole system tended to keep th2 
variation from becoming opposition.' 
There was then an expansion of community by the breaking down of the 
more exclusive loyalties of the city-states. Citizenship of a polis 
was no longer the highest value and possession owned exclusively by 
1. Isocrates (with an English translation by G. Norlin), vol.1, 
London 1928, p.149. 
2. G. Sabine, A history of Political Theory, London 1961, 
pp. 150-151. 
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one section of its membership. 	And of course the development of this 
was the fact that citizenship could be extended to non-Romans within 
the Empire. The old exclusiveness of citizenship gave way to the 
more inclusive and open ideas which prevailed in the Empire. 1 
V 
The process described above is one where men detach themselves, 
so to speak, from their particular societies and cultures and assert 
that as.men they have rights and obligations since they are equally 
governed by a morality which applies to mankind in its entirety. Indeed, 
what has developed is a moral perspective which makes the external 
point of view possible. Because by regarding themselves in this way 
men are capable of articulating more particular principles for the 
regulation of the relations between their communities. It is only 
through seeing oneself as a particular social, cultural or political 
being, and as a moral agent who transcends the division of men along 
these lines, that the individual can begin to think of an external 
point of view which would provide a yardstick for judging or conducting 
the relations between the sub-divisions of humanity. 
Now we shall find in the follcwing section that both Pufendorf 
and Vattel, who are my representatives of the internal point of view, 
and Kant, who is my representative of the external point of view, share 
the idea that there is a morality which governs the whole of mankind. 
There is an important respect in which each of these formulations of a 
1. 	For an account of these ideas see L.S. Mazzolani, The Idea of 
the City in Roman Thought: From Mal -Lied Community to Spiritual 
Commonwealth, London 1970. 
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point of view shares a vital philosophical idea - the idea that men are 
moral equals. However, Pufendorf or Vattel do not consider this in 
its historical setting. The idea of moral equality 15 not seen in 
terms of a long process of historical development which may be continued 
by gradually subjecting the sphere of international politics to its 
rule. Moral equality is a starting point in the theory, but it is 
detached from its historical setting and consequently it is not regarded 
as a goal which might be gradually approached at the international 
level. 	These theorists, through a variety of arguments which will be 
considered later, make a case for the separate state and overlook moral 
equality as a standard by which to regulate the relations between states. 
Kant, on the other hand, points to the idea of moral equality as a 
concept which has been uncovered in the course of man's history and 
which may be further applied throughout man's history until the whole 
of humanity regulates itself in accordance with principles whereby men 
recognise each other as equals. 	While the internal point of view 
begins with the moral equality of mankind and moves to the division 
of mankind into separate, sovereign states, the external point of view 
regards moral equality as attached to human nature but only gradually 
brought to bear upon a wider range of social and political relations 
including those at the international level. While the internal point 
of view regards progress as mainly a 'domestic' affair, the external . 
 point of view understands it in terms of the increased scope for moral 
equality in all social and political relations, including internation-
al ones. 
By taking the idea of moral equality as its starting point the 
internal point of view differs in another important respect from the 
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view of progress fouad in the theory of Kant. In coming to see them-
selves as moral equals men overcome what they take to be decisive 
differences due to social and cultural heritage. 	And in so doing 
they obtain moral freedom for they establish principles for themselves 
on account of their awareness of their common rationality. They are 
led to criticise their traditional and uncritical standards and to 
replace these with rational and universal principles. Their moral 
freedom consists in their capacity to detach themselves from their 
particular social and cultural backgrounds in order to articulate the 
moral principles which ought to be followed by a rational person. In 
drawing our attention to this phenomenon the external point of view 
in Kant argues for the enlargement of application Of moral principles 
in social and political life. To regulate international relations in 
accordance with a rational morality is to enlarge moral freedom since 
the principles of behaviour follow from critical, rational human 
nature. And the theory of progress requires the gradual extension of 
moral principle in international relations so that men capable of de-
taching themselves from their particular social or cultural or poli-
tical contexts can better express themselves as critical and rational 
beings. 
We arrive then at two theories of international relations with 
two contrasting theories of progress. The first understands progress 
first and foremost as the improvement of relations within the state, 
and only secondarily as the improvement of relations between states. 
And 'international' progress moreover is not an end in itself, but 
merely the establishment of a particular type of environment favourable 
to the separate state. The second theory understands progress in 
terms of the elaboration of principles which recognise the moral 
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equality of all men and the application of these principles to the 
entirety of social and political life. Necessarily since these 
principles are the principles of rational beings our second theory 
is particularly concerned with the enlargement of moral community, 
with the erosion of the social, cultural and historical barriers 
between peoples which stand in the way of a more inclusive moral 
community. 	According to this concept of progress these barriers 
are arbitrary or irrelevant from the moral point of view, and progress 
consists in superimposing upon them a structure of rights and obli-
gations which correspond with the common rationality of men. Progress 
is the continual enlargement of moral community, the move from 
exclusive to inclusive ways of associating. 
Traditional political theory, by being state-centred, takes 
the boundaries of community for granted. By analysing, explaining, 
prescribing for relations within an established community, political 
theory of the state-centred kind, can be accused of too narrow a focus. 
It can be accused of reflecting uncritically its cultural context's 
way of structuring the social world into insiders and outsiders. Pre-
scription and progress are understood in terms of the improvement of 
relationships within the community whose existence or value as an 
exclusive entity is taken for granted. It is for this reason that 
state-centred political theory may be regarded as attached to the 
internal point of view, that the theory of international relations 
becomes 'the theory of survival'. The external point of view in 
regarding the extension of moral community as an end for rational men 
challenges the dichotomy the internal point of view would wish to 
make within the theoretical life. Domestic political theory is not 
'the theory of the good life' while international relations theory is 
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'the theory of survival'. The external point of view wishes to 
unify the theoretical life (within the study of politics) under a 
theory of progress consisting of the enlargement of moral community 
and the enhancement of human rationality. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Philosophy  of International Relations  
I 
I propose now to begin a theoretical account of the experience 
of belonging to a humanity which is divided into separate, sovereign 
states. The objective is to employ some of the conceptual themes 
which have previously been described in order to represent a particu-
lar experience of the modern state and international relations. The 
account or understanding I have in mind parallels the traditional con-
cern of political theory with giving a theoretical representation of 
the experience of living in a state. The philosophy of international 
relations must have as one of its main objectives an account similar 
in method to the accounts of the state given by traditional political 
philosophers. 
A word has to be said first of all about the nature of the enter-
prise. It is clearly distinguishable (to begin with what it is net) 
from the enterprise of the historian or the sociologist. One author 
sees the difference between them in terms of the difference between 
interpretation and description. 
'In describing or identifying something one 
is dealing with empirical qualities, and thus 
remains pretty closE to one's subject matter, 
that is one never moves away so far from the 
object of one's description that it is no 
longer recognisable ..; In interpreting some-
thing one moves away from it, or rather from 
the way it appears on the first look to its 
ultimate constitution; and therefore one's 
analysis of it can never be useful in identify-
ing it at the phenomenal level.' 1 
1. B.C.Parekh, "On the Nature of Political Philosophy", in P.T.King 
and B.C. Parekh, Politics and Experience, Cambridge 1963, p.166. 
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Interpretation is, the author goes on to say, a method of understand-
ing the nature of a thing by uncovering 'the source of multiplicity 
in some general elements or principles and then reduc"(ing) the multi-
plicity to a fully satisfactory degree of order'. 1 	The objective 
of an interpretative account of the experience of living in.a humanity 
divided into separate states would be to reveal it as divided between 
two modes of experience previously discussed, namely between an 
internal and an external point of view. 	The objective of this chapter 
is to show that our experience of international relations is necessarily 
split between two competing viewpoints and that a fuller philosophy 
of international relations must aim at overcoming the division. 
The experience of international relations is the experience of 
living in separate states. Yet this is unsatisfactory as an explanation 
since the separate state is the product of deeper cultural forces. 
The state, in the words of Kropotkin, is one of the forms adopted by 
society in the course of its development. 2 It is one of the ways in 
which societies have constituted themselves in the modern world, one 
of the ideas about political life within a particular culture or civil-
isation which has been appropriated by a number of societies. So 
although our first impression is of a humanity divided into separate, 
sovereign states our second impression is of the common cultural or 
ethical foundations of the state system. The preparedness to live in 
separate, sovereign states is in fact the shared experience of a 
particular culture. There is a kind of unity midst the division. 
Let us explore this in a little more detail. The separate 
state institutionalises the division between insiders and outsiders, 
1. ibid., p.165. 
2. P. Kropotkin, Tice State: its Historic Role, London 1969, p.10. 
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and is therefore a reflection of a particular culture's assumptions 
about the boundaries of moral community. The individual can there-
fore consider himself in two ways; in the first place, as an insider 
who has a status refused to outsiders and the capacity to make parti-
cular claims denied to them; in the second place as an outsider 
whose claims on other communities need not be heeded since obligations 
to him are residual. The individual is aware of being the subject of 
aft internal point of view (that underlying his own political assoc-
iation) and the object of an internal point of view (that underlying 
other political associations). 	An explanation of the experience of 
living in a humanity divided into separate states must take account 
of the plurality of internal points of view. The internal point of 
view underlies every state which is not co-extensive with humanity. 
It is because each state reflects and enacts an internal point of 
view that it is possible to say that states form a kind of society. 
They form a diplomatic society where each state assumes the legiti- 
macy of a particular set of social and political principles underlying 
the others. Diplomatic society is constituted by a plurality of 
internal points of view with states accepting the legitimacy of assoc-
iations predicated upon them. Thus, states form a kind of society, 
one where there is necessarily the prospect of conflict (even of a 
large scale), but it is a kind of society nevertheless. 
It is important to consider one objection to this portrayal 
of international relations as a society. It may appear that the 
attempt to describe the state-system as a society, on account of some 
common system of beliefs underlying member states, is a misguided one 
since it purports to discuss a heterogeneous and conflict-prone context 
in a language more applicable to a context marked by consensus and 
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homogeneity. However, it does not follow that individuals or groups 
sharing common principles must necessarily be in a condition of har-
mony. There is an elementary sense in which conflict is only possible 
between groups which share some common experience. Of interest too 
is the concept of the state of nature (as understood in the writings 
of Hobbes and Spinoza), a concept which has often been employed to 
describe the main features of international relations. Conflict in 
the state of nature is made possible by the fact individuals believe 
they possess the right - to advance their interests even at the expense 
of the interests of others. And until certain arrangements are made 
whereby individuals are more responsible to each other and limit their 
rights accordingly, no social harmony is possible. But the state of 
nature is a society even if it is not a harmonious one. One author 
has written of Spinoza's state of nature that it is 'anti-civil' 
rather than 'anti-social' as even 'to fight against a man is a proof 
of a common social nature in each'. Men, it is said, 'fight in order 
thereby to establish certain social relations which appeal to them as 
better than those existing already'. 1 There is a kind of recognition 
of humanity even in war since those with whom one is in a condition of 
conflict are beings with whom one could be civilly related, at least 
in principle, but would prefer not to be, at least on existing terms. 
This is true both of the state of nature between individuals and be-. 
tween states. The 'permissive' cause of their conflict is their 
shared belief that the particular individual or group is at liberty 
to advance its particular welfare, obligations to take account of the 
interests of outsiders being merely residual. The state-system consti-
tutes a society in the sense that each state claims the liberty of 
1. R.A. Duff, Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy, 
Glasgow 1906, pp. 155-156. 
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advancing its interests and recognises this is a fundamental obli-
gation for every separate political association. Each state through 
the process of recognition legitimises the internal. point of view of 
another and so forms a peculiar type of society of states. 
The argument, as it has developed so far, maintains that inter-
national relations or that part of them known as the state-system can 
be understood as a plurality of internal points of view. There is in 
other words an ethical basis of the society of states. Arguably then 
this ethical basis requires closer analysis, for if the state-system 
ought to be changed it is perhaps through changing the ethical ideas 
which underlie it. I propose, with this in mind, to look at the ideas 
of K. Waltz on the 'permissive' cause of international conflict. Waltz's 
ideas are of interest for two reasons: in the first place, they appear 
to reject the need for a philosophical account of international relat-
ions and in the second place, they appear to deny the need to take 
account of moral philosophy in the consideration of specific issues 
which arise in the course of inter-state relations. The position in 
short appears to reflect an idea encountered previously - that inter-
national relations theory is 'the theory of survival' since inter- 
state relations consist of unique and dramatic issues which defy a 
philosophical account. In opposition to this I wish to suggest that 
there is an ethical basis underlying the state-system, that it is found 
principally in the idea-system called the internal point of view, and 
that any prescriptive theory of international relations must at some 
stage address itself to the obligations which this point of view 
requires of the individual. But let us consider first of all some of 
the main lines of argument used by Waltz. 
In 'Man, the State and War' Waltz introduces three levels of 
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analysis of the causes of war. 1 
	
It is argued that 'prescription is 
logically impossible apart from analysis' and that the three levels 
of analysis, the images, exhaust all logical possibilities to be dis-
cussed prior to beginning those questions which deal with prescrip-
tion. 2 The core of Waltz's argument is that the problem of war could 
be explained either as a product of man's evil nature, or as a result 
of the ways in which states are domestically constituted, or finally 
as'a result of the anarchy of the state-system since the external re-
lations of states are conducted outside government. For Waltz the 
last mode of explanation offers the most adequate account since it 
takes account of the 'security '3 dilemmas of states fending for them-
selves in an anarchic condition - an understanding of international 
relations as a peculiar context which is represented in dramatic form 
in Rousseau's parable of the stag and the hare.' Accordingly any pre-
scriptive theory of international relations must address itself - if 
it is to be realistic - to the third image of international conflict. 
If the problem of war is the problem of the external relations of 
states prescription must seek ways of adjusting these relations. Good 
prescription involves the discovery of restraints which will make it 
difficult for states to pursue their ends without incurring some 
hostile response from others. It involves the attempt to balance 
their external relations so that a peaceful condition may result. 
1. K. Waltz, Man, the State and War, Columbia 1965. 
2. ibid., pp. 13-14. 
3. A concept used by J.H. Herz, Political Idealism and Political 
Realism, Chicago 1964, p.14. 
4. Rousseau's parable and the lesson Waltz draws from it are used 
by Rosecrance "International Interdependence", in Goodwin and 
Linklater, op.cit., ch.l. 
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This analysis would appear to maintain that the fundamental 
problem of international relations - the problem of war - can best be 
approached through the adjustment of the external !:elations between 
states while individuals relate to their separate states just as they 
did before. The values which support the state-system do not require 
criticism since they do not appear, in Waltz's view, to belong to the 
'permissive' causes of war. In this case prescription recommends the 
adjustment of the external relations of states while the ethical basis 
of the state-system remains uncriticised and unchanged. There is no 
need to think anew our obligations to the state and to the rest of 
mankind since the rights and obligations of the individual and collect-
ivity play no fundamental role as a 'permissive' cause of war, or in 
making war possible. 
There appear to be two explanations of Waltz's tendency to over-
look the role of moral philosophy in prescriptive international relat-
ions theory. In the first place he rejects the idea that justice and 
obligation form one of the important bonds between the members of a 
society. The emphasis instead is upon the role of authority as the 
main instrument of social control, and this spills over into Waltz's 
notion of the main ingredient of international order: 
'The authority, not the categorical 
imperative, is the important factor 
so far as peace is concerned.' 1 
Closely related to this is Waltz's agreement with Kelsen that justice 
is not a rational idea: 
'The important point, however, is not that 
there is in the state a way of making and 
enforcing correct decisions but that some 
1. 	op.cit., p.190. 
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decision be made and followed. Thus 
Hans Keisen has argued that 'justice is 
an irrational ideal. However indispensable 
it may be for volition and action of men, 
it is not subject to cognition. Rczarded 
from the point of view of rational cognition, 
there are only interests and hence conflicts 
of interest'. One set of interests can be 
satisfied at the expense of another, or they 
can be compromised. But one cannot say that 
one of these ways of dealing with conflict 
is just, the other unjust.' 1 
As far as Waltz is concerned it is not the absenceof a strong sense of 
obligation to outsiders but the absence of constraint upon the sover-
eign state in the condition of international anarchy which accounts 
for the ever-present possibility of war. Consequently international 
relations theory can ignore the realm of the normative. 
It is arguable that 'war will be perpetually associated with 
the existence of separate, sovereign states'. 2 But the permissive cause 
of this does not stem alone from the anarchic context of inter-state 
relations. To maintain that it does is to ignore the fact that the 
separate state rests upon a system of obligation (perhaps tacitly) 
which involves the population of the state in common claims against 
outsiders. It is important to take account of the fact that the state 
is a limited moral community which seeks to advance its interests even 
if in so doing it will harm the interests of outsiders. The mere 
existence of separate states brings about a possible condition of con-
flict by virtue of the fact that each is concerned with the satis-
faction of its own interests first and foremost. Disputes, conflicts 
and perhaps war are inseparable from the state as a limited moral com-
munity and as an association which enacts an internal point of view. 
This was quite clearly seen by Hegel of whom one author writes: 
1. 	ibid., p.190. 	2. 	ibid., p.238. 
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'For Hegel the task of political philosophy 
is to analyse and relate together those 
forms of experience through which ethical 
and pol:1_tical life occurs. War, being one 
of the Eorms of political life, must. have 
a place in the philosophical account of 
the political. War can no more be regarded 
as accidental to the activity of the state 
than peace. War and peace are both modes 
of activity in the actual life of states 
and are to be part of the philosophical 
analysis of the state.' 1 
According to this view the possibility of war lies not merely in the 
anarchic condition of international relations but also within the 
state constituted as it is by particular assumptions about its rights 
and obligations. Therefore, in a world divided into separate states 
conflict is possible not only because of the anarchic context of inter-
state life but because states are the entities they are. 2 
Let us consider an alternative account of international relations, 
one offered by G. Modelski. 3 This writer maintains that the state-
system consists of the following five features. Firstly, it is legiti-
mate and natural that the world is divided into separate, sovereign 
states. 	Secondly, each state has the right of dominant control over 
its citizens. Thirdly, ultimately the nation-state has no responsi-
bility but to itself. Fourthly, there is a radical separation between 
the internal affairs of the state and its external relations. Fifthly, 
each state has the right of self-help. 	These five features can be 
regarded as indicating that the state-system, and the principles 
1. D.P. Verene, "Hegel's Account of War". in Z.A.Pelczynski, 
Hegel's Political Philosophy, Cambridge 1971, p.170. 
2. Rousseau clearly thought the existence of one state, based on the 
desire to advance its own interests, would in itself provoke the 
formation of other states: 'It is easy to see how the establish-
ment of one community made that of all the rest necessary, and 
how, in order to make head against united forces, the rest of 
mankind had to unite in turn.' Discourse on the Origins of 
Inequality (ed. Cole), London 1968, pp. 205-206. 
3. Principles of World Politics, New York 1972, pp.114-116. 
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underlying it, are closely related to the nature of the association 
called the state. To return to a point made earlier the theory 
and practice of the state already contain the germs of a theory and 
the fundamentals of a practice of inter-state relations. And these 
two spheres of the state's existence arc held together by a more em-
bracing concept - the internal point of view. If 'war will be per-
petbally associated with the existence of separate, sovereign states' 
this is largely the result of their being constituted by an internal 
point of view. A philosophical interpretation of international re-
lations, seeking 'the sources of multiplicity in some general elements 
or principles', will find the internal point of view suffices, draw- 
ing together as it does some of the rapports between the state and the 
conduct of inter-state relations. 
It has been argued that a philosophical analysis of the state 
would be an important part of the analysis of the state-system and it 
has been suggested that an approach to the maintenance of international 
order requires us to rethink the ways in which we relate to the separ-
ate state. The problems of international relations, so it has been 
argued, are integrally related to the way in which we conceive of the 
state and in particular of our obligations to it. It is important 
to stress that these points are not contained within Waltz's second 
image of international relations. The second image considers the 
political organisation of the state, its constitutional form, whether 
it be a democracy or a tyranny for example, and proceeds to argue that 
the incidence of war is directly connected with the nature of the 
state's organisation. The argument I have put forward above is how-
ever distinguishable from the second image of international relations, 
and indeed from the other two images also. For while Waltz considers 
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the nature of man, the organisation of the state and the context of 
interstate relations, at no stage does he consider the state as a 
particular kind of pclitical association. It is quite clear that 
Waltz's three images do not consider the state as such. Accordingly, 
Waltz's analytical framework is not logically exhaustive and its 
prescriptive value is limited. The three images, or the three philo-
sophical interpretations of international relations are incomplete 
without an interpretation which examines the rapports between the state 
as a particular type of political association and the general character-
istics of international relations. And if the argument of this thesis 
is correct, that the internal point of view provides a conceptual 
scheme which performs this task, then an approach to the problem in 
order must include a consideration of the individual's relation to the 
state, of his obligations to the state and to the rest of humanity. 
II 
It has been argued that if war is inherent in the state-system 
it is because of the nature of the state as a limited moral community. 
A number of limited moral communities, each of which is capable of harm-
ing the interests of another, necessarily come into conflict. It is 
important now to consider a view of the state and international re-
lations which would appear to be in disagreement with both this view 
and the previously discussed ideas of Waltz. T.H. Green maintained: 
'There is no such thing as an inevitable 
conflict between states. There is nothing 
in the nature of the state that, given a 
multiplicity of states, should make the gain 
of one the loss of the other.' 1 
1. 	T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 
Obligation, London 1966, p.170. 
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Now it can be argued that Green reaches his conclusion through his 
acceptance of a second image of international conflict. He maintains: 
'just so far as the perfect organisation 
of rights within each nation, which entitles 
it to be called a state, is attained, the 
occasions of conflict between nations 
disappear,' 1 
It is part of Waltz's complaint against the second image, that even 
perfectly constituted states may find themselves in conflict for their 
internal organisation, nc matter how perfect, is not a guarantee 
against international conflict. And this is necessarily true of those 
parts of Green's argument where he appears to assume that with the 
disappearance of a 'privileged class' which denies the civil rights 
of a 'suffering class' the source of war will be removed. 2 According- 
ly, it can be argued that Green is mistaken in thinking that war is 
not inherent in a world divided into sovereign states. 
However, there is in Green's writings another and more forceful 
argument which renders his claim that there is no such thing as inevit-
able conflict between states quite tenable. Green refers to the 
natural right to life and liberty, or to what he terms a 'free life' 
and he maintains 'the right is one that belongs to every man in virtue 
of his human nature (of the qualities that render him capable of any 
fellowship with any other men), and is a right as between him and any 
other men'. 3 In the course of their historical development men have 
come to regard this right as inherent in human personality itself 
rather than owed only to those who are fellow members of a particular 
tribe or society. And the claim that the right to a free life is a 
natural or human right necessarily involves a commitment to the well- 
1. ibid., p.175. 	3. ibid., p.156. 
2. ibid., p.171. 
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being of men everywhere: 
'If the claim is made on behalf of any and 
every human being, it must be a claim on 
human society as a whole, and there must 
be a possible common good of human society 
as a whole, conceived as independent of the 
special conditions of particular societies, 
to render such a claim possible.' 1 
And indeed the good state is one which recognises these rights. The 
state is however the product of previous social development, a 
development which does not cease with the formation of the state. It 
arises because: 
there must have been families of which the 
members recognised rights in each other 
(recognised in each other powers capable of 
direction by reference to a common good); 
there must further have been intercourse 
between families, or between tribes that 
have grown out of families, of which each 
in the same sense recognised rights in the 
other.' 2 
The state is then a particular association concerned with the recogni-
tion of natural rights. But since these rights are the rights of 
men rather than the rights of citizens the state cannot ignore a moral-
ity at the international level: 
'Hence there is no ground for holding that a 
state is justified in doing whatever its 
interests seem to require, irrespectively 
of effects on other men. If those effects 
are bad, as involving, either a direct 
violation of personal rights or obstruction 
to the moral development of society anywhere 
in the world, then there is no ultimate 
justification for the political action that 
gives rise to them.' 
Green also maintains that: 
'With the abatement of national jealousies 
1. ibid., pp. 157-158. 	3. 	ibid., p.173. 
2. ibid., p.139. 
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and the removal of those deeply seated 
causes of war which, as we have seen, are 
connected with the deficient organisation 
of states, the dream of an international 
courc with authority resting on tIle consent 
of independent states may come to he 
realised. Such a result may he very remote, 
but it is important to hear in mind that 
there is nothing in the intrinsic nature 
of a system of independent states incompat-
ible with it, but that on the contrary every 
advance in the organisation of mankind into 
states in the sense explained is a step 
towards it.' 1 
According to Green war is not inherent in a system of sovereign states 
or in the state as such, and this is the case since it is possible 
for the state to embody the recognition of rights which require it 
to take its place within a more inclusive moral community. 
Let us now consider Green's arguments in relation to the ideas 
put forward in the first section of this chapter. 	There it was 
argued that conflict is inherent in a system of sovereign states each 
of which is based upon an internal point of view; or, that conflict 
and diplomatic society are inseparable. The emphasis is however not 
upon the separate state as such, but on the value-system underlying 
it, on the fact the separate state has an internal point of view of 
obligation. It is however possible for the state to recognise a moral-
ity at the international level which will require it to take a differ-
ent view of its place in international relations. Separate sovereign 
states may develop an awareness of an external point of view with 
which to regulate their relations. And indeed several states may be 
able to regulate their relations by moral principles without giving 
way to higher international agencies. There are however two points to 
make with regard to this. In the first place, there is a tension 
1. 	ibid., p.179. 
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within a society which understands itself as the application of 
universal standards within a particular territorial area and which 
also holds fast to its sovereignty. As an association built upon 
universal moral standards its territorial limitation must appear in-
adequate and it ought to have as its objective its inclusion within 
a more inclusive moral community which possesses institutions which 
protect the common good of the whole world. On the other hand, a state 
which holds fast to its sovereignty and territorial integrity would 
appear to regard its exclusiveness as valuable and this will necessar-
ily prevent the full application of universal moral standards in its 
external relations. There is then in the first place the question of 
the extent to which a state can hope to preserve its sovereignty 
while aiming at the fullest application of universal moral standards 
in nolitical life. There is, on the other hand, the fact that univer-
sal moral standards have to be applied to a condition where humanity 
is divided into separate, sovereign states and it is easy to under-
estimate the difficulty of moving beyond this condition. It is evi-
dently the case that states must through their own relations come to 
accept the importance of universal standards, but until trust develops 
it is necessarily the case that they will wish to preserve their 
sovereignty. Even good states which apply the principle of right can 
only gradually move towards their own incorporation with a more inclus-
ive moral and political community. Citizens can only accept the 
incorporation of their states within such associations when they are 
confident that universal moral standards will continue to be applied. 
For these reasons any move from a diplomatic society to an internation-
al society must be a gradual and complex one whereby the internal point 
of view is replaced by an external point of view. 
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Let us now consider some of the main points in this section. 
It has been argued that international relations can be understood as 
the manifestation by separate states of an understanding of political 
life called the internal point of view. I have maintained that states 
with this view point underlying them are prone to conflict. 	But it 
has been suggested that the modern state is to some extent involved 
with another set of ideas, namely the external point of view. Indeed, 
if the problems of international relations stem in large part from the 
internal point of view rational citizens could re-examine their obli-
gations to the state and to the rest of humanity in order to arrive 
at principles for an alternative organisation of world society. And 
indeed, it is perfectly possible to imagine citizens and states grad-
ually coming to accept the principles of the external point of view, 
or co imagine some state accepting its principles while others refuse 
to acknowledge it either through perversity or on account of an alter-
native cultural perspective. And indeed it is possible to imagine 
some members of a state accepting the external point of view while 
their government rejects it or fails to enact it properly. Whatever 
the case it is arguable that it is not the state but a particular per-
spective underlying the state which is responsible for international 
conflict. And an attempt to give an account of the experience of 
living in a humanity divided into separate states must consider this 
perspective. In so doing, however, it indicates that it is possible 
for the state to adopt a different perspective, that there is nothing 
in the separate state or diplomatic society which inevitably commits 
the state to an internal point of view indefinitely. Our philosophi-
cal account notes the existence of an internal point of vied; under-
lying the state, but it also notes the possibility of an external 
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point of view developing alongside it. 
III 
Although the internal point of view underlies every state it 
would be erroneous to think it did not compete with other points of 
view, even ones which are sharply antagonistic to it. An account 
of the experience of living in a humanity divided into separate, sover-
eign states would be incomplete if it focussed merely on the internal 
point of view. For the citizen of the modern state may have loyalties 
which are in conflict with the state-system. An account of the nature 
of international relations should then consider the fact that any 
state which aims to enact an internal point of view may find opposi-
tion from insiders who wish to separate themselves from the state to 
which they belong - usually on account of an ethnic or national identi-
fication. But these allegiances are not necessarily incompatible with 
the state-system as such. 	They require for the most part no more 
than a redefinition of the units which constitute the state-system. 
Nevertheless an account of international relations must stress the 
existence of loyalties which are incompatible with the state-system as 
it is presently constituted. 	And this is true not only of states in 
the 'Third World' but of states in Western Europe too. 
The state-system and the principles underlying it do not go 
unchallenged. But the challenge is not only from national or ethnic 
groups which spill over traditional state boundaries. There is in 
addition (and this is particularly the case in Western Europe) the 
existence of loyalties higher than the state and obligations which 
point beyond it. There is at the heart of the modern state•in Europe 
a perspective which is incompatible with the idea that the obligations 
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of the internal point of view are primary while others are secondary. 
Evidently religious belief often seeks to express or build a moral 
community more extensive than the nation-state and contests the idea 
that the individual owes his obligations first and fo'remost to the 
separate, sovereign state. The tension between citizenship and 
religious affiliation has been a recurring feature of both the theory 
and practice of the separate sovereign state. The theorist of the 
separate state must attempt to contain universalist religion pointing 
as it does to obligations beyond the state. 	Recognition of the 
opposition between universalist religious belief and the primacy of 
the civic virtues is particularly evident in Rousseau's political 
theory where the tension is to be overcome through a civil religion 
'without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject'. 1 
But for another writer, Bakunin, there is an inescapable tension be-
tween obligations to the state and obligations to humanity, which can 
only be overcome through the disappearance of the state itself. 
Bakunin refers to the fact that: 
'The modern state, as we have said, has 
freed itself from the yoke of the Church 
and has consequently shaken off the yoke 
of universal or cosmopolitan morality of 
the Christian religion, but it has not yet 
become permeated with the humanitarian idea 
or ethics - which it cannot do without 
destroying itself, for in its detached 
existence and isolated concentration the 
state is much too narrow to embrace, to 
contain the interests and consequently 
the morality of, humanity as a whole.' 
Bakunin saw a tension between the social contract theory of the state, 
which has as its end 'the common interest and the public right of all 
individuals who formed this contract, with the exception of those who 
1. Rousseau, Social Contract, (ed.Cole), London 1968, p.114. 
2. The Political Philosophy of Bakunin,(ed. G.P.Maximoff), London 
1964, p.137. 
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remained outside of it', 1 and the 'idea of humanity' which has now 
grown so strong that it may destroy the state - • since the triumph 
of humanity can be re;ilised only through the destruction of states ' . 2 
There is, according to Bakunin, an inescapable tension between obli-
gations to the state and obligations to humanity. 3 Indeed, the 
tension between them has been noted by other writers. Kenneth 
Boulding writes of: 
• a serious ethical dilemma that has become 
overwhelmingly acute in the modern world -
that of reconciling the universal ethic that 
both science and high religion imply with 
the particularistic loyalties to existing 
institutions and responsibilities: 4 
This tension is of the utmost importance. No account of the experience 
of living in a humanity divided into separate states is complete 
unless it draws attention to the fact the citizen of any separate 
state has fundamental obligations to outsiders - obligations due to 
outsiders as men, as indeed the concept of humanity divided into separ-
ate states already acknowledges. It is arguable then that within the 
modern state which is based on the concept of the rights of the indivi-
dual, or the rights of man, there is a fundamental conflict. For on 
the one hand the state as a separate association has its internal 
point of view while on the other hand it subscribes to a universal 
ethic which would appear to require a considerable transformation of 
its theory and practice of external relations. It is to this tension 
1. ibid. 	 2. ibid., p.140. 
3. Bakunin's argument differs from the one put forward earlier in 
that this tension is absolutely inescapable since the state is 
necessarily limited to a portion of mankind whose interests it 
necessarily advances against the interests of outsiders. Since 
Bakunin cannot allow for the development of a different view of 
obligation on the part of citizens ft follows that the triumph 
of humanity can only he accomplished through the destruction 
of separate states. 
4. Conflict and Defence, New York 1962, pp. 330-331. 
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within the modern state, which is so crucial to the understanding of 
the experience of a humanity divided into separate, sovereign states, 
that the following section turns. 
IV 
We have previously taken note of some of the implications for 
world society of the view that morality is not merely a phenomenon 
which is to be enacted by members of the same society. A society which 
comes to realise that there are moral principles which follow from 
the idea of being human or that there are rights which are attached 
to human nature itself has undergone a profound change with immense 
implications for its political life. One of the consequences of such 
a morality is the need for a reinterpretation of the state. In reason-
ing about the state in fresh terms it will be important to inquire 
into the kinds of social and political arrangement which will most 
adequately reflect the rights and obligations which men have qua men. 
For if the concept of rights and obligations owed to man as man is 
taken seriously it is necessary to reason afresh about the types of 
relationship or arrangement between societies or states which will most 
adequately conform to these moral ideas. There is a need for a recon-
sideration of the place of the separate community in world society in 
order to maintain the wholeness of moral and political experience in 
the face of an apparent tension between the obligations men have as 
members of separate communities and the obligations they have simply 
as men. It is evidently impossible for them to maintain that their 
obligations to those with whom they identify and with whom they wish 
to live form a separable, insulated whole. Certainly men may acquire 
considerable advantages within their communities by claiming that as 
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men they are due certain moral considerations, buv it is no less true 
that they incur considerable obligations in the conduct of their 
external relations if they take their moral langua3e at all seriously. 
Indeed they will not have explored the resources of their language 
fully if they do not begin to specify their obligations to outsiders 
and indeed their rights against outsiders. Indeed it is an inadequate 
concept of man which articulates the rights of men within states while 
ignoring their rights within world society at large. I Certainly, a 
society which employs the language of the rights of men must reconsider 
the idea that the mere fact a man is a member of a different community 
is sufficient reason for treating him differently from insiders. And 
they must equally reconsider the assumption that action on behalf of 
the society's welfare may ignore or ride over the interests of out-
siders. While the rights and obligations owed among insiders can no 
longer be taken for granted (for they may be overridden by the demands 
of membership of a more inclusive moral community), so license in the 
conduct of external relations must be ended. Clearly the area of what 
can be contested morally and politically is greatly enlarged. 
Undoubtedly the claim that man qua man has rights arose in the 
development of Western political experience to cope with its own intern-
al political problems - in particular to secure for the individual 
certain guarantees against the state. And at least in the first 
1. There is an interesting twist to this remark in the writings of 
Isocrates. In calling for a concerted Greek action against the 
Persian Isocrates pointed to the foolishness of asserting that 
within states the Greek had the right to govern barbarians while 
in his external relations the failure to unite against the barbarian 
could result in the barbarian ruling, the Creek. Isocrates writes: 
'For verily it is shameful for us, who in our private life think 
the barbarians are only to be used as household slaves, to 
permit by our public policy so many of our allies to be enslaved 
by them.' 	Isocrates, op.cit., p.149. 
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instance it is not surprising that theorists should deploy their 
language of rights and obligations in order to secure improvement in 
the nature of the stale. But there was in the West a reluctance on 
the part of those theorists, who thought that rights were attached to 
sheer humanity, to articulate a theory of international relations in 
these terms. Hegel, for example, believed: 
'A man counts as a man in virtue of his 
manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, 
Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, 
&c. This is an assertion which thinking 
ratifies and to be conscious of it is of 
infinite importance. It is defective only 
when it is crystallised, e.g., as a cosmo-
politanism in opposition to the concrete 
life of the state.' 1 
Bosanquet, reflecting the influence of Hegel, wrote that 'our nation 
remains after all our instrument for doing services to humanity and 
our main ideal of humanity itself.' 2  Rousseau maintained that 'the 
feeling of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing mankind' 
and recommended that 'our humanity should confine itself to our fellow 
citizens' if it is to be 'active'. 3 The problem, as these writers 
see it, is the absence or undesirability (especially in the case of 
Rousseau) of a social group at the level of mankind, the absence of 
concrete relationships or associations through which principles of 
humanity can find expression. A more complete account of this idea 
exists in the following quotation from Durkheim: 
'On the one hand, we can scarcely help 
conceiving moral ends that are loftier 
than national goals; on the other hand, 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, Oxford 1952, p.134. 
2. B. Bosanquet, "The Teaching of Patriotism", in Social and 
International Ideals, London 1917, p.15. 
3. Rousseau, A Discourse on Political Economy, Ed. Cole, 
op.cit., p.246. 
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it seems quite impossible that these 
loftier ends can be embodied in a human 
group adequate to them. The only way of 
resolving this difficulty, which troubles 
pubic thinking, is to seek the realisation 
of the human. ideal through the most highly 
developed groups that we know, through those 
closest to humanity as a whole, but without 
confusing the two - that is, through the 
efforts of specific nations. To eliminate 
all such contradictions, thus satisfying the 
requirements of our moral consciousness, it 
suffices that the state commits itself as its 
main goals not to expanding in a material 
sense to the detriment of its neighbours, 
not to gaining greater strength than they; 
or to - becoming richer than they; but to the 
goal of realising among its own people the 
general interests of humanity - that is, 
committing itself to au access to justice, 
to a higher morality, to organising itself 
in such a way that there is always a closer 
correspondence between the merit of its 
citizens and their conditions of life with 
the end of reducing or preventing individual 
suffering. From this point of view, all 
rivalry between different countries disappears 
and consequently between cosmopolitanism and 
patriotism.' 1 
Now there is a sense in which the principles of humanity can be applied 
to the relations between groups without their forming a similar social 
group among themselves, at least in any precise form. Certainly, in 
recourse to and in the conduct of war communities can be obliged to 
respect certain moral principles derived from the supposition that 
all men are to be treated in accordance with one morality. And these 
obligations apply to a condition where men are farthest from forming . 
 a more inclusive social group. It is the causal connectedness of men 
which requires that the principles of humanity should apply to their 
relations. 	Whether or not they form a clearly defined human grouping 
would hardly appear to be relevant. The existence of a worality which 
applies to man qua man creates rights and obligations between the 
1. E. Durkheim, Moral Education, New York 1961, pp. 76-77. 
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members of sharply defined separate social groupings, and the failure 
to elaborate these is a failure of political philosophy and practice 
to take the implications of universal morality seriously. 
It is the existence of a. belief in universal morality that makes 
international theory possible. The fact that men are divided into 
separate sovereign states but are at the same time members of a world-
wide moral community creates tensions in moral and political exper-
ience which can only be resolved at the level of an international 
relations theory. The belief in a world-wide moral community leads 
the members . of any particular society to reconsider the status of 
rights and obligations against outsiders as these have been conceived 
traditionally. The use of force in the conduct of external relations 
becomes problematic and contestable within the context of an inter-
national relations theory. Between societies which have few trans-
actions this international relations theory will have to consider 
international obligations concerning the use of force only. And for 
the individual an international relations theory can attempt to har-
monise any tension within him between obligations to his separate 
state and obligations to outsiders. At this level it may not be 
necessary to question the state as a separate or exclusive political 
association. However, where states develop an increased level of 
interconnectedness or interdependence, where they engage in a variety 
of social and economic relationships, and where these involve a variety 
of non-governmental actors an international relations theory needs to 
greatly enlarge its scope. For in this context it is essential to 
discover whether or not the moral rights of persons in different poli-
tical communities can in fact be safeguarded while men are divided 
into separate, sovereign states. It is arguable that the causal 
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connectedness of men may become so profound that the division of men 
into separate, sovereign states becomes an obstacle to the adequate 
enactment of principles Lo humanity. In this conte%t an international 
relations theory is obliged to ask whether or not the formation of 
an international association (either at the regional or global level, 
and with jurisdiction over single or many issues) is itself an obli-
gation of the first order. A political theory which concluded its 
analysis with the discussion of the right order of the state and the 
moral framework within which separate states might co-exist is defect- 
' 	kve. For at a certain stage of social and political development of 
world society the very division of men into separate, sovereign states 
becomes a fundamentally important problem for moral rather than utili-
tarian reasons. For the tension between obligations to the separate 
community and obligations to outsiders may become more acute Clan ever 
since it has opportunity to exist over a wider range of issues. And 
in this condition a theory of international relations acquires consid-
erable importance in the rethinking of social and political relation-
ships on a regional and global scale. 
The international relations theorist cannot take for granted the 
division of mankind into separate, sovereign states. The theory of 
international relations is, of course, concerned with the problem of 
the justification of the state, but the terms of his justification or 
invalidation of the state differ in z: crucial respect from the terms 
of traditional, state-centred political theory. Traditionally the 
justification of the state is presented in the form of an argument con-
cerning the reasons for obeying the state and it is therefore a theory 
addressed first and foremost to insiders. International theory is con-
cerned with the manner in which the state is to be justified to the 
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outsider, for if obligations to outsiders are of fundamental import-
ance it is necessary to consider the type of 'provincial' political 
association most in conformity with a universal moral law. For this 
reason international relations theory considers the principles under-
lying the bonds between insiders and outsiders and reflects upon the 
rationale of the separate state from 'above' rather than from 'below', 
from the viewpoint of international. morality rather than from the view-
point of the insider, the citizen. In this sense it is an expression 
of the external point of view, the completion of any philosophy of 
politics which maintains that there is a morality attached to the 
concept of man qua man. 
V 
Let us now draw together some of the main themes of this chapter 
and consider their implications for the remaining tasks of this thesis. 
It has been maintained that a philosophical account of the experience 
of living within separate states must draw attention to the internal 
points of view which underlie the state-system. For in each state 
wishing to preserve its separateness there is an evident distinction 
between the insider and the outsider which is fundamental to the way 
in which it conducts its external relations. But the modern state also 
contains the idea of a universal morality, its major contribution 
being the idea that certain rights are attached to the idea of being 
a man. 	And indeed any citizen at all sensitive to moral and political 
issues may consider himself being pulled in conflicting directions as 
each of these perspectives nay make conflicting claims upon him. It 
is especially in the recourse to and the conduct of war that the 
citizen or statesman may feel these conflicting demands. Pe may 
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reasonably feel a loyalty to those who are equally members of the 
society of his birth, and he may in addition feel the moral demands 
of membership of a moral community which is more inclusive than the 
state. And these tensions are liable to develop in a variety of ways 
as societies become more interdependent and face in increasing areas 
of life a choice between the welfare of the state and the welfare of 
humanity. 
There would appear then to be a tension between a world divided 
into separate states and the belief that one standard of morality 
applies to all members of world society. What is more this tension 
is built into the very nature of the modern state, a state which is 
exclusive but has adopted the language of a morality bestowing rights 
and obligations on man qua man. It is the business of a philosophy of 
international relations to give an account of modern social and politi-
cal life which aims at discovering principles which will overcome the 
tensions within the experience of a humanity divided into separate 
states. In attempting this function international relations theory 
performs the classical tasks of social and political philosophy which 
have been to search for a rational integration of man's social and 
political life. If it is correct that 'the need for philosophy arises 
when the unifying power has disappeared from the life of man' then the 
philosophy of international relations has important tasks to perform. 
given the tensions within our experience of the modern state and its 
international relations. 1 One author refers to the fragmentation of 
modern culture in the following words: 
'the social world of man is fragmented not 
only internally because of the separation 
1. 	H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Oxford 1941, p.35. 
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of the major spheres of man's activity 
from one another; it is also fragmented 
externally because he can view his culture 
only as one of a series of cultures that 
exist throughout the world.' 1 
According to my earlier analysis there is a fragmentation of ethical 
and political life reflected in the opposition between the internal 
and external points of view. And this is indeed a fragmentation with-
in the modern state which has failed to evolve a theory capable of 
resolving their opposing claims upon the individual. It is also a 
fragmentation within world society itself where the conflicts between 
states can be regarded as a denial of the moral unity of mankind and 
of its capacity to solve its disunity through the resources of a 
universal ethic. As international relations theory is concerned with 
giving a coherent account of moral and political life at the inter- 
natl_onal level, it is with the two conflicting viewpoints of the nature 
of obligation in a world of sovereign states that it must begin. 
1. 	D.P. Verene, Ilan and Culture: A Philosophical Anthology, 
New York 1970, p.3. 
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P ART 	TWO 
Introduction 
In the second part of this thesis I propose to discuss the 
theory of the state and international relations advanced by three 
writers - Pufendorf (1632-1694), Vattel (1714-1767) and Kant (1724- 
1804). . The objective of this section is a more detailed and system-
atic discussion of the internal and external points of view through 
an analysis of their presentation within these three thinkers' writings 
on international relations. Pufendorf and Vattel are exponents of an 
individualistic version of the internal point of view. 	Their particu- 
lar interest lies in the fact they both begin with a state of nature 
in which men are moral. equals. 	It is therefore of interest to probe 
their arguments about the justification of the sovereign state given 
their fundamental moral assumptions. I shall show that Pufendorf is 
a theorist of the internal point of view mainly on account of his 
tendency to understand the moral community of mankind in a particularly 
lax fashion. Apart from a few qualifications which will be advanced 
later, Pufendorf's thinking about international relations defends only 
the most minimal of diplomatic societies. Vattel too inclines towards 
a flexible interpretation of obligations to humanity, but unlike 
Pufendorf he has a strong sense of states forming a kind of society 
whereby they make various concessions to each other's interests in 
order to maintain an international order among themselves which oper-
ates principally through their common. acceptance of the balance of 
power. There is in Vattel's writings a more powerful sense of inter-
national obligation although as with Pufendorf there are fundamental 
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flaws in his concept of a morality which prevent a more forthright 
development of an international theory. I shall argue that it is in 
Kant's writings that we can find a more adequate account of a moral 
philosophy and its application to international relations. 	Kant, 
possessing a stronger sense of obligation to humanity, elaborates an 
external point of view which makes fundamental demands for alterations 
of the state-system. In addition, Kant provides us with an interesting 
philosophy of history which can be used in the attempt to develop some 
aspects of the theory of international relations. Accordingly, in the 
third and last section of this thesis I shall provide a prolegomenon 
to a theory of international relations from the external point of view. 
This will build upon some of the more fundamental and recurring themes 
of this thesis in an effort to provide a perspective from which to 
theorise about our obligations beyond the state. The general r -!thod 
employed in this third section has developed as a sharp reaction to 
the individualistic thought of Pufendorf and Vattel especially - and 
indeed of Kant, too, to some extent. It is to these writers then that 
I now turn. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Pufendorf's Theory of the State and  
International Relations. 
In Pufendorf's writings we find one of the classic statements 
of the internal point of view. I shall be concerned with discussing 
his formulation of this viewpoint and its relationship with the con-
cept of a morality connected to human nature as such. In order to 
reconstruct Pufendorf's thought in such a way as to assist our choice 
between the internal and the external points of view, my interpretation 
will be concerned with three distinguishable, although ultimately 
interrelated themes. First of all there will be a discussion of 
Pufendorf's account of the state of nature and the "natural law which 
binds the individuals within it; secondly, there will be an examin-
ation of Pufendorf's defence of the separate, sovereign state, or for 
a civil society which embraces only a portion of humanity; and 
thirdly, I shall discuss Pufendorf's ideas about the right relation-
ship for separate sovereign states. The analysis will be concerned 
principally with the relationship between Pufendorf's belief in a 
universal morality and his simultaneous defence of the characteristics 
of the state•system. 
I 
The State of Nature  and the Theory of Natural Law.  
It has been said of Pufendorf that he 'effected a certain com-
promise' between the views of Grotius and flobbes, two writers whom 
Pufendorf quotes and discusses at considerable length. 	The author of 
this remark has in mind Pufendorf's account of positive law ('Grotius 
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conceived that the intrinsic nature of things formed the foundation 
of law; Hobbes held that its source was the will of a sovereign of 
undefined power. Pufendorf effected a certain compromise between 
these views'), but it applies to his broader social and political 
thought as a whole. 1 Pufendorf, to give only one example, explicit-
ly rejects the Hobbesian account of life in the state of nature. For 
him the state of nature is not a state of war where the ideas of right 
and wrong have no place. Pufendorf is evidently closer to Grotius in 
asserting that men in the state of nature are descended from Adam and 
Eve and thereby owe each other the respect to which men as equals are 
entitled. Their common human nature requires that they observe obli-
gations to each other as reason would prescribe: 
'even though some man may be unable to 
work me any benefit or harm and has in 
himself nothing for me to fear or desire, 
yet it is nature's will that even such a 
one he considered my kinsman and equal, 
and this reason alone, were there no others, 
lays upon the race of men the cultivation 
of a friendly society.' 
Shared human nature requires that men acknowledge obligations to the 
whole of mankind. Indeed their separation into particular societies 
should not lead them to overlook the bond of common humanity. Pufendorf 
criticises the Ancient World where: 
'most men had so completely forgotten the 
principle of natura-law, namely that all men 
are related to each other by nature, and that 
1. C. Phillipson, "Samuel von Pufendorf", in J. McDonnel and 
E. Hanson, Great Jurists of the World, New York 1963, p.316. 
2. De Jure Raturae et Gentiwn, (Classics of International Law), 
Oxford 1934, p.212. 	(Herefter DJPG.) This echoes Grotius' 
remark 'For the very nature of man,which even if we had no lack 
of anything would lead us into the mutual relations of society, 
is the mother of the law of nature'. De lure Belli ac Pacis, 
Oxford 1925, p.15. 
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it is wrong, therefore for one to do 
violence to another except for some 
preceding offence, that it was generally 
believed the duties of humanity shoul(f 
only be exercised towards one's fellow 
citizens, and that foreigners were no 
better than enemies, whom we could injure 
whenever it appeared to be to our 
advantage.' 1 
Pufendorf therefore stresses the fact that universal morality survives 
the division of men into separate societies and emphasises the obli-
gation of admitting foreigners and treating them with respect in 
accordance with its precepts. And in all this Pufendorf is undoubt-
edly in agreement with Grotius. 
Against this we must set Pufendorf's views on the origins of 
the state. It is evident here that he agrees with Hobbes that men 
established civil society for their own protection. The insecurity 
of life in the state of nature and the futility of the solitary indi-
vidual point to the necessity of the state and the rationality of 
political obligation: 
'the complaint of the masses about the burdens 
and drawbacks of civil states could be met 
in no better way than by picturing to their 
eyes the drawbacks of a state of nature. 
These are properly understood by those who 
have accepted as a proverb the saying: 
"Were there no courts of justice every man 
would devour his neighbour".' 2 
There is here an indication of the problematic nature of the 'compro-
mise' Pufendorf is supposed to have effected. On the one hand he 
asserts the sociability of man but on the other hand he does not 
appear to have separated his argument from that of Hobbes. Pufendorf 
maintains there is a natural obligation to form a 'friendly society' 
with all men, but he is evidently also prone to the belief that the 
1. DJNG, p.1330. 	2. 	ibid., p.157. 
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rationale of civil :society rests in the fact it removes man from the 
miseries of the state of nature and will therefore appeal to his 
self-interest. Now there is in this ambivalence the making of a 
tension between the two points of view, the one asserting the primacy 
of obligations to humanity, the other asserting the primacy of obli-
gations to those with whom we share a separate political society. 
And it is of particular interest here to consider the manner in 
which Pufendorf understands the role of a universal morality which 
survives the separaticin of men into distinct political societies. In 
what way then does Pufendorf bring a universal morality to bear upon 
the division of humanity into separate, sovereign states? 
Let us begin by considering Pufendorf's view of the equality 
of men. Pufendorf advances an impressive account of human equality 
in the sense of the right of all men to be treated as equals. He 
maintains 'the very being a man is a state out of which arise certain 
obligations and certain rights as well' 1  and rejects slavery (an 
institution which 'merits complete disapproval') since 'all men by 
nature, antecedent to any act of man, are understood to be free ' . 2 
In the state of nature then men are free from the direction of other 
men given their inherent rights of equality and liberty. Neverthe-
less, as we have said, the state of nature is a moral condition and 
men are obliged to act through consideration and respect for the 
equality of their fellows. Man 'should think of himself as being put 
in the place of the other to whom something is to be done; and the 
other in turn set in his place'. 3 Now the fundamental obligation, 
which is attached to human nature itself, is to apply the same rules 
	
1. 	ibid., p.S. 	2. 	ibid., p.342. 
3. 	Elements of Universal Jurisprudence (Classics of International 
Law), Oxford 1931, p.240 (hereafter Eilj). 
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to all persons in like circumstances, an idea which has more recent- 
ly been referred to as the principle of universalisability: 
'Accordingly this too is one of the common 
duti•ts of the natural law; that no one, 
who has not acquired a particular state, 
arrogate more to himself than the rest have, 
but permit others to enjoy the same right 
as himself.' 1 
In this way Pufendorf asserts that man has an obligation to he sociable, 
an obligation which embraces the whole of mankind which ought to 'cul-
tivate universal peace' and 'exhibit the services of humanity' in all 
its social relations. 2 And these are the obligations which men 
acquire through being human. 
Pufendorf rejects the view that universal morality alone will 
suffice to render human relations perfectly harmonious. He there-
fore argues for the necessity of narticular agreements and contracts 
between men so that social life may be bettered. His general argu-
ment for particular pacts and agreements represents a crucial develop-
ment in Pufendorf's discussion and is - if my interpretation is 
correct - fundamental to his theory of the state and international 
relations: 
'The duties thus far sat forth derive their 
force from that common relationship which 
nature established among all men even before 
any act was exchanged between them. But it 
is not enough to confine within such a circuit 
the duties which men owe each other. For not 
all men are so constituted that they are will-
ing to do everything, with which they can help 
others, out of mere humanity and love, and 
without assuring themselves of some hope of 
receiving their equivalent; while it is often 
1. Two Books on the Duty of ilan and Citi;.en According to the 
Natural Law (Classics of International Law), Oxford 1927, 
D.43 (hereafter TBDIX). 
2. EUtT, p. 242. 
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the case that the things which can come to 
us from others are of such a nature that we 
cannot have the boldness to ask that they be 
done for us gratis. It is often also not 
fitting for our person or lot that we be 
indcited to another for such a kindness, and 
so in many instances another person is unable 
to . do us a kindness, and we are often unwilling 
to receive one, unless the other person receives 
its equivalent from us. Moreover, it often 
happens that other men do not know how they 
may serve our interests. Finally in view of 
the finite power of man being unable to extend 
itself to all persons at the same time and 
with the same force, it is surely reasonable 
that such actions as are not yet covenanted 
for by former obligations are bound over to 
those who, by agreements, have secured for 
themselves a prior right to them. And so, if 
mutual offices, the real fruit of humanity, 
are to be practised more frequently between 
men, and by a kind of set rule, it was necessary 
for men themselves to agree among themselves 
on the mutual rendering of such services as a 
man could not also be certain of for himself 
on the mere law of humanity. Therefore, it had 
to be determined beforehand what one should do 
for another, and what he should in his turn 
expect from another, and demand on his own 
right. This is, indeed, accomplished by 
promises and agreements.' 1 
The morality based upon a 'kind of kinship among men' requires the 
superimposition of contractual agreements on account of the following 
features. 	First of all, men are self-interested and care more for 
their own individual well-being than for their obligations to humanity; 
2 
secondly, they have a powerful and 'sensitive self-esteem' which 
makes them seek to establish reciprocal relationships wherein no man 
loses the dignity of independence; thirdly, individuals cannot assist 
all individuals to the same extent and should therefore come to parti-
cular agreements with a finite number of men; fourthly, men are in-
capable of precise knowledge of the courses of action most beneficial 
to each other and should therefore seek to enhance the moral order 
1. 	TBDMC, p.48. 	2. ibid., p.42. 
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among themselves through agreeing on a reciprocal basis to assist 
each other in specific ways; and fifthly, the moral law is not 
sufficiently precise 	enable one 'to deduce from that one source 
all that men were entitled to receive to advantage from one another'. 1 
For these reasons the rights and duties owed to men as men must be 
made concrete and given particular content through specific contract-
ual agreements. However, these particular agreements are superimposed 
upon a morality for the whole of mankind, and obligations to the 
whole of humanity must necessarily survive any particular relation-
ships men should freely enter into. The manner of its survival will 
however depend upon the particular emphasis Pufendorf wishes to give 
to each of these five features. If a great deal of emphasis is given 
to either the first or second features then one might expect an argu-
ment which understood the state fry purely instrumental terms. The 
individual might consider himself obliged to co-operate only with the 
members of a particular community, his obligations to the rest of 
humanity taking on the status of a residual category. If the third 
feature is stressed, a man may enter into obligations with only a 
portion of mankind, but should a condition arise where the whole globe. 
is more causally connected there would not be, at least on the face 
of things, a strong objection to a universal mode of co-operation 
whereby duties to humanity could be more readily respected. If the 
fourth and fifth features were to be emphasised there would again 
appear to be no obstacle to the establishment of a universal civil 
society whereby duties to humanity were specified, or if such estab-
lishment were impossible at any given time (through the difficulty of 
communications, for example) there would be no obstacle to its future. 
1. 	ibid., p.48. 
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establishment when favourable conditions obtained. We can say then 
at this stage that the relationship between particular contractual 
arrangements and surviving obligations to humanity will depend direct-
ly upon the particular emphasis Pufendorf chooses to give to each of 
these five features. 
Pufendorf most certainly believed that men would wish to escape 
the state of nature and establish the condition of civil society in 
order that their rights and obligations could be given legal guarantee. 
Obligations to humanity certainly exist in the state of nature but 
there is no power giving man the precise guarantee that they will be 
fully respected; thus: 
'... what we owe under the mere duty of humanity 
differs from what is owed by virtue of a compact 
or perfect promise especially in this respect, 
viz., that things of the former class are properly 
asked and honourably performed; but when the 
other has failed of his inhumanity, barbarity 
or harshness I cannot compel him to perform, 
by my force or that of a superior. This is 
my privilege however when he does not of himself 
perform what is due in accordance with a perfect 
promise or a compact. Hence we are said in 
the former case to have an imperfect right, 
in the latter a perfect right, as also to be 
obligated imperfectly in the one case, and 
perfectly in the other.' 1 
It is crucial to the understanding of Pufendorf's thought to stress 
that he held men were naturally bound to be sociable to one another; 
but given the malice that exists in some men it was essential to agree 
among themselves to form states for their own protection: 
For although the natural law commands men to 
abstain from inflicting any injury, still 
respect for that law cannot insure to men 
the abili4y to live quite safely in natural 
1. 	ibid., p.49. 	2. 	ibid., p.104. 
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Some men will not wish to harm others; other men will be deterred 
from harming others because of fear; there is however 'a great 
multitude of those tc whom every right is worth le3s': 
'There is no one who does not strive to 
protect himself against such persons, 
if he loves his own safety; and that 
protection cannot be had more conveniently 
than by help of states.' 1 
Men are obliged to respect the obligations which are attached to human-
ity and to 'cultivate a friendly society' with one another. This is 
however an obligation to develop what Pufendorf wishes to call 
'sociableness', but it is not an obligation to enter civil society 
as such: 
'Here then it is not enough to say that man is 
by nature herself drawn into civil society, 
so that without it he cannot and will not 
live. For surely it is evident that man is 
an animal of the ,  kind that loves itself and 
its interest to the utmost degree. When, 
therefore, he voluntarily seeks civil society, 
it must be that he has had regard to some 
utility that he will derive from it for himself. 
And though, outside of society with his kind, 
man would have been much the most miserable of 
creatures, still the natural desires and 
necessities of man could have been abundantly 
satisfied through the first communities, and 
the duties performed out of humanity or by 
agreement. Hence it cannot at once be inferred 
from man's sociability that his ature does 
tend exactly to civil society. 
It is evident from this quotation that Pufendorf is stressing particu-
larly the first of the five features mentioned above. Obligations to 
humanity, being insufficient in themselves, require the superimposition 
of freely entered contractual arrangements whereby self-interested 
men establish states among themselves for their common protection. 
Now since everyone in the state of nature 'is understood to be 
1. 	EUJ, pp.104-105. 	2. ibid., p.103. 
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his own master, and subject to the authority of no man' the establish- 
ment of separate states requires the consent of men. 1  Moreover, 
every pact 'must conr:arn something which a man was. otherwise unable 
to require of me by the mere law of nature'. 2 Therefore, individuals 
are at liberty to select to join the states of their choice and to 
create particular political obligations which are not enjoined by the 
law of nature. In this way men superimpose particular political obli-
gations upon the natural obligations which already exist: 
'And so the law of humanity or charity, and 
the agreements of men among themselves, 
mutually supplement each other by way of 
their duties and guarantees, in that what 
is not or cannot he secured by charity, is 
secured by agreements, while in cases where 
agreements are not possible, charity offers 
its services.' 3 
Were Pufendorf to assign particular significance to the third, fourth 
and fifth features listed above, the nature of the supplement could 
point to the establishment of a universal civil society. Through the 
establishment of such a civil society the natural obligations to 
humanity might be more readily observed. However, Pufendorf in the 
following quotation asserts the primacy of individual self-interest 
in the formation of states: 
'Furthermore, whatever I have done with another 
man in agreements, I have done not so much for 
his advantage as for my own, while in the duties 
of humanity the very opposite is the case.' 4 
Thus in addition to the duties to humanity, a man acquires through his 
own consent obligations to specifiable persons within a particular 
political association. And the second type of obligations, unlike the 
first, arise merely from considerations of manifest 'utility'. Now 
1. TBDMC, p.90. 	3. ibid., p.380. 
2. DJNG, p.176. 4. ibid., 
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there is a possible tension at the heart of PufenJorf's argument. 
On the one hand, he wishes to maintain that obligations to humanity 
survive its division into separate states. He maintains that: 
'although he may have bound himself by a 
special bond to some particular society 
nevertheless, with all men, even those who 
live outside that society, he should cultivate 
universal peace as far as they may allow him 
to, and he should exhibit the services of 
humanity which he can conveniently.' 1 
On the other hand, the basis of the separate state is its manifest 
'utility' as understood by its citizens. Since the bond between 
fellow-citizens is based upon reciprocal agreements whereby each 
satisfies his self-interest (understood in terms of legal guarantees), 
it is necessary to pose the question whether or not this association 
can exist alongside others without imposing 'sacrifices of value' 
upon them in order to increase ics welfare. It is necessary to ask 
this question since it may be possible that by becoming obligated in 
particular ways to fellow-citizens, the individual may become the 
enemy of other men, outsiders - which was not the case before. 2 In 
order to understand in what way obligations to outsiders will survive 
the division of humanity into separate sovereign states,'it is first 
of all essential to look a little closer at the nature of the bond 
which exists between fellow-citizens. 
1. EUJ, p.242. 
2. Rousseau understood the formation of the separate state 
in this way. 	See S. Hoffman, "Rousseau on War and Peace" 
in The State of War, London 1965, p. 67. 
II. 
The Case for the Separate Political Associ.ation 
There are two factors to be considered in this section. It 
is important to give an account of Pufendorf's argument for sover-
eignty and of his defence of the location of sovereignty in a separ-
ate political association. Let us consider his argument for sover-
eignty first of all. 
Sovereignty is desired since the law of nature does not pro-
vide an adequate basis for either deriving or protecting the rights 
and duties of men. Men must therefore proceed to make specific 
agreements among themselves and submit to a higher authority which 
is capable of enforcing them. Alen therefore leave that condition 
'where it appears that anyone can free himself from such obligations 
as rest only upon tacit agreement, if he expressly declares that he 
is not willing to be bound by them and that he will not complain 
should others also not observe them towards him'. 1 Through submission 
to sovereignty men leave the condition where their obligations are 
merely 'imperfect' for a condition where their obligations are 'per-
fect' since they are enforceable. And obligations only become per-
fect through the recognition of the supremacy of the sovereign: 
'For what order can there - be which does not 
look toward some first principle? And this 
principle is all-important, and designed to 
control all things, that is, it is govern- 
ment, or the highest power in society, and 
unless this is present, no society is sought 
by any being which makes use of reason and 
discourse.' 2 
1. 	DJNG, p.228. 	2. ibid., p.164. 
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Now it may be thought that beings using their 'reason and discourse' 
might wish to submit to an agency with sovereign jurisdiction over 
the entire world - should certain empirical conditions hold. However, 
in arguing that the observation of agreements cannot be left to free 
men Pufendorf maintains that 'protection cannot be had more conven-
iently than by the help of states'. 1 	Here Pufendorf has made the 
move, which was remarked on earlier, from the view that the moral order 
must be enhanced through the establishment of government to the view 
that men ought to live in separate, sovereign states. 2 Unlike con- 
tract theory generally, however, Pufendorf presents us with a number 
of arguments for the division of mankind into separate, sovereign 
states. To understand his arguments it is necessary to return to his 
idea of man in the state of nature. 
It is often wondered if the state of nature (and the social 
contact whereby men enter civil society) is a purely heuristic device 
for speculative purposes or an attempt to actually depict unrecorded 
historical events. As far as Pufendorf is concerned humanity for 
most of its history has been divided into separate groups. Pufendorf 
accepts the Christian doctrine that all men are descended from the 
marriage of a 'single pair' - hence their common kinship. 3  He there-
fore rejects the view that there ever was an actual state of nature 
comprising more or less solitary individuals. All men have either 
been subject to the same paternal power or organised into separate 
family groupings. Pufendorf writes: 
'a state of nature never actually existed, 
except in some altered form, or only in 
1. TBDMC, p.105. 
2. See above, pp.17-18. 	3. DJIIG, pp.162-163. 
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part, as when, indeed, some men gathered 
with others into a civil state, or some 
such body, but retained a natural liberty 
against the rest of mankind; although the 
more groups there were in this di -vision of 
the human race, and the smaller their member-
ship, the nearer it must have approached a 
pure state of nature. So when at first man-
kind divided into different family groups, 
and now have divided into states such groups 
live in a mutual state of nature, insofar 
as no one group obeys another, and all the 
members have no common master.' 1 
Pufendorf imagines men splitting into separate family groups at an 
early stage in their history with the obligations of kinship weaken-
ing. Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are obligations of humanity 
which embrace these groups although the absence of their enforcement 
creates an incentive to establish sovereign authority. According 
to Pufendorf the patriarchs abandoned the state of nature so that 
they 'might fortify themselves against the evils which threaten man 
from man'. 2 We are to imagine then a condition in which men as family 
members consent to belong to a political association with a sovereign 
head so that their security may be better protected. 
Let us recall the Hobbesian element in Pufendorf's account of 
sovereignty. It is understood to be the most satisfactory means 
whereby men protect themselves and is therefore considered simply in 
instrumental terms. Since men are not obliged to live in states on 
account of natural obligation they are at liberty to choose whether 
or not to submit to a sovereign power. Pufendorf however believes 
not only that it is rational to seek the protection of the state but 
that it is rational to seek the protection of the separate state. He 
maintains that 'the most efficient cure had to be sought from man 
1. 	ibid., p.I63. 	Ge 	TBDA1C, p.104. 
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himself, by joining into states and establishing sovereignty ,1 
We must assume, since men are at liberty to form political associa-
tions in order to promote their own interests, that men understand 
that these will be promoted without the establishment of a universal 
civil society. The fact a man chooses to live in a separate politi-
cal society surely indicates his belief that his interests would not 
be better promoted by associating with every other man on the face of 
the earth. What this would appear to amount to is the belief that 
the goal of sovereignty, which is of the greatest benefit to man, can 
only be attained at the local level. Men are concerned with security, 
which Pufendorf understands as a condition where obligations become 
perfect through the presence of a sovereign power. Pufendorf evident-
ly believes that self-interested men who judge co-operation in largely 
instrumental terms will choose to live in separate, sovereign states. 
Let us now consider some of the principal arguments used by Pufendorf 
in reaching this conclusion. 
I propose to consider three areas of argument in discussing 
Pufendorf's remarks about the rationality of the separate state. In 
the first place I shall consider his dismissal of the establishment 
of a universal civil society for the purpose of satisfying economic 
wants. I propose then to consider his view that the sheer size of 
the human race makes it impossible for its association into a single 
political community. And finally I propose to consider an argument 
that the process of associating at the international level would en- 
.able men to live in accordance with the obligations they have simply 
as human beings. It will be noted in the course of this argument 
that Pufendorf's argument for the separate state necessarily involves 
1. DJNG, p.959. 
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his taking an internal point of view of obligations to the state 
and to the rest of humanity. 
If it is rational to seek associations which will satisfy our 
interests, should men attempt to find an international association 
to increase their benefits? Individuals might benefit from member- 
ship of larger associations (larger, that is, than the separate state); 
and separate states themselves might derive benefits from establishing 
or working towards the establishment of a more inclusive political 
association. If we are to understand by these remarks that men might 
be economically advantaged by belonging to more inclusive political 
associations, then Pufendorf will reject the argument. He does not 
consider economic interests as a valid reason for wishing to enlarge 
the political association. Pufendorf is 'convinced that want was 
neither the only nor even the main cause for the establishment of 
states '1 and maintains that 'there are many states today which seek 
abroad the means to supply their needs or pleasure, and yet they do 
not feel it necessary to combine with those with whom they trade into 
one state '? Therefore, if we were to understand interests as 
economic interests it is clear that men should not judge and re-judge 
their political associations in terms of their instrumental value for 
their economic interests. 	Pufendorf would presumably remain uncon- 
vinced by modern opponents of the state who take the view that the 
satisfaction of the economic interests of the individual could be 
attained more easily through international institutions - not because 
Pufendorf cares nothing for the state's ability to protect the economic 
welfare of its citizens, but because institutions which relate men 
1. 	DING, p.958. 	2. ibid. 
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economically are inferior to institutions where men are absolutely 
agreed on the fundamental goal of their subordination to a sovereign 
power. 	Man's most fundamental interests are satisfied by the 
guarantees afforded by the sovereign power. Pufendorf does not 
understand man as homo economicus and would regard him as foolish were 
he to reconsider his allegiance to the state on the grounds that his 
economic interests would be maximised by its incorporation in a 
larger political entity. Pufendorf does not understand man in these 
terms but of course he does not consider that states might become 
obsolete or less satisfactory means of promoting the interests of 
individuals. 
It is certain that Pufendorf thought that the legal bond was 
qualitatively different from economic bonds between persons. Neverthe-
less it is equally obvious that any legal and political association 
would have to be capable of withstanding economic crisis and external 
attack. For these reasons a rational individual will want to be sure 
that any state he proposes to join can be viable. Legal guarantee 
may be the primary reason for associating politically, but it is only 
possible within an association capable of satisfying some equally 
important individual concerns. And indeed Pufendorf recognises this 
factor is of importance to potential contractors. He maintains 
that 'the just size' 1 of the state is related to the level of power. 
required to guarantee the state's security: 
'the agreement of two or three cannot afford 
that sort of security against other men. For 
it is easy for so many to conspire to over-
throw these few, that they can ensure for 
themselves a perfectly certain victory over 
the others; and the hope of success and 
impunity will give them confidence for the 
1. ibid., p.968. 
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attack; therefore to this end it is 
necessary for a considerable number of 
men to join together that the addition 
of a few to the numbers of the enemy may 
not be of appreciable moment in helping 
them to victory.' 1 
Now in the formation of any political association groups of contract-
ors will have 'to compare themselves in order to know themselves' as 
Rousseau would put it. 2 Pufendorf asserts that the just size of a 
state should be measured by the strength of its neighbours', and so 
it must be in that condition where men first establish separate poli-
tical societies. The state must make an effort to be secure and it 
is necessarily through power that it will be able to survive as an 
independent entity. It is not surprising that although 'mutual bene- 
volence' is a factor in the establishment of states 'others afterwards 
may be induced to join them out of fear'. 3 Since power is vital in 
the considerations of potential contractors the establishment of 
separate states must be a hazardous business. Sovereignty may be 
'sacrosanct', as Pufendorf wrote, because it puts an end 'to the 
infinite miseries of the state of nature'. 4 Nevertheless, it seems 
likely that the process of establishing separate sovereigns could pro-
voke considerable uncertainty, disorder and conflict. It is arguable 
that men would experience great insecurity while states were being 
established lest they should be unable to find for themselves a poli-
tical association of their own choice capable of withstanding external 
attack. It is possible that men would be in constant motion first 
establishing one society for their security only to dissolve it again 
should it be unable to be superior to or equal with neighbouring 
1. TBDMC, p.106. 
2. "The State of War", in Forsyth et.al., op.cit., p.171. 
3. EUJ, p.237. 	4. 	DJNG, p.163. 
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societies. Pufendorf appears to recognise that the move from the 
state of nature to the condition of civil society would be a diffi-
cult one in that soma men might have to join certain states simply 
through fear. But he does not recognise what is involved in assert-
ing this, namely that the transitional step between the state of 
nature and the condition of civil society might give rise to greater 
'miseries' than had ever been experienced in the state of nature, or 
indeed that the move might not be possible at all, or possible only 
through the use of force. Pufendorf is insufficiently sensitive to 
the problems created by the move from the state of nature. He does 
not appear to have recognised - indeed it appears to go unrecognised 
until Rousseau turned his attention to international relations - that 
men were exchanging one state of nature for another, even more treach-
erous. However the dilemma that men might experience in moving from 
the state of nature to the condition of civil society appears to go 
unnoticed despite the fact that the configuration of power is of 
fundamental importance to men involved in the establishment of 
separate, political societies. 
If the problems of establishing separate political societies 
are of enormous proportions might men fare better by seeking their 
legal guarantees within a political association as inclusive as 
possible? It is clear that Pufendorf believed separate states could 
compensate for their deficiencies through international trade and co-
operation, but the possibility of a universal civil society is sharply 
rejected: 
'The numbers of the human race and the infinite 
multitude of transactions have not allowed men 
to unite into one body, forasmuch as that one 
body, in such large dimensions, would be 
threatened through internal disturbances by 
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the same inconveniences as those which 
exercise the human race, and almost greater 
ones, divided as the human race is, into 
a large number of smaller governments,' 1 
While it may be possible to enter into all manner of economic relations 
at the international level, Pufendorf does not believe it is possible 
to establish a global sovereign. 	It would appear that Pufendorf is 
making a point now more or less taken for granted, namely that a world 
government might abolish international wars only to usher in civil 
ones.. At the same time the argument suggests that the sheer complex- . 
ity of . international life is the ultimate barrier to the establish-
ment of sovereign institutions at the global level. 
Now it is undeniable that there are formidable, even insuperable 
barriers to the development of a global sovereign. It might be re-
ga.:ded as essential, if only for administrative convenience as well 
as for democratic control and sense of community, for men to live in 
separate states. Pufendorf implies that the division of men into 
separate states is for the good of all. The state: 
'is considered the most perfect society, and 
is that wherein is contained the greatest 
safety for mankind, now that it has grown 
so numerous.' 2 
It was stated earlier that Suarez had advanced a substantially similar 
argument, although it seemed there was no intellectual barrier in 
Scholasticism to prevent the replacement of a world of sovereign 
states with an international authority should empirical conditions 
allow. 3 In other words, the argument that the world is divided into 
separate states as a matter of administrative convenience is quite 
compatible with the position that states should ground their relations 
1. EUJ, p.274; see also DJNG, p.169. 
2. DJNG, p.949. 	3. See above, p.51. 
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on justice and seek to create conditions whereby international 
agencies might be established in the future.. But it becomes clear 
from the unfolding of Pufendorf's argument that tie state is not 
merely a temporary administrative convenience which may be super-
seded, but which is at any rate obliged to conduct itself in accord-
ance with universal moral standards. An argument of this kind would 
understand the division of mankind. into separate states as merely a 
transitional stage. It would assert in addition the value of an assoc-
iation which embraced the whole of mankind or brought principle to 
bear on those 'transactions' which might otherwise go unregulated. 
Pufendorf's argument for the separate, sovereign state is not 
a negative one, or not mainly a negative one, which rests simply upon 
the administrative convenience of the state. If the sovereign state 
exists simply because no higher association is possible, it would 
still be possible to take the external point of view and argue for 
the eventual transformation of the state-system. His argument however 
points to the imperfect nature of obligations to humanity and asserts 
the priority of obligations to fellow-citizens. Now it is already 
apparent from Pufendorf's account of the move from the state of 
nature to the condition of civil society that there will be much 
uncertainty and fear, and (although Pufendorf does not say this) a 
strong possibility of duplicity and coercion. It would not seem to 
be the case from Pufendorf's description of the establishment of 
sovereign states that men are prepared to assist one another to set 
up their political associations. There would seem to be no need for 
contractual arrangements between groups whereby each promised to 
assist the other should the condition of viability fail to result. 
Rather, in the search for a viable political society men are guided 
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by the objective of associating with others in a sufficiently power-
ful state. It might be argued that if this is the case obligations 
to humanity have little substantial value. Indeed the reason why 
Pufendorf's argument for the separate state is not negative is that 
he believes there are more positive, particular causes for establish-
ing states. And in explaining these causes to us Pufendorf deliber-
ately underplays the idea of obligations owed by men to each other 
simply as men. 
Pufendorf is aware that obligations to humanity have been over- 
looked or minimised in accounting for the rise of separate states. 
• 
Indeed he does raise an objection which could be brought against his 
own argument: 
'Now as for the further objection: • 'If man 
loved man in the course of nature, that is, 
as man, no reason could be given why each 
single individual should not love each other 
single individual, as being equally a man, 
or why he should the rather frequent those 
in whose society honour and advantage are 
accorded him beyond others.' To meet this it 
should be known that all men, indeed, have 
been brought together by the similarity of 
their nature towards one another, so that in 
actual fact that general friendship resulting 
from a common nature ought also to be common 
to all, unless someone, perchance, has by his 
crimes made himself unworthy of it. Now, in 
truth, a number of circumstances are added to 
that common nature which are responsible for 
one loving this one more than that one; suppose 
for example, that there was between them a 
greater harmony of dispositions in regard to 
special inclinations, or else that their 
birth-places were not far apart. But then 
and only then could no reason be given, if 
all men had grown out of the earth together 
like fungi, without any relationship to one 
another, or if they had among one another a 
similarity of dispositions at every point. 
But such a state of men has never existed, 
so no conclusion can be drawn from supposing 
it, contrary to what the actual facts show. ' 1  
EUJ, p.236; see also DJNG, p.213. 
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There would appear to be two reasons for the legitimacy of the 
division of mankind into separate civil societies. Pufendorf 
maintains: 
'That definite individuals unite to form a 
definite kind of society comes about either 
in consequence of a special harmony of dis-
positions or of other qualities, or else 
because they imagine that they can obtain 
some special end better with these persons 
than with those. Now it is by no means 
necessary for all men to coalesce into one 
society in which all are equal to one another; 
but it is sufficient if the same persons get 
together in several and distinct groups, 
which are, nevertheless, by no means altogether 
mutually unsociable, but refrain from unjust 
injuries towards one another, and, as far as 
they are permitted by closer obligations, share 
with one another their advantages and blessing.' 
Pufendorf appears to believe that the diverse characteristics of men 
should find expression in the fr..gmentation of mankind into several 
civil societies. Men have the right to choose which societies they 
will belong to: 
'Such societies nature has altogether wished 
to have among men, although it has been left 
within the free choice of men, and so is to 
be determined by pacts, just what individuals 
are to be united to what society, or who is 2 
 to be set at their heads for governing them.' 
It has been noted previously that men are at liberty to establish 
civil societies in accordance with their estimations of their self-
interest, a point which is reinforced in the above quotations. For 
Pufendorf obligations to humanity do not require the formation of a 
universal civil society and they do not appear to require any co-
operation to ensure that separate states are established in accordance 
with just principles - whereby no man is treated unequally (by, say, 
1. 	EUJ, p.234. 	2. ibid., p.235. 
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having his level of security diminished when states come to be 
established). Pufendorf asserts that men have the liberty of 
establishing civil societies for the protection of their interests; 
but he also wishes to maintain that men have natural obligations to 
share 'advantages' with each other. It is evident that these two 
objectives are not entirely consistent. The heart of Pufendorf's 
argument favours enabling self-interested men to choose the civil 
societies most likely to advance their own interests and most likely 
to contain men of like mind. For this reason it is necessary to 
conclude that Pufendorf has compromised the idea of a natural 
morality in his argument for the separate, sovereign state. 
Pufendorf rejects the idea that duties to humanity could in 
principle be the bases of an international society and he does not 
accept that the continuation of the process of association at the 
international level would enhance the moral order that exists among 
men. Of fundamental importance to Pufendorf are the contractual obli-
gations or reciprocal arrangements reached by individuals pursuing 
their own advantage. For this reason the individual is obliged first 
and foremost to the society of which he is a member. His particular 
society gives him the most important guarantee since fellow members 
have also submitted themselves to one sovereign power. Outsiders 
may be fellow men, and may be due respect simply on that account, but 
it is impossible to hold them in the high esteem due to fellow-
citizens since they have not agreed (or are part of) a civil society 
where the sovereign is authorised to enforce the agreements which 
may exist among them. Pufendorf will argue then that a man is more 
obliged to whoever has associated with him so that each may protect 
their rights; he is more obliged to this man than to one who is 
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prepared to keep their relationships at the uncertain level of 
imperfect obligation. This argument for the primacy of obligations 
to fellow citizens accounts for Pufendorf's failure to apply obli-
gations of humanity to the establishment of separate, sovereign 
states and to the conduct of their external relations. Pufendorf 
will neither reject the existence of obligations to humanity nor ade-
quately apply them to man's social and political relations. He does 
not consider that obligations to humanity might not permit men the 
liberty of contracting freely with each other to form a separate state 
without paying any significant attention to the interests of those 
who will be excluded from membership. Nor does he consider that their 
freedom of contract might be valid only if consistent with obligations 
to humanity. Rather, he concentrates upon the 'particular causes' 
which lead men to form 'particular and more limited societies . . 1 
Of the five features discussed earlier Pufendorf selects the 
first as the most important. 2 The appeal of sovereignty to self-
interested men carries particular weight in the argument for the 
separate state and in the argument for the priority of obligations 
to insiders. Pufendorf states that 'no hope need be held out for 
continued agreement and concord in a great group of men, when there 
is no sovereignty ' . 3 	He states also that 'the height of mortal 
achievement has been attained when security rests upon the strength 
of the entire state, and when one recognises no man on earth to be 
his superior'. 4 It is of no surprise then that Pufendorf should 
think that: 
1. DJNG, p.213. 
2. For these five features see above, pp. 118-119. 
3. DJNG, p.971. 	4. 	ibid., p.163. 
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'A good citizen's duty towards the whole 
state is to have nothing dearer than its 
welfare and safety, to offer his life, 
property and fortunes freely for its 
preservation, to exert all the strength 
of his mind and industry to add tc• its 
fame and promote its interests.' 
Nor is it surprising that for the sovereign 'the welfare of the 
people is the supreme law'. 2 The self-interested individual, then, 
who regards sovereignty as the major prize to be obtained, will hold 
obligations among fellow citizens higher than obligations to out-
siders. For him the separate sovereign state is the main guarantor 
of his security and the most important focus of his loyalty. 
III 
The Right Relationship of Sovereign States. 
In the state of nature, the condition of natural liberty, man 
is free to decide with whom to associate and in what kind of society. 
Men are not obliged to consult with all others (or all others likely 
to be affected) in these matters. Now had men in the state of nature 
formed a moral community where the laws of nature were binding upon 
them it would have been possible to argue that all men had the right 
to be involved in the decision to establish a separate, sovereign 
state. 3 Men could have argued that the existence of such an assoc-
iation, probably armed and claiming the right to acknowledge only its 
own will, posed a direct threat to their own interests and welfare. 
Therefore potential contractors should consult with them so that 
	
1. 	TBDMC, p.144. 	2. ibid., p.121. 
3. 	As indeed Filmer had argued, see above pp. 17-18. 
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their separate association did not harm the substantial interests 
of outsiders in contravention of the obligations owed to each other 
as men. Similarly, potential outsiders should not stand in the way 
of men wishing to establish the legal machinery to enforce obligations 
among themselves. Men could argue, however, that any group of men, 
which was prepared to take a unilateral decision to establish a 
sovereign state, was already in the process of infringing its obli-
gations to the rest of mankind. But the liberty of a group of persons 
to detach themselves from the rest . of mankind by forming a territor-
ially limited political association is indicative of a more general 
factor. For if men are free to choose to live in a separate, sover-
eign state without giving consideration to the interests of others 
(or without consulting others in the process of establishing their 
state) then they are free presumably to conduct their external. rela-
tions without consulting the interests of outsiders. The manner in 
which the state is established is a certain guide to its general 
orientation to the conduct of its external relations - and both are 
indicative of the way the social world is differentiated into 
insiders and outsiders. 
When Pufendorf argues that men have duties under the natural 
law which they are obliged to observe in the establishment of a civil 
society he is referring to the fact that no civil society can be 
created without the consent of its citizens. 1 It is contrary to the 
natural liberty and equality of a man to compel him to submit to a 
government not of his own choice. 	While this carried the desirable 
1. 	When men come to form a civil society they are 'still subject 
to the natural law, and so were obligated, of course, to draw 
up only such rules of sovereignty and civil disobedience as 
were agreeable to that law and to the lawful ends of states'. 
DJNG, p.1068. 
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connotation that the individual citizen has rights against the state, 
it also implies that outsiders have no fundamental claims upon 
contractors when they establish their political society or with 
regard to the manner in which they choose to exercise their sover-
eignty. For this would be to challenge the liberty and equality of 
other men and so to infringe one of the fundamental obligations men 
owe each other. 
The sovereign state receives its legitimacy from insiders, or 
more precisely from the consent of its citizens. According to Pufen-
dorf the sovereign state is established through the operation of a 
threefold contract. And at each level the contract takes place be-
tween a limited portion of mankind, that portion which wishes to form 
a separate association. In the first place it is necessary for free 
men to consent to form a society with each other. Each man agrees 
with the others that he is 'desirous of entering into a single and 
perpetual group, and of administering the considerations of their 
safety and security by common council and leadership. 1 Having agreed 
to form a society it is necessary for them to select together the nature 
of the government which will regulate their activities. Therefore, 
in the second place, men must choose whether to submit to the will of 
the majority regarding the kind of government to have or to remain in 
the state only if their particular choice of government is selected. 
The individual is at liberty to withdraw from the society if it does 
not decide to create the kind of government he would prefer to have. 
In the third place, men have to decide upon the individual or body 
that is to become 'the government of the group'. When this third 
contract has been completed the 'finished state' exists. 2 
1. 	ibid., p.974". 	2. 	ibid., p.975. 
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The sovereign receives its legitimacy from members of the 
group itself, a factor which will have a decisive influence upon 
the relations between sovereigns. Pufendorf maintains that 'just 
as a king owes his sovereignty to no one outside his realm, so he 
need not obtain the consent and approval of other kings and states, 
before he may carry himself like a king, and be regarded as such' . 1 
 As there is no 'external' factor in his legitimacy it would be an 
'injury for the sovereignty of such a king to be called in question 
by a foreigner'. 2 Sovereigns confront each other as equals without 
a superior and so a new state of nature results. And the state of 
nature which 'really exists' is none other than the condition which 
'exists between different states'. 3 The true state of nature com- 
prises free and equal sovereign states which cannot be bound to 
recognise political obligations without their consent. If the state 
could be bound without giving its express consent then its internal 
legitimacy, based upon the consent of its citizens alone, would be 
violated. 
It has already been noted that Pufendorf considers that the 
security provided by separate states renders international govern-
ment unnecessary. The separate state is insulated from outsiders to 
the extent that it is self-sufficient economically and politically. 
Since the primacy of duties to itself appears to prevent duties of 
humanity from posing any threat to its independent nature, the state 
has no need to recognise agreements which are not to its advantage. 
Perfect obligations exist on account of the authority of the sover-
eign, and since states do not recognise a sovereign no perfect 
1. ibid., p.1009. 
2. ibid. 	 3. 	TBDMC, p.90. 
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obligations are found among them. The agreements of states, either 
through custom or treaty, do not constitute binding international 
law. As perfect obligations depend upon the authority of the sover-
eign power, the mere agreements of states can only be temporary 
pacts which the individual state is free to revoke. There is no 
ius gentian, no binding international custom, as there was for Suarez: 
'Nor, in truth, are those sufficiently 
accurate who speak of laws as certain 
common agreements ... since Thereby they 
confuse a law with a pact.' 
And to show that these common agreements have no authority or obli-
gatory power, Pufendorf states that they: 
'do not rightly constitute special species 
of law, since, forsooth, the nations have 
those rights in common with one another, 
not from some agreement or mutual obligation, 
but they have been established by the special 
order of the individual legislators in the 
individual states, and so can be changed by 
one people without consulting others, and are 
frequently found to have been so changed.' 2 
The agreements between states add nothing to the natural law, and, 
since they are not commanded by a common sovereign, states are merely 
imperfectly obliged to obey them. Indeed, as 'the welfare of the 
people is the supreme law' the sovereign power can revoke such agree-
ments as it wishes when they are understood to have outlived their 
usefulness. 
It is not surprising that Pufendorf's account of international 
relations should lack any idea of moral progress. As we saw earlier, 
the internal point of view holds the opinion that progress for man 
can be accomplished within the sovereign state, while the state-system 
itself remains relatively static. It could be argued that Pufendorf's 
1. 	DJNG, p.147. 	2. 	EUJ, p.165. 
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lack of interest in progress at the international level is doubly 
deficient. In the first place, a serious commitment to duties of 
humanity should have involved Pufendorf in a discussion of what 
states might do to improve the nature of the relations between them. 
And he might have considered the development of customary rules as 
one of the ways in which states could bring about the rule of justice 
not only within but also between states. In the second place, it is 
not at all clear that the new state of nature will abolish the 
miseries of the old." In that event, it might be in the interest of 
all states to develop rules in the course of their relations which 
might then place limitations upon their rights of action. It is 
evident that Pufendorf offers no meaningful account of the means where-
by states might produce through their own actions a more inclusive 
moral community. 
On the other hand, Pufendorf is aware of the need for some 
states to co-operate with others in order to make good their own 
deficiencies. 	States may co-operate not to bring moral principles 
to bear upon their relationships or to improve the nature of the inter-
national system as such, but to acquire certain particular goals for 
themselves. To discuss this it is necessary to discuss the idea of 
' systems of states' which illustrates Pufendorf's view of the condi-
tions and parameters of international co-operation. 
Pufendorf begins by stating that 'we speak of systems of states 
when more than one are so held together by some special and strict 
bond that they appear to form one body'. 1  Although the state is 
regarded as supreme, Pufendorf believes that 'it is possible with 
1. 	DJNG, p.1043. 
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moral bodies for several to have but one head'. 1 Now this concept 
does not serve to indicate that various states have pooled their 
sovereignty to becolae no more than mere provinces in some 'civitas 
maixima'. 	But their involvement in a system of states does require 
that they revoke the right of unilateral decision in matters which 
are of interest to the system as a whole. One of the obligations of 
'membership' is the willingness to consult and seek the consent of 
Others within the arrangement. It is important to ask why it is that 
the sovereign state should be party to an arrangement which appears 
to be in conflict with its essential nature. To answer this question 
it is essential first of all to distinguish between two types of 
state-system: 
'We apprehend that there are two species of 
systems properly speaking; one where two 
states have one and the same king; the other 
where two or more states are joined by a 
pact into one body.' 2 
In the first system 'the individual states remain entirely distinct' 
while the king lives but when he dies 'there returns at once to each 
of the peoples the right to decide as it will on its form of govern-
ment' and to do this 'without consulting the others'. 3 In this 
system the individual states retain sovereignty over their affairs, 
although their form of government is linked with the system as a 
whole and cannot be changed until the head dies. The second 'species' 
is rather different in nature: 
'The other kind of system is that which 
consists of several states bound to each 
by a perpetual treaty, and which is usually 
occasioned by the fact that the individual 
states wished to preserve their autonomy 
1. ibid., p.1045. 
2. ibid., p.1044. 	3. ibid., p.1045. 
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and yet had not sufficient strength 
to repel their enemies. In this treaty 
there is commonly an agreement that one 
or other part of the supreme sovereignty 
should be exercised at the consent of all.' 
Here Pufendorf simply takes account of the fact that one state may 
not be able to secure a condition of viability for itself but may 
simultaneously desire to retain its sovereignty: 
'For it hardly seems likely that the affairs 
of several states could be so closely inter-
woven that it would be to the advantage of 
one and all of them that no part of the supreme 
sovereignty be exercised without the consent 
of all. Or if there were any such, it would 
have been more to their advantage to unite ,2 in one state than to be joined only by treaty. 
Co-operation to make up for the state's deficiencies does not require 
the formation of a new political association since, as we have seen, 
mere want in Pufendorf's view does not account for the foundation of 
political society. International co-operation exists to reinforce 
the state-system rather than to replace it and it is certainly not 
a method of attempting to create conditions whereby a move beyond 
the state-system would become possible. Nevertheless the system of 
states should have some jurisdiction over the activities of states 
as the following remark indicates: 
'if any controversy arises between the 
allies themselves the others who have no 
direct interest in it may at once interpose 
as mediators, and not allow it to come to 
open warfare.' 3 
It may also be useful to have a 'permanent council' to 'treat with 
the ambassadors of foreign states, and conclude negotiations with 
them in the common cause of all the confederates'. In these ways 
separate, sovereign states can form 'one body'. 4 
1. ibid., pp.1046-1047. 	3. ibid. 
2. ibid., p.1047. 	4. ibid., p.1049. 
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To surrender sovereignty to the system of states would be 
to give the alliance a perfect right to enforce any obligation 
violated by a sovereign state. Pufendorf, however:, is unprepared to 
allow that a system of states is entitled to take away the rights 
of states to decide the extent of their obligations. Any 'permanent 
council' which may exist cannot be empowered to act contrary to the 
will of any of the associates. Its power can be no greater than that 
'delegated by the confederates': 
'For the liberty of a state, which is nothing 
other than the power to decide on its own 
judgment about matters pertaining to its 
self-preservation, is unintelligible in case 
it can be forced by another, acting with 
authority, to undertake something against 
its will.' 1 
'The individual members wish to be led' to a course of action 'not 
by authority but by reason alone'. Associates will allow the system 
of states this much: that 'I will not exercise my right unless you 
are willing'. What they will not allow the system of states is a 
principle which maintains 'You will have the right to require me to 
exercise my right, even though I be unwilling'. 2 For this reason the 
system of states as understood by Pufendorf is best described as a 
Gesselschaft. 3 Accordingly the state cannot be obliged to remain 
	
1. 	ibid., p.1050. 	2. 	ibid. 
3. 	According to Talcott Parsons, in such an association: 
'The relationship is to be regarded subjectively as a 
means by which the individual attains his own ends. The 
motive for entering into such a relationship is that it 
is the most efficient means to his end that is available 
in the situation; ... in any new situation that may arise 
the presumption is against the inclusion of a new obligation 
unless it can be shown to be 'in the contract' as implied 
in its terms. The burden of proof is on him who would 
require the performance of an obligation not obviously 
and explicitly assumed.' 
T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, vol.2, New York 
1968, 'Note on Gemeinschaft and Gesselschaft', pp.686-694. 
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as part of the association if the situation changes so radically 
that the association is no longer the most effective means of promot-
ing the state's interests: 
'Such systems are dissolved when some of the 
confederates voluntarily leave the league and 
administer their states to themselves, which 
usually happens from the consideration that 
they hope for more advantage from separation 
than from union, and that they feel their 
allies to be more of a burden than an assistance.'  
It is essential that Pufendorf consider international co-operation 
in purely instrumental terms given his understanding of the separate, 
sovereign state. For Pufendorf the basic fact about man is his 
desire to hold on to his liberty in the state, 'because this sover-
eignty is supreme, that is is not dependent upon'any superior man on 
earth; its acts cannot for that reason be made void at the discretion 
of any other being's will ' . 2 It is inevitably the case that 
Pufendorf's theory of man and the state should give rise to a merely 
instrumental idea of the value of international co-operation. 
IV 
Let us conclude this section with a brief discussion of 
Pufendorf as a theorist of the internal point of view. Pufendorf's 
theory of the state and international relations betrays all the 
features of this point of view. It holds that the rights of the ego-
centric state are supreme; it argues that the obligations of the 
citizen are due first and foremost to the society in which he lives 
,while the sovereign is obliged to consider the welfalfe of society as 
the 'supreme law'; and finally there is ample evidence to show that 
1. 	DJNG, p.1051. 	2. 	ibid., p.1055. 
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Pufendorf considered international co-operation to be a means 
whereby any separate state could make good certain deficiencies 
through certain reciprocal arrangements with others. Pufendorf's 
theory of the internal point of view belongs to that special variety 
which holds that there are fundamental moral obligations which all 
men owe to each other. The separate state is not entitled to do as 
it pleases since there are obligations due to other men simply on 
account of their humanity. Nonetheless, the state, as it is por-
trayed by Pufendorf, is egocentric. It is created through the con-
sent of its citizens in order to promote their interests. And, as 
has already been noted, Pufendorf does not appear to consider to 
any satisfactory extent the injury that may be done to other men 
either in establishing the separate state or in conducting its 
external relations once it has been established. If Pufendorf's 
idea of a universal morality were taken more seriously states would 
be obliged to co-operate with each other in order to protect each 
other's interests. Pufendorf fails to provide any serious account 
of the obligations between states under the moral law. His discussion 
of the right relationships between separate, sovereign states 
focusses neither on the need to promote the application of universal 
morality nor on the obligations of states to improve the inter-
national environment which affects them all. It focusses rather 
upon some minimal level of peaceful co-existence with the option of 
instrumental co-operation to provide egocentric states with some of 
the economic or political objectives which they are unable to secure 
for themselves. And, as we have seen, this is an essential character-
istic of the internal point of view. 
It is arguable that alongside Pufendorf's argument for the 
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separate state lies a universal morality which is the basis of a 
quite different account of international relations - an account 
which has been desclibed as the external point of view. As Pufen- 
dorf does not exploit the resources of this ethic at all satisfactor-
ily (or develop its implications for the nature of international 
relations) he is open to the charge of failing to harmonise two 
separate perspectives. And since.these two perspectives are not 
harmonised there is at the heart of Pufendorf's account of the state 
a tension which cannot go unnoticed. 	For Pufendorf wishes to argue 
that there is a moral law which governs all men. He wishes to assert 
that it is not sufficiently precise to be the ground of all political 
relations. He also wishes to assert that men are not always able to 
know how to help each other and are not able to help all men equally 
well. Nevertheless, he clearly x.ishes to argue that a universal 
morality does exist despite these difficulties. On the other hand, 
Pufendorf argues that men are concerned first and foremost with their 
own interests, that they find a dignity in independence and prefer 
to ground their relationships on contractual and reciprocal principles 
which preserve the individuality of the separate parties. Pufendorf 
does not employ his universal morality in order to ask how far indivi-
duals are entitled to consider their self-interest first of all or 
how far one man may be obliged to another without the existence of 
contract and reciprocity. And it is for this reason precisely that 
we have to conclude that Pufendorf fails to harmonise these two 
elements in man and has failed therefore to give a satisfactory account 
of the state and international relations. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
Vattel's Theory of the State and  
International Relations. 
I 
Vattel, like Pufendorf, wishes to argue that there is a 
morality which survives the division of humanity into separate, sover-
eign states. Nevertheless, we shall discover once again an argument 
for the primacy of obligations to separate, sovereign states. 
Vattel's theory differs in important respects from Pufendorf's how-
ever. The latter's theory is defective in that it provides an alleg-
ed justification for the egocentric state. He does not pay suffi-
cient attention to the fact that as each state is equal (since it 
derives its legitimacy from the consent of its subjects), and as 
all men have obligations to assist each other, states themselves 
should attempt to improve each other's conditions as far as is 
possible. It is to Vattel's credit that, using similar philosophi-
cal resources to those of Pufendorf, he provides an account of the 
obligations which all states have as members of 'the natural society 
of nations'. 1 Equal states have obligations to protect the natural 
order of states and to assist each other to become more 'perfect'. 
Now this is in itself an important step beyond Pufendorf. However, 
we shall discover that Vattel's theory generates its own difficulties, 
most notably in his desire to 'subjectivise' the moral law in order 
to allow sovereign states to be the sole judges of their ability to 
carry cut their international obligations. It will be necessary in 
1. 	Vattel , The Law of Nations, Washington 1916, p.6. 
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the subsequent chapter to discuss Kant's account of the moral law 
and its bearing upon international relations. For if Vattel repre-
sents an improvement upon Pufendorf by arguing for obligations 
to the 'natural society of states' his own subjectivising of the 
natural law is particularly defective. It will be important then to 
consider the approach of a theorist who does not dilute the moral law 
and who produces as a result a radically different account of the state 
and international relations. We shall discover this more radical 
and, as . I shall argue, more correct theory of international relations 
in the writings of Kant. However, let us approach Kant through a 
more detailed discussion of Vattel's thought. 
Vattel resembles Pufendorf in many respects but most of all by 
presenting an individualistic theory of the state. He too begins 
with a state of nature in which individuals are unable to 'perfect' 
themselves and he proceeds to offer an ascending conception of govern-
ment whereby men establish a state by means of a contract in order to 
improve their condition. Furthermore, Vattel agrees with Pufendorf 
that there is not the same necessity for a world-wide contract in 
order to form a universal civil society: 
'It is true that men, seeing that the Laws 
of Nature were not being voluntarily observed, 
have had recourse to political association 
as the one remedy against the degeneracy of 
the majority, as the one means of protecting 
the good and restraining the wicked; and the 
natural law itself approves of such a course. 
But it is clear that there is by no means the 
same necessity for a civil society among Nations 
as among individuals. It cannot be said, there-
fore, that nature recommends it to an equal 
degree, far less that it prescribes it. 
Individuals are so constituted that they could 
accomplish little by themselves and could scarcely 
get on without the assistance of civil society 
and its laws. But as soon as a sufficient 
number have united under a government, they are 
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able to provide for most of their needs, 
and they find the help of other political 
societies not so necessary to them as the 
State itself is to individuals.' 1 
In addition, Vattel is clearly of the mind, as war Pufendorf, that 
states are subdivisions of the human race, and that men, while assoc-
iated in particular societies, remain tied to outsiders by virtue 
of their moral obligations: 
'Since the universal society of the human 
race is an institution of nature, itself, 
that is, a necessary result of man's nature, 
all men of whatever condition are bound to 
advance its interests and to fulfil its duties. 
No convention or special agreement can release 
them from the obligation. When, therefore, 
men unite in civil society and form a separate 
state or nation, they may, indeed, make parti-
cular agreements with others of the same state, 
but their duties towards the rest of the human 
race remain unchanged; but with this difference 
that when men have agreed to act in common, 
and have given up their rights and have sub-
mitted their will to the whole body as far 
as concerns their common good, it devolves 
thenceforth upon that body, the state, and 
upon its rulers, to fulfil the duties of 
humanity towards outsiders in all matters 
in which individuals are no longer at liberty 
to act, and it particularly rests with the 
state to fulfil these duties towards other 
states.' 2 
Vattel believes then that men have two loyalties, one to the separate 
state the other to humanity itself, and that they have, in addition, 
two sets of obligation corresponding to these loyalties. Once again 
this raises the problem of harmonising these obligations so that 
the moral and political world forms a consistent whole. 
It was noted earlier that Pufendorf held that all men were 
equal and that no man had the right to claim for himself what he would 
refuse to others. This principle of equality is similarly important 
1. Vattel, ibid., pp.9a-10a. 	2. ibid., pp.5-6. 
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within Vattel's thought. He argued that the state is a legitimate 
political association established by men wishing to improve their 
condition. And indeed since all men wish to improve their condition 
(and are obliged to assist others to improve theirs), it follows 
that separate, sovereign states should treat each other as equals 
and should assist one another to attain their ends - as far as is 
possible. While Pufendorf failed to adequately consider the obligations 
states have to improve each other's condition, Vattel asserts them 
emphatically: 
'Since men are by nature equal, and their 
individual rights and obligations the same, 
as coming equally from nature, nations, 
which are composed of men and may be 
regarded as so many free persons living 
together in a state of nature, are by nature 
equal and hold from nature the same obligations 
and the same rights. Strength or weakness 
in this case counts for nothing. A dwarf is 
as much a man as a giant is; a small republic 
is no less a sovereign state than the most 
powerful kingdom. From this equality it 
necessarily follows that what is lawful or 
unlawful for one nation is equally ltwful 
or unlawful for every other nation.' 
Now Vattel considers a variety of ways in which states can assist each 
other in the maintenance of their independence and viability. He 
maintains that 'if a Nation is suffering from famine, all those who 
have provisions to spare should assist it in its need ' . 2 Further-
more states should be concerned to preserve each other's independence 
from any aggressor: 
'If a Nation were to make open profession 
of treading justice under foot by despising 
and violating the rights of another whenever 
it had an opportunity of doing so, the safety 
of human society at large would warrant all 
the other Nations in uniting together to 
subdue and punish such a Nation.' 3 
1. ibid., p.7. 	2. ibid., p.115. 	3. ibid., p .135. 
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There is, in short, a natural society of states which each state is 
obliged to preserve and advance. Vattel does not condone the ego-
centric state. Rather re argues for states which are prepared to 
assist each other to 'perfect' themselves, as required by the moral 
law which embraces them all. 
Although Vattel takes us beyond Pufendorf, he proceeds to dil-
ute the universal moral law which should regulate the affairs of states. 
It is one of the idiosyncracies of Vattel's position that he asserts 
the existence of a moral law which would bind persons, by definition 
according to normal discourse, and simultaneously asserts the right 
of the state to decide whether or not it will or can honour its obli-
gations. Vattel maintains that nations are 'free and independent of 
one another' and that: 
'In consequence of that liberty and independence, 
it follows that it is for each Nation to 
decide what its conscience decides of it, 
what it can or cannot do; what it thinks 
well or does not think well to do; and there-
fore it is for each Nation to consider and 
determine what duties it can fulfil towards 
others without failing in its duty towards 
itself. Hence in all cases in which it belongs 
to a Nation to judge of the extent of its 
duty, no other Nation may force it to act 
one way or another. Any attempt to do so 
would be an encroachment upon the liberty of 
Nations.' 1 
Now if there were a binding moral law it would appear rational to 
argue that states should have recourse to a form of international 
arbitration to settle their differences in accordance with impartial 
principles. 	And if the moral law was .truly binding it would appear 
irrational to grant states the liberty of choosing whether or not to 
have recourse to such procedure. Now Vattel believes that: 
1. 	ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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'A Nation must, therefore, render to others 
what is due to them, leave them in the 
peaceful enjoyment of their rights, repair 
any harm caused or injury done to any of 
them by Itself, render them just sLitisfaction 
for an injury that cannot be repaLred, and 
give them reasonable securities where they 
have had just grounds of fear as to what the 
Nation might do.' 1 
But he also asserts (at first with regard to what he calls the 'doubt- 
ful case') the lawfulness of a state which chooses 'to force its 
enemy to a settlement without having previously tried pacific means' 
on the grounds that 'it belongs to each Nation to judge whether it 
is in a position to attempt pacific means of settlement before having 
recourse to arms'. 2 On the other hand, in his Introduction Vattel 
puts forward an argument which undermines the concept of a morality: 
'When differences arise each Nation in fact 
claims to have justice on its side, and 
neither of the interested parties nor other 
Nations may decide the question. The one 
who is actually in the wrong sins against 
its conscience; but as it may possibly be 
in the right, it cannot be accused of 13 violating the laws of the society of Nations. 
If this is pressed to its conclusion it would appear that there is no 
standard of justice with which to settle disputes between states. 
But, as we have seen, Vattel thought there was a moral law which 
obliged states as well as individuals, although adjustments would be 
necessary to make this moral law applicable to the different kind of 
society to be found at the international level. 	Nevertheless, Vattel 
is inclined to think that the mere act of judging another stare may 
be incompatible with that society's liberty and with the natural 
society of states. Vattel claims: 
'The liberty of a Nation would not remain 
1. ibid., p.222. 
2. ibid., p.226. 	3. ibid., pp.7-8. 
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complete if other Nations presumed to 
inspect ane control its conduct; a 
presumption which would be contrary to 
the natural law, which leaves every Nation 
free and independent of all other Nations.' 1 
Paradoxical as it is, Vattel wishes to assert that states are under. 
a moral obligation not to judge each other in accordance with their 
moral obligations. 
Vattel's dissolution of an international morality (or his 
' subjectivising' of the natural law by leaving every state the liberty 
of deciding what it can and cannot do) rests on quite different argu-
ments from those used by Pufendorf. Vattel does not wish to press 
the essentially self-interested aspects of human nature or the unwill-
ingness of men to perform obligations without hope of some reciprocal 
benefit. Vattel is more concerned about the possibility that an object-
ive morality might be used to over-rule the liberty of a state. It 
might provide the basis for intervention in another state's affairs 
or for subordination of states to some imperial power or to the 
Papacy. 2 Vattel believed that the division of humanity into separate, 
1. ibid., p.5. 
2. According to one of his commentators: 'Fearing the hegemony of a 
pope or of an emperor, he resolutely argues even against the idea, 
so dear to Wolff, of a maxima civitas, in which all the states 
would be subject to a single law, as if they had only one common 
superior.' ibid. Introduction by A. de Lapradelle, pp.xi-xii. 
Vattel rejects the idea of 'civitas maxima' on p.9a, ibid. In his 
Law of Nations Christian Wolff advanced the idea of a 'supreme 
state' consisting of 'all nations in general'. The supreme state 
was, Wolff argued, 'a certain sort of state, consequently a society, 
moreover since every society ought to have its own laws and the 
right exists in it of promulgating laws with respect to those things 
which concern it, the supreme state also ought to have its own laws 
and the rights exist in it of promulgating laws with respect to 
those things which concern it'. Moreover, 'in the supreme state 
the nations as a whole have a right to coerce the individual nations 
if they should be unwilling to perform their obligation, or should 
show themselves negligent in it'. The Law of Nations (Classics 
of International Law), Oxford 1934. pp. 13--14. 
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sovereign states was not merely the result of the impossibility of 
administering a world-wide political association. Rather, Vattel 
argues (and is here in agreement with Gibbon) that the division of 
men into separate, sovereign states is a precondition of human free-
dom - particularly freedom from an imperial power. 1 In addition, 
Vattel believed that the freedom of men was protected by denying states 
the right of judging each other's acts, a right which would justify 
one state 'punishing' another and so undermining the natural equality 
of states. For Vattel, as we shall see later, the balance of power 
is the means whereby free and equal states can maintain an internation-
al order while preserving that same freedom and equality. Let us now 
consider in a little more detail Vattel's concept of human liberty 
and its association with the 'subjectivising' of natural law. 
The freedom of men is expressed first of all with reference to 
the original condition of man, namely the state of nature. No man can 
be subjected to political authority unless he has given his prior con-
sent. Now while the individual has moral obligations to the rest of 
mankind, he retains the liberty of deciding whether or not it is pos-
sible for him to honour them. And this is a consequence of the fact 
that man is responsible first and foremost to himself. Each man has 
the right to perfect himself and to join in a society in order to im-
prove his condition. But it must be his own deliberate decision which 
brings him into civil society. The rent of humanity has no right to 
prevent a man from joining the political society of his own choice or 
1. 	'The division of Europe into a number of independent states, 
connected, however, with each other by the general resemblance 
of religion, language and manners, is productive of the most 
beneficial consequences to the liberty of mankind.' Cibbon, 
The History of the Decline and FaZZ of the Roman Empire, 
Vol.1, (revised and edited by the Rev.H.H.Milman) London 1890, 
p.58. 
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to interfere with the type of constitution which a people may choose 
to establish. Similarly, once the state is established no state has 
the right to impose its will on another state, for the latter is 
equally free to decide what it is to do. In this way states possess 
a natural freedom in relation to each other - like individuals in the 
original state of nature. Each has the right to perfect itself, each 
has the obligation to assist the other, but no state can be compelled 
to assist another. 	Now this would appear to create important diffi- 
culties for Vattel's theory. On the one hand, a group of people have 
the liberty to form a sovereign body in order to promote their common 
interests. However, their sovereignty will be incomplete if they can 
be compelled as of right to perform certain actions. Indeed, the 
meaning of sovereignty, as commonly understood, indicates that a group 
has the liberty of taking decisions without any obligation of consult-
ing others or without reference to any higher authority. It is 
simply the right of taking decisions on one's own account. However, 
Vattel also wishes to argue for the existence of obligations to the 
whole of humanity. It is clear that sovereign states have been granted 
the liberty to choose whether or not to honour other than the most 
fundamental obligations owed to each other by virtue of the membership 
of the natural society of states. There is the problem of reconciling 
the fact that states have obligations to themselves in addition to 
obligations to preserve an international order favourable to them all. 
Vattel's account of the state and international relations must offer 
principles which will deal with situations where these two obligations 
and responsibilities are in conflict. 
Now the problem is overcome in Vattel's writings by regarding 
obligations to oneself as prior to obligations to others. The 
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individual state is responsible first of all to itself and it has to 
measure its obligations to others against this standard. Vattel 
maintains that: 
'If the rights of a nation are derived from 
its obligations they are chiefly derived from 
those which the nation owes to itself. We 
shall likewise see that its duties towards 
others mainly depend upon, should be regulated, 
and measured by its duties towards itself.' 1 
Vattel does not wish men 'to learn how not to be good., . 2  Ile does not 
wish to argue that men are justified in always placing their own 
interests before the interests of others: 
'We know that, in general, duties toward self 
prevail over duties towards others; but this 
is only to be understood of duties which bear 
some proportion to one another ... What idea 
should we have of a prince, or of a nation, 
who would refuse to yield the smallest 
advantage in order to gain for the world 
the inestimable blessing of peace?' 3 
And quite clearly no state has the right of violating the right of 
other states to an equally free existence. But in those contexts where 
a state has a choice between harming another or enduring substantial 
injury to itself, it has no choice but to place its own welfare first. 
Nevertheless, the decision whether or not a state can honour an obli-
gation without doing injury to its own welfare must always belong to 
the sovereign state. Vattel might have argued for international 
arbitration to have a fundamental place in the conduct of international 
relations, but his preference rests with the liberty of the state to 
decide for itself. 
1. Vattel, op.cit., p.13. 
2. Machiavelli, 'The Prince', in The Prince and the Discourses 
(ed. M. Lerner), New York 1950, p.57. 
3. Vattel, op.cit., p.225. 
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In this discussion Vattel makes use of the distinction between 
perfect and imperfect obligations. The essence of an imperfect obli-
gation is that a man or a state may request that the obligation be 
honoured, but has no right to compel the ether state to act in accord-
ance with it. With a perfect obligation, on the other hand, one party 
may use force to compel another to act accordingly. Therefore, where 
a state is only imperfectly obliged it cannot be compelled to honour 
its obligation: 
'It will now be readily understood why a right 
is always imperfect when the corresponding 
obligation depends upon the judgment of him 
who owes it; for if he could be constrained 
in such a case he would cease to have the 
right of deciding what are his obligations 
to the law of conscience. Our obligations 
to others are always imperfect when the decision 
as to how we are to act rests with us, as it 
does in all matters where we ought -to be free.' 
The element of freedom which is contained in the idea of an imperfect 
obligation has peculiar implications for Vattel's idea of the natural 
society cf states. It seemed that Vattel had improved upon Pufendorf 
since he had a more rigorous idea of the obligations which survived 
the division of men into separate, sovereign states. States had the 
duty of assisting each other to perfect themselves. Therefore, Vattel's 
system would seem to require that men in the act of dividing into 
separate states recognise the obligation of trying to improve each 
other's condition. Pufendorf, on the other hand, imagined a situation 
where some men might be compelled to join a society simply out of fear. 
But Vattel is not sufficiently rigorous in his defence of international 
obligations. He maintains that a nation which experiences famine may 
request aid from another, but cannot compel the granting of aid since 
1. 	ibid., p.6. 
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the option of assistance is one which has to be left to the potential 
donor. It would not be an 'injury' or an 'act of aggression' to 
refuse to grant aid. 1 However, it would he an injury to compel a 
state to act in accordance with its duties to humanity since this 
would constitute a violation of the natural liberty of states. While 
there is an obligation to help all men to perfect themselves there is 
simultaneously a right to refuse to perform the obligation. Ultimate-
ly for Vattel the obligation to respect the natural liberty of states 
is the most fundamental of all. 
Since the natural liberty of states is the highest value for 
Vattel it follows that the move from an imperfect to a perfect obli-
gation is possible only through the consent of the state. One state 
may grant another the right to receive aid, and not merely to request 
it, through the signing of a treaty and it may be compelled by the 
other signatory to honour that obligation. But, in this example, the 
obligation is created by the state through its consent. Conversely, 
without the element of consent the state would not have been obliged 
to actually give aid. Now Vattel believed that all states should 
recognise each other's right to decide whether or not to create perfect 
obligations through the signing of treaties. 	Each state should value 
its own liberty and the liberty of others, the ensuing condition being 
preferable to one where states could compel each other to assist in 
their perfection. In the latter condition states would either be in 
constant danger of war or would require some superior power to compel 
states to honour their obligations. Since the former condition repre-
sents a continual threat to international order and the latter condition 
represents a threat to individual liberty, states are commonly 
1. ibid., pp. 116 and 139. 
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advantaged by recognising each other's liberty to decide the extent 
to which they can honour their duties to humanity without incurring 
substantial injury to themselves. It is in the interest of all to 
regard a legitimate ordering of world society as one in which separate 
states recognise each other's liberty and equality. Vattel's theory 
of the state and international relations does not defend the right 
of the egocentric state to ignore international obligations or violate 
the rights of others when it chooses. 	It defends the idea of inter- 
national obligations, which ought to be respected, and it argues that 
major benefits for the international order must take precedence over 
trivial losses for the state. There is, in other words, a principle 
of proportionality which the state has to take into account in deciding 
upon any precise course of conduct. But even in arguing for the 
natural liberty of states to judge how far they can perform 'offices 
to humanity', Vattel is defending a principle of international morality. 
For it is of overriding significance that separate states recognise 
their equal freedom. 
II 
Let us now turn to a dicussion of Vattel's concept of inter-
national order. It has been suggested that Vattel improves upon Pufen-
dorf's account of international relations by maintaining that states 
are obliged to preserve an international order among themselves, one 
which protects the liberty of each member state. By comparison with 
Vattel, Pufendorf's thoughts on international order are particuarly 
crude. Pufendorf considered external relations in instrumental terms 
and would not appear to wish to argue that states should expend much 
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effort preserving the international order unless precise benefits 
would result. Pufendorf is over-inclined to consider international 
order in instrumental terms and, as a result, little attention is 
paid to obligations to preserve an international order among free and 
equal societies. It is to Vattel's credit that he considered at some 
greater length the nature of the international order that might exist 
between separate states. 
It is crucial to Vattel that the natural liberty of states must 
be preserved by states themselves. 	Vattel imagines a voluntaristic 
international order whereby free states contribute to the preservation 
of their natural liberty. And it is through the use of the balance of 
power that equally free societies can best maintain an order favourable 
to themselves: 
'Europe forms a political system in which the 
nations inhabiting this part of the world are 
bound together by their relations and various 
interests into a single body. It is no longer, 
as in former times, a confused heap of detached 
parts, each of which had but little concern for 
the lot of others, and rarely troubled itself over 
what did not immediately affect it. The constant 
attention of sovereigns to all that goes on, the 
custom of resident ministers, the continual 
negotiations that take place, make modern Europe 
a sort of republic, whose members - each indepen- 
dent, but all bound together by a common 
interest-unite for the maintenance of order 
and the preservation of liberty. This is what 
has given rise to the well-known principle of 
the balance of power, by which is meant an 
arrangement of affairs so that no state shall 
be in a position to have absolute mastery and 
dominate over the others.' 1 
Vattel defends the balance of power as a means of preserving the 
liberty and equality of separate states. It is not the result of sep-
arate, egotistical states attempting to reach supremacy only to be 
1. 	ibid., p.251. 
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thwarted and possibly overtaken by others. For Vattel the balance of 
power was not to be confused with an international system 'in which 
egotism was limited by ncthing but eogtismt . 1  Indeed, as Hinsley has 
stated, Vattel belongs to a group of thinkers who 'assumed that the 
relations between those states were moderated by the recognition that 
they were members of a common civilisation, no less than by exped-
iency'. 2 The balance of power is a condition which states should seek 
to establish for their mutual welfare and for the preservation of one 
of the great values of the civilisation to which they belong, namely 
liberty. It is important that every state should be on its guard 
against any state which would seek to upset the balance of power, and 
to 'weaken' it 'as soon as a favourable opportunity can be found when 
we can do so with justice'. 3 	For this reason Vattel had particular 
regard for England 'whose wealth and powerful navy have given '- er a 
very great influence, without, however, causing any state to fear for 
its liberty, since that power appears to be cured of the spirit of 
conquest - England, I say, has the honour to hold in her hands the 
political scales. She is careful to maintain them in equilibriuni.' 4 
 Nevertheless, Vattel does not overlook the fact that the main incent-
ive for preserving the balance of power will be the resulting advan-
tages for the separate state. A state which enters a war in which it 
has no immediate interests at stake is, according to Vattel, safe-
guarding the liberty of the nation attacked, preserving the balance 
of power and securing an environment in which states will be more 
likely to assist it should it be attacked. Indeed 'if all sovereigns 
1. F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge 1963, 
p.188. For Vattel the balance of power is a "policy" rather 
than a "situation". 
2. ibid., p,187. 
3. Vattel, op.cit., p.251. 	4. 	ibid. 
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were constantly aware of their true interests '1 they would be pre-
pared to safeguard the balance of power at all times for in so doing 
they discharge their obligations to humanity and help to perfect 
themselves: 
`Thus, when a neighbouring state is attacked 
unjustly by a powerful enemy which threatens 
to crush it, if you can defend it without 
exposing yourself to great danger there is 
no question but that you should do so. Do 
not raise the objection that a sovereign has 
not the right to expose the life of his 
soldiers for the safety of a foreign nation 
with which he has not contracted a defensive 
alliance. 	He may happen to have like need 
of help; and therefore by putting into force 
the spirit of mutual assistance he is promoting 
the safety of his own nation. Statecraft thus 
goes hand in hand with duty and obligation, 
for princes have an interest in checking the 
advance of an ambitious ruler who seeks to ,2 increase his power by subduing his neighbours. 
Vattel was of the opinion that the balance of power was a means of 
preserving the freedom of all states, and so its use was an important 
means of fulfilling the obligations which all men owe to one another. 
In addition, Vattel believed that states could freely regulate the 
balance of power among themselves, since enlightened self-interest 
would endorse its capacity to assist the state to perfect itself. 
The balance of power in Vattel's view is capable of holding 
together the obligations of the state to itself and the obligations 
owed the rest of humanity. And it is the enlightened self-interest 
of the state which enables it to fulfil its responsibilities to others 
while improving its own welfare. Vattel's system contains one loop-
hole which makes the harmony of obligations to fellow-citizens and 
fellow-men less attractive than it might seem. The loop-hole is found 
in the fact that the state is always the judge of how far it can honour 
1. 	ibid. 2. 	ibid., pp.114-5. 
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its international responsibilities when its own welfare !s endangered. 
According to Vattel's theory of international relations there is no 
reason why a state should refuse an alliance with a po.ier attempting 
to upset the balance of power if it is more likely to preserve its 
own liberty in that way rather than through an alliance with weaker 
powers. Here it seems Rousseau has found the answer to Vattel as well 
as to Pufendorf. Vattel can avoid the attack that Rousseau might make 
of Pufendorf, namely that in exchanging the natural condition of man 
for a state of nature composed of states man moves into a more miser-
able condition. Vattel has at least argued that states are obliged 
to assist each other to perfect themselves. Nevertheless, since they 
retain the liberty of deciding how far they can honour their inter-
national obligations insecurity must be an inevitable part of. Vattel's 
international order. For this reason Rousseau's parable is particular-
ly striking. Why should one man co-operate with five others to 
capture a stag when through his own efforts he can capture a hare 5 
especially when he knows that each of the others has the liberty of 
doing the same? In an environment when the commitment of others to a 
common objective cannot be assumed, a state must always be tempted to 
take care of its responsibilities to itself first of all, lest in per-
forming its obligations to outsiders it finds itself disadvantaged. 
Since this insecurity is essentially related to the liberty of states, 
the objective of harmonising obligations to fellow•citizens and obli-
gations to fellow-men seems to elude Vattel. 
Although Vattel's theory of international relations is an im-
provement upon Pufendorf's, insofar as it has a more developed idea 
of an international order founded upon obligations to humanity, it 
allows these obligations to be overridden too easily. Certainly, 
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Vattel is careful to point out that international obligations should 
not be ignored simply on account of minimal national advantages. The 
liberty of states wou_id be challenged according to Vattel if states 
were presumptuous enough to pass judgment on each other's conduct. A 
serious commitment to the concept of obligations to humanity would 
require the removal of the latitude allowed states and a defence of 
international bodies authorised to pass judgment on the conduct of 
external relations. A more rigorous interpretation of obligations 
to humanity would require states to submit their disputes to, for 
example, an international court entrusted with judging state conduct 
in accordance with principles of law and morality. However, Vattel 
does not argue for this objective on account of his preference for 
the liberty of the state. If Vattel fails to develop a harmonious 
relationship between universal moral obligations and more local poli-
tical obligations, at least it is in pursuit of an important value, 
namely liberty or freedom from the domination of an imperial power. 
It is not surprising that Vattel should have found favour in the 
contemporary world where the freedom of states from the imposition of 
the ideologies of foreign powers is important for international order. 
Hedley Bull's argument that in an ideologically diverse world order 
must have priority over justice (since the pursuit of justice would 
endanger order) has its roots in Vattel's theory of international 
relations. 1 Bull credits Vattel with having helped establish the 
'pluralist' as opposed to the 'solidarist' approach to international 
relations. 2 In opposition to the Grotian or 'solidarist' approach, 
1. H. Bull, "Order vs. Justice in International Society", 
Political Studies, vol.19, 1971, pp. 269-83. 
2. H. Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society", 
in Butterfield and Wight, op.cit., ch.3. 
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the 'pluralists' maintain that states 'are capable of agreeing only 
for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforce-
ment of the law. In tae view it takes of the area of actual or 
potential agreement among the member states of international society 
it may be called pluralist where the Grotian doctrine is solidarist; 
and the rules it prescribes for relations among them are such as to 
reflect this difference'. 1 There is a sense in which the principles 
advanced by Vattel deal with a unique context, namely a group of states 
which form a society insofar as they recognise common moral principles, 
while acknowledging that only limited agreement is possible among 
sovereign states. Where states are ideologically divided it is evident-
ly more desirable that states agree upon the nature of an order that 
might exist among them than attempt to impose opposing conceptions of 
justice upon each other's populati.ons. And indeed an agreement upon 
the need to preserve the natural liberty of states would be no mean 
accomplishment in such a condition. 
Bull, who accepts Vattel's pluralism, states that 'although the 
solidarity exhibited by international society may increase in the 
future, just as it may decrease, it can still be argued that in the 
twentieth century the Grotian conception has proved premature'. 2 If 
the Grotian conception is 'premature' rather than absurd or incoherent 
then we shall have to go beyond Vattel for a sound theory of inter-
national relations. 	Vattel does not offer his theory simply for 
application in a context where states are unable to agree on funda-
mental rules for the regulation of their relations. On the contrary, 
Vattel is opposed to the development of any association larger than 
1. 	ibid., p.52. 	2. 	ibid., p. 73. 
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states as is apparent in his explicit rejection of Wolff's idea of 
civitas maxima. 	If Vattel was simply concerned to offer principles 
which might maintain a certain level of international order until 
such time as international society was capable of more 'mature' 
development then Vattel's ideas could be incorporated within what has 
been termed an international theory. But Vattel's assertion of the 
liberty of the sovereign state and of its right to decide how far it 
may honour its moral obligations to outsiders would, if implemented, 
prevent the emergence of a truly international society and ensure 
that prematureness of Grotius. For Vattel's theory is a diplomatic 
theory. And although he defended the idea of a moral order in inter-
national relations obligations to fellow-citizens have an unmistake-
able priority over obligations to fellow-men. Consequently obli-
gations to humanity are acceptable only insofar as they do not 
challenge the idea of a humanity divided into separate, sovereign 
states. In order to discover an attempt to harmonise these obligations 
let us now turn to the ideas of Immanuel Kant. 
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CHAPTER ETCHT 
Kant's Theory of Morals and  
International Relations. 
'Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and the 
others - miserable comforters all 
of them..' 
The previous two sections have examined the ways in which two 
thinkers have handled one of the fundamental ideas in the tradition 
of Western thought, namely that each man has moral obligations to the 
rest of humanity. These thinkers were at the same time concerned to 
argue for the division of mankind into separate, sovereign states. 
Although each thinker argued that obligations to the rest of humanity 
did exist, it was evidently believed that individuals created parti-
cular obligations among themselves through the formation of states 
and that these had priority over the obligations men incurred natur-
ally. Now the method employed by Pufendorf and Vattel is of particu-
lar interest in considering Kant as a theorist of international rela-
tions. It is central to their argument that men have particular ends 
which can be satisfied without engaging in a world-wide civil society. 
For Pufendorf the essential end of man is the attainment of a condi-
tion of enforceable law which will give man the security he lacks in 
the state of nature. For Vattel the essential end is a form of per=
fection which is understood in terms of welfare and happiness. It is 
in pursuit of these ends that men form societies and engage in inter-
national co-operation should the separate state be inr:apable of pro-
viding for them by itself. And it is the ability of men to realise 
their ends without forming a universal state which accounts for their 
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division into separate political associations. Therefore, at the 
heart of the international relations theory of Pufendorf and Vattel 
lies a particular concept of man and the ends he w2.shes to pursue. 
While it is important to Pufendorf and Vattel that men recognise obli-
gations which they have as men (as they have moral ends by virtue of 
their nature) these ends are not held to provide the basis of a world-
wide political association. Natural moral ends suggest that there is 
a society of states, because there is a universal morality which sur-
vives the division of men into states, but men are not obliged to try 
to form an international society which ensures that justice is done 
to all men. States are obliged to consider moral obligations in con-
ducting their external relations, but since as associations they are 
concerned first of all with promoting the ends of their citizens, 
they remain judges of how far they can or will honour international 
moral obligations. The perfection of international relations, by 
increasingly bringing them under the regulation of universal morality, 
is not an end in itself for either Pufendorf or Vattel. It is pre-
cisely at this point that we find in Kant a radically different 
account of the state and international relations, and underlying this 
a fundamentally different account of the ends of man. 
Kant regards men as bound by a necessary obligation to so 
arrange their social and political lives that they gradually approach 
a condition of universal justice and 'perpetual peace'. 	This goal 
is not a 'hypothetical' goal, one which men might pursue if they wish 
to advance certain of the ends they happen to have. It is rather an 
essential or 'categorical' end, one which men unconditionally are 
obliged to seek by virtue of their rational nature. 1 Man, on account 
1. On the distinction between the hypothetical and the categorical 
imperative see Kant, The Moral Law (Kant's Groundwork of the [over] 
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of his rational nature, has moral ends which he is bound to advance 
and these ends assess the rationality of the particular purposes he 
wishes to pursue. For Kant man has a moral obligLtion 'to further a 
. systematic harmony of purposes among men „1 which is understood by 
one commentator as an 'ideal moral world ... in which each man would 
have the liberty to realise all of his purposes in so far as these 
purposes are compatible with like liberty for all'. 2 The attainment 
of this objective, which is an essential human objective, is possible 
only through the attempt to bring all men under a world-wide system 
of law. 
Let us consider in a little more detail the fundamental differ-
ences between either Pufendorf or Vattel and Kant. As we have seen 
the former argued that men had natural liberty since they were free 
from government in the state of nature. Because of the defects of the 
state of nature men had consented to subject themselves to political 
authority in order to promote their own advantage. Although men as 
men have certain moral ends it was also argued that they wish to secure 
their own safety and promote their own welfare. These individual ends 
bring men into political societies. While men are obliged to respect 
the moral ends they originally and naturally have, it is clearly the 
case that morality is made more effective within sovereign states 
where men seek the satisfaction of their individual ends. Since the 
particular ends of individuals can be attained within the separate 
state, there is no need for an international government and not the 
same need for making universal morality more effective at the inter- 
Metaphysics of Morals) edited and translated by H.J. Paton, 
London 1961, p.82. 
1. H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, London 1947, p.163. 
2. J.G. Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right, London 1970, p.93. 
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national level. Conversely, if it were only possible for men to 
adequately promote their welfare through associating at the inter-
national level then it would be necessary to make morality more effect-
ive through the establishment of a world-wide legal system. The 
extent of the effectiveness of man's natural morality depends entire-
ly upon the degree to which men must associate in order to promote 
their individual ends. 
Now the essential purpose of Kant's concept of man is to con-
test the manner in which the effectiveness of morality is made depend-
ent upon the individual's assessment of how he might best promote his 
individual welfare. For although it is undeniable that men have parti-
cular ends to pursue including their self-preservation and welfare it 
is also true that as rational beings they have moral ends which they 
ought to realise. According to Kant man is a member of two worlds - 
a world of desire where he seeks his advancement and the satisfaction 
of his inclinations, and a world of rationality where through reason 
he can establish the moral ends he ought to pursue. By acting in 
accordance with the moral ends prescribed by reason, man establishes 
what is distinctively human in his nature. Only through morality can 
man affirm his dignity. 	The preservation of his life and the satis- 
faction of his desires are ends which man shares with the animals. 
Through the acceptance of a morality whereby man acts in accordance 
with principles which are true for all, man curbs his individual de-
sires and affirms his freedom and dignity through asserting his inde-
pendence of the natural world. On account of his membership of. the 
world of rationality man is capable of establishing moral ends which 
it is his duty to pursue. The ordering of social and political life 
in accordance with these ends is the manner in which man unfolds his 
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uniquely human charateristics. 
Kant is at odds with the method of Pufendorf and Vattel since 
it regards the pursuit and perfection of man's moral ends to be 
dependent upon prior calculations about the satisfaction of individ-
ual inclinations. Morality will not receive legal guarantee at the 
international level, according to these theorists, since it is possible 
for men to satisfy their fundamental desires within the sovereign 
state. For Kant this method places the realm of rationality at the 
service of the realm of inclination so jeopardising the capacity of 
men to use reason to establish moral ends which are independent of 
inclinations. It is the fundamental aspectof Kant's moral philosophy 
that the dependence of 'the concept of obligation' upon man's 
' empirical motive' leaves man's distinctively human characteristics 
unrealised. 1 The effectiveness of man's morality is made dependent 
upon calculations within the world of inclination, and so the necessary 
ends man has as a rational being do not achieve priority over the 
calculations men make in attempting to promote their welfare. 
While Pufendorf and Vattel understood political life as a 
means whereby individuals promote their welfare, Kant understands it 
as a means whereby men make their rational morality more effective 
among themselves. 2 The former understand political life in prudential 
terms since it is an instrument whereby individuals promote their 
interests. In Kant's terms the political is here made dependent upon 
the world of inclination while it ought to be related to the ends men 
1. Kant, The Moral Law, op.cit., pp. 58-59. 
2. Kant refers to 'Morals ...before which politics must bow the knee.' 
Perpetual Peace, in M.G. Forsyth, H.M.A. Keens-Soper and P. 
Savigear, The Theory of International Relations, London 1970, 
p.243. 
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necessarily have as rational beings. The more essential ends of men 
cannot be satisfied by permitting humanity to remain divided into 
separate, sovereign states which are understood to be the main agencies 
for satisfying their individual ends. Moral philosophy, as a rational 
inquiry which attempts to establish the ends which rational beings 
ought to pursue, requires rather the gradual tratzsformation of this 
political world so that all men may make effective the fundamental 
moral obligations owed to one another. 
I propose now to discuss Kant's ethics and theory of inter-
national relations within three main sections. In the first place the 
discussion will be concerned to briefly outline the fundamentals of 
Kant's moral philosophy. The discussion will proceed to try to indi-
cate the more important respects in which Kant's ethical theory differs 
from either Pufendorf's or Vattel's especially with regard to recom-
mendations concerning conduct. The third and final section of this 
chapter will discuss Kant's particular recommendations for the conduct 
of the external relations of states. Throughout this section the 
discussion will be concerned to illustrate Kant's approach to the 
harmonisation of obligations due to fellow-citizens and obligations 
due to fellow-men. 
II 
In his statement of his objectives Kant makes it plain that he 
was not attempting to create a new morality. It was arrogant of a 
theorist, so Kant alleged, to believe he was about to discover prin-
ciples previously unknown to the human race. 	For this reason it is 
unacceptable to think that Kant was involved in the creation of prin-
ciples which were binding in all circumstances irrespective of the 
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consequences of acting upon them. On the contrary, Kant's ambition 
was to begin with the fact that man experiences himself as a moral 
agent and then to proceed to articulate certain propositions which 
make this experience possible and intelligible. His major ambition 
was then to make explicit the principles which underly moral experience, 
to bring its presuppositions to light. 
According to Kant the following 'imperative' is fundamental to 
the nature of morality: 'Act only on that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it shall become a universal law'. 1 
This formulation makes explicit the fact that a rational person will 
wish his actions to be governed by universal principles, since we only 
enter the world of morality when we ask if the principle on which we 
act can in fact be universalised. Now in stating this point, Kant has 
in mind all rational beings, a category more inclusive than human 
beings. It is conceivable, he argues, that there are beings which are 
absolutely rational and perfectly good, and so without inclinations 
which tempt them to act in opposition to universal principles. Man, 
however, belongs to the world of reason and the world of inclination 
and so may be tempted to 'take the liberty of making an exception' to 
a principle in order to satisfy an inclination. 2 The idea of a 
universal principle emphasises the fact that a man should not make 
arbitrary exceptions to a principle in order to benefit himself. He 
is not at liberty to treat others according to a principle which he 
would wish to evade should it become the basis of another's action 
towards him. 	To be moral, men must strive to obey impartial and 
impersonal principles which (other things being equal) treat rational 
beings equally. What holds for one man in a specific situation must 
1. ibid., p.88. 	2. ibid., p.91. 
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hold also for other men in similar situations. Any attempt to avoid 
the element of universality in action is contrary to reason, since 
it is an attempt to make an arbitrary distinction oetween equal, 
rational beings. Such an attempt is contrary to the essence of 
morality. 
Let us consider universality with regard to a particular example. 
It could be said that a state was behaving morally if, for example, 
it refused to take another state's territory on the grounds that it 
could not act upon a principle which would allow any state to capture 
the territory of another. A state which declined to capture another's 
territory, only on account of a fear that its action might result in 
punitive action by other states, would not behave morally. It is, 
after all, acting in a self-interested manner, being constrained only 
by its fear of what would happen to it were it to attack another state. 
We could imagine the state reviewing the situation if the source of 
its fears could be removed. This indicates that the state is consid-
ering how to act only with regard to prudential calculations. It is 
considering only the probable consequences of its action upon its own 
interests. However, if it is to remain within the domain of morality 
the state must ask if it is allowing itself a course of action which 
it would deny to others, if it is claiming a liberty to act against 
others which other states would not be allowed against it - in short, 
if the principle underlying its act can be universalised. Our state, 
in the example above, would be taking the moral point of view if it 
refrained from attacking others on the grounds that in similar circum-
stances it could not reasonably allow other states the liberty of 
attacking it. It takes the moral point of view through the submission 
of its inclinations to a universal principle, a principle which 
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governs all states equally and without exception. 
This first formulation of the moral law is according to Kant's 
argument closely related to a second. Kant argues that acting in 
accordance with universal laws involves rational beings recognising 
each other as ends rather than merely as means. For all rational beings, 
whether they are men or not, must have their own rational nature as an 
end in itself. The concept of morality, in other words, presupposes 
that rational nature is an end in itself: 
'Now I say that man, and in general every 
rational being, exists as an end in himself, 
not merely as a means for arbitrary use by 
this or that will; he must in all his actions, 
whether they are directed to himself or to 
other rational beings, always be viewed at 
the same time as an end ... Rational nature 
exists as an end in itself.' 1 
It is in the nature of a rational being that when he acts it is always 
with some reference to an end which he sets for himself. But as we 
saw in the first formulation of the categorical imperative a rational 
being must limit his ends by asking if the maxim underlying the end is 
capable of being universalised. If the maxim cannot be universalised, 
if everyone could not have this maxim, then a rational being would 
make an arbitrary exception in his own case were he to go ahead and 
act anyway. Here he would be involved in saying that he was prepared 
to subordinate the universal law to his personal inclinations, and 
indeed that he was prepared to ignore the ends of other men in order 
to satisfy his own particular inclination. He is, in other words, pre-
pared to allow personal inclination to over-ride the equality of others. 
He is involved too in discounting the ends of other beings and is, 
therefore, prepared to treat other beings as mere means to his ends. 
1. ibid., pp. 95-96, 
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The point of universalisability is not merely to ensure consistency 
for its own sake: it is so that 'the rational being will insure that 
in pursuing his own ends (whatever they may be) he leaves every other 
rational being the freedom to pursue his own ends'. 1. To act in accord-
ance with universal principles is to regard the ends of other beings 
to be equal to one's own, and is thereby to affirm the value of 
rational nature. 
In his description of a morality which binds all rational beings 
Kant maintains that we should act in such a way that the 'will can 
regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means of its 
own maxims'. 2 Again, this formulation is related to the first formu-
lation of the categorical imperative. 	While the first formulation 
focussed upon the objectivity of universal principles, this formulation 
asserts that the necessity of living in accordance with such principles 
does not come from outwith the nature of a rational being, but is 
given to him through the exercise of his own reason. Kant is concern-
ed to argue that some earlier moral theories failed to realise the 
full implication of the fact that man is 'subject only to laws which 
are made by himself and yet are universal'. 3 Reason itself gives rise 
to universal moral principles which men are obliged to consider. And 
since men are capable of acting in accordance with reason (since man 
stands apart from the causality of the natural order) it follows that 
he can regulate his inclinations in order to remain within the realm 
of morality. Kant maintains that earlier thinkers: 
1. Murphy, op.cit., p.74. 
2. The Moral Law, op.cit., p.101. 
3. ibid., p.100. 
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'thought of man merely as subject to a 
law (whatever it might be), and the law 
had to carry with it some interest in 
order to attract or compel, because it 
did not spring as a law from his cwn will: 
in order to conform with the law his will 
had to be necessitated by something else 
to act in a certain way.' 1 
Kant wishes to argue that it is essential to the idea of morality that 
rational beings can follow the promptings of reason alone, and that it 
is not necessary that it should be in their interest before they act 
in accordance with universal principles. Indeed, to suggest that this 
is the case (which we noted was found in Pufendorf and Vattel) is to 
jeopardise the concept of morality as it undermines man's freedom 
from the complete control of natural laws. The concept of morality 
is only applicable to a being which is free. 	Since it is pointless 
directing moral approval or disapproval at a being incapable of acting 
differently, the concept of morality presupposes the capacity to stand 
above one's particular desires or interests in order to ensure that 
their satisfaction is not at the price of violating universal prin-
ciple. 	To be capable of acting morally is to be able to control one's 
ends by reason. And this in turn involves the idea of being free. In 
addition to the idea that the concept of morality presupposes the 
concept of universality and respect for other beings as end in them-
selves it is important to consider its involvement of the idea that 
rational nature is free. 
The idea of rational beings using reason to establish universal 
principles, which treat rational nature as an end in itself, leads 
Kant to a further formulation of the categorical imperative. With 
this formulation Kant is considering rational beings establishing uni-
versal principles through their social existence. This formulation 
1. 	ibid. 
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is as follows: 'So act as if you were always through your maxims 
a law-making member in a universal kingdom of. ends'. Rational beings 
are to think of themselves as members of a moral :ommunity creating 
and obeying moral principles. It is the view: 
'that morality demands that we act on the sort 
of policies which, if adopted by everyone, 
would generate a community of free and equal 
members, each of whom would in the process of 
realising his own purposes also further the 
aims of his fellows ... Its basis is the idea 
of autonomy, or freedom under self-imposed law, 
according to which each person freely submits 
to self-discipline under the same rules he 
would prescribe for others, so that everyone 
would act as a law unto himself, or 'autonomously', 
and yet also in co-operative harmony with 
everybody else.' 1 
This moral community, or kingdom of ends, harks back to Rousseau's 
direct democracy, to that context where 'each, while uniting himself 
with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before' .2 
This is most apparent in Kant's remark that 'a rational being belongs 
to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its uni-
versal laws, he is also himself subject to those laws. He belongs to 
it as its head, when as the maker of the laws he is himself subject to 
the will of no other'. 3 The kingdom of ends is a condition where 
rational beings obey only the laws they make themselves. And since 
these laws are the product of reason each man is at liberty to pursue 
his ends insofar as these are compatible with the existence of others 
as ends in themselves. As a result there is what Kant calls 'a system-
atic harmony of purposes', a moral community where the endsof rational 
beings are harmonised in accordance with rational principles. 
1. W. Wick in his introduction to Kant, The Metaphysical Principles 
of Virtue, New York, 1964, p. xv. 
2. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in Cole,op.cit., p.12. 
3. The Moral Law, op.cit., p.101. 
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Let us briefly consider the manner in which this more contract-
arian formulation of the categorical imperative is related to earlier 
ones. The principle of universalisability involved the idea of treat-
ing ether beings as ends in themselves. It was necessary that one 
agent did not make arbitrary exceptions in his own case and so treat 
the ends of others without respect. A different way of formulating 
this is that it is wrong to treat another being in accordance with a 
principle to which he could not give his consent as a rational being. 
One could not expect a being to agree to allow his ends to be totally 
ignored simply in order that another man can satisfy his personal 
inclinations thereby. 	Kant considers this with reference to the 
giving of a false promise in order to obtain money from another. He 
maintains: 
'For the man whom I seek to use for my own 
purposes by such a promise cannot possibly 
agree with my way of behaving to him, and 
so cannot himself share the end of the action.' 1 
When Kant maintains that the promisee cannot agree with what is being 
done to him, it is certain that he does not mean to deny that in 
empirical situations a man might consent to be used. What Kant is 
concerned to argue is that a rational being aware of rational nature 
as an end could not allow himself to be used as a means to the satis-
faction of the personal inclinations of another. No rational being 
could consent to an action which discriminated against him without 
reason - by definition. Or, as Paton has put it: 
'the will of a rational person is not to he 
subjected to any purpose which cannot accord 
with a law which could arise from the will 
of the person affected himself.'2 
1. The Moral Law, op-cit., p.97. 
2. Paton, op.cit., p. 169. 
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This is the sense in which we are to understand the 'contractarian' 
theme as it appears in Kant's formulation of the categorical imper-
ative. And it is in Lhis sense also that the contractarian emphasis 
in the idea of the kingdom of ends is to be added to the ideas of 
universality, rational nature as an end in itself and freedom, to form 
the essence of morality. 
The analysis so far has been concerned with morality in rela-
tion to all rational beings, a category which includes but is not ex-
hausted by human beings. According to Kant the concept of duty holds 
'for all rational beings ... and only because of this can it be a law 
for all human wills'. 1 Now the analysis Kant has offered with regard 
to rational morality is described as his formal moral philosophy. The 
morality which applies to human beings is described as his material 
moral philosophy, because in order to apply rational morality to 
humans it is necessary to take account of human nature itself. The 
concept of morality so far discussed is not sufficient to guide the 
actions of human beings. As a recent commentator on Kant has stated: 
'To know that we should treat all rational 
beings as ends in themselves is not to know 
a great deal. For what counts as treating 
another as an end? To know this we have to 
know something about the actual material ends 
and purposes that human beings have. For what 
we want to know now is not simply what in 
general counts as rational action for any 
rational being, but rather what counts as 
rational action for humanity.' 2 
Kant refers to the possible existence of beings with a 'holy will ' . 3 
These beings are unlike humans (although both are rational) in so far 
as the former are always in conformity with the moral law, while human 
1. The Moral Law, op.cit., pp.92- 93. 
2. Murphy, op.cit., p.86. 
3. The Moral Law, op.cit., p.107. 
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beings, tempted by their personal inclinations, may easily fall short 
of its commands. The categorical imperative has to take into consid-
eration the specific nature of human beings, beings which have to 
struggle against their inclinations (as Kant might put it) in order 
to become moral. In dealing with the material ends of human nature 
in order to apply the categorical imperative to human beings Kant makes 
reference to man's membership of two worlds, the world of reason and 
the world of inclination. It is impossible for man to have the ends 
of a purely rational being with a holy will since man has inclinations 
and desires which he wishes to satisfy. On the other hand it is im-
possible for man to pursue only his inclinations since he occupies 
the world of reason and has the capacity to be moral. Kant understands 
man as the 'final end of nature', the highest being. in nature, and as 
having an obligation to perfect himself. According to Kant perfection 
is one of the 'essential ends' of humanity since man must try to 
realise his moral powers. 1 Neither a being with a holy will nor an 
animal could be said to have the duty to perfect itself since the 
former inhabits only the rational world, while the latter inhabits 
only the world of animality. The concept of perfection has significance 
only when employed in connection with a being which occupies both 
worlds. This is true also of another of man's essential ends, namely 
happiness. 
In his argument that it is reasonable for human beings to pur-
sue happiness Kant recognises the natural element in man's nature. 
Since he is a being with desires and inclinations it is reasonable 
that he should wish to maximise pleasure and integrate all his ends 
including pleasure into a harmonious whole. Now according to Kant a 
1. See especially Murphy, op.cit., pp. 99-102. 
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man cannot be obliged to pursue happiness since this is one of the 
states men naturally seek. Man does have an obligation to perfect 
himself since he is o)liged to treat his own rational aature as an 
end to be made manifest in his action. However, as far as happiness 
is concerned a man with inclinations and desires will of necessity 
pursue that state. And although it may seem more natural that a man 
should place his own happiness before others' ("the maxim, 'Every man 
for himself, God (destiny) for us all' seems more 'natural' than the 
'duty of beneficience'') men cannot be indifferent to the happiness 
of others. 1  As Gregor has said: 
'And so my attitude toward happiness is not 
an attitude merely toward my happiness but 
rather toward the happiness of men as such. 
To will my own happiness and, at the same time, 
be indifferent to the happiness of others 
would be morally wrong because my maxim 
regarding happiness would lack the univer-
sality of a law.' 2 
A man is at liberty to pursue his own happiness, but is obliged to 
govern this by a rational principle which respects the equal liberty 
of other men to pursue their happiness too. The pursuit of happiness, 
which recognises the natural element in man, is governed by universal 
principles which indicate man's participation in the rational order. 
It is important to consider the manner in which the concept 
of obligation is related to the essential ends of humanity. For Kant 
a man is obliged to perfect himself, that is in part, to govern his 
inclinations by rational principles, but not to make himself happy, 
since he will aim at happiness by nature. On the other hand, he is 
1. Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, 
(translated by J. Ellington), New York 1964, p.116. 
2. Quoted by N.J. Gregor, Laws of Freedom: A Study of cant's 
Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysic 
der Sitten, Oxford 1963, p.192. 
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obliged to consider the happiness of others, but is not obliged to 
attempt to make others perfect. It is an obligation to show concern 
for the welfare of others, which requires taking an interest in 
their happiness; however, there is no obligation to perfect others 
as such an attempt would constitute an intrusion upon the moral lives 
of other persons. The central obligation to humanity is to be found 
in the duty of benevolence since each man 'must regard his sphere 
as part of an all-encompassing sphere of cosmopolitan sentiment ' . 1 
In order to bring the categorical imperative to bear upon the 
condition of human beings Kant refers to acting in accordance with 
'a universal law of nature' and belonging to a kingdom of ends 'on the 
analogy of a kingdom of nature'. 2 The universal law of nature serves 
to make the principle of universalisability more 'vivid' for us. In 
the words of Paton: 
'The best, if not the only way, to make such 
a law vivid in our imagination is to picture 
to ourselves a world in which everybody in 
fact acted in accordance with it. This is 
the eminently sensible procedure which Kant 
now commends to us. It is one which is 
commonly followed by ordinary men. The duty 
of fire-watching, for example, was sometimes 
pressed home by the question 'What would 
happen if everybody refused to do it?' To 
ask questions of this kind is to consider 
a maxim as if it were to become through 
your will a universal law of nature.' 3 
In order to test whether or not what we propose to do is moral we are 
to imagine a world in which everyone acts according to the maxim 
1. The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, op.cit., p.140. 
2. The two formulations of the categorical imperative which employ 
this idea are: 1. 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to 
become through your will a universal law of nature', and 2. 'All 
maxims as proceeding from our own making of law ought to harmon-
ise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.' 
The Moral Law, op.cit., p.86 and p.96 respectively. 
3. Paton, op.cit., p.146 
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underlying our action. Now this is an act of imagination only, through 
which we make more evident the nature of the maxim upon which we pro-
pose to act. There is no question of whether or net this world might 
exist and we do not judge the rightness or wrongness of an action 
according to its likelihood of producing such a world. Kant is con-
cerned simply with deciding whether or not a world in which everyone 
does what we now propose to do would be one capable of systematically 
harmonising the purposes of men. The problem is whether or not a 
world in which there are no exceptions to a maxim, just as there are 
no exceptions to a law of nature in the physical world, would be cap-
able of allowing men the liberty of pursuing their ends in so far as 
these ends are compatible with universal principles. A world in which 
everyone stole would be one where the reasonable ends of men were 
frustrated. They would not be sure of securing possession of those 
objects which helped them to perfect themselves and to be happy. For 
this reason the individual who proposes to steal (on the assumption 
that there are no extenuating circumstances) would be in violation of 
rational principles regulating the actions of humans. 
This idea is made more evident in Kant's idea of rational 
human beings belonging to a kingdom of ends 'on the analogy of a king-
dom of nature'. Now according to Kant it is useful to presuppose that 
nature is governed by a teleological principle which moves it towards 
its final end. And this serves, Kant believes, as an analogy to he 
deployed in considering the morality of our acts. 	It is important to 
ask if the maxim of our action will assist or delay the realisation of 
that condition where the ends of men are systematically related. We 
are to ask in short whether or not a condition (where everyone did 
what we now propose to do) would bring nearer the realisation of the 
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kingdom of ends - that condition where men are at liberty to pursue 
their ends within the framework of universal principles which 
emanate from their individual wills. If such universalisation would 
bring such a condition nearer, or at least do nothing to frustrate 
it, then the action could be performed. 
There are two further points to make in order to conclude 
this brief exposition of Kant's moral philosophy. First of all, in 
asking whether or not an action would result in a particular condition 
- the fullest harmony of human purposes - the individual is not judg-
ing his action according to its likely consequences. It is a funda-
mental part of Kant's moral philosophy that an act is not judged sole-
ly by its consequences. Indeed, were this the case a moral act would 
be no different from a prudential act since it would be selected out 
of the belief that it was an efficient means to a particular end. For 
Kant, a good act ought to be performed not because of its consequences 
per se, but because it can be universalised and because it treats men 
as ends in themselves. This is, according to Paton, the essence of 
morality while the concern about an act's ability to bring about the 
systematic harmony of purposes among men is merely a technique or test 
whereby beings which are less than moral clarify what they ought to do. 
In the second place, man's end is the establishment of a society where 
all men have their liberty to pursue their ends within the terms of a 
morality which applies to all. As Paton puts it: 
'The ideal set before us is a community of 
rational persons, obeying the same moral law 
for its ewn sake, respecting each other's 
freedom, and in this way striving to realise 
a harmonious system of ends such as can be 
realised in no other way. The duty of a good 
1. Paton, op.cit., p.157. 
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man is to act as a lawmaking member of 
such an ideal community.' 1 
Men have a duty to seek a society in which men obey universal laws 
which take all their ends into account and harmonise them in such a 
way that the ensuing condition is compatible with the rational con-
sent of all members. In effect this requires the gradual establish-
ment of a universal civil society within which the obligations men 
have as men are recognised and protected. Kant's morality leads to 
a theory of the state and international relations which is radically 
different from the theories of Pufendorf and Vattel. However, before 
discussing Kant's international relations theory it is worthwhile 
contrasting some of the features of his morality with related themes 
in the thought of Pufendorf and Vattel. 
III 
It was noted earlier that the theory of international relations 
advanced by Pufendorf and Vattel was necessarily linked with particu-
lar conceptions of moral philosophy. From the previous section it is 
clear that Kant's concept of ethics differs fundamentally from either 
Pufendorf's or Vattel's view. 	If Kant's ethical doctrine could success- 
fully undermine their views then their defence of the internal point 
of view would have failed. We should then be in a position to see how 
Kantian ethics can provide an account of an international society 
based upon a rational defence of the external point of view. 
Let us begin the contrast between Kant, and Pufendorf and 
Vattel (who, despite their differences from one another, reveal certain 
similarities when judged from a Kantian point of view) by discussing 
1. ibid., p.190. 
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further the idea of perfect and imperfect obligation. It will be 
recalled that Pufendorf believed a man could not be compelled to do 
what is required by 'a mere duty to humanity'. An obligation can 
only be enforced between men who have agreed what they are willing to 
perform among themselves and have subsequently submitted to a common 
sovereign. Moral rules are not perfectly obliging in themselves, but 
require the sanction of positive law. Correspondingly, these moral 
rules are not perfectly obliging in the relations between states since 
these can survive without society and without agreeing on particular 
duties which require the establishment of a common sovereign. Vattel 
maintained the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligation 
although for him the distinction was made with reference to the idea 
of duties to the self. The individual or the state can only submit 
itself to a perfect obligation when it is convinced that this is com-
patible with its obligations to perfect itself. The individual and 
the state are granted a fundamental liberty to decide their obligations 
(within the state of nature), a liberty which is clearly at odds with 
the idea that individuals or states are obliged to treat each other as 
equals under the same moral law. For this reason Vattel shares with 
Pufendorf a non-progressive theory of international relations. Neither 
self-interest nor desire to perfect oneself requires the abolition of 
the international state of nature. The distinction between perfect 
and imperfect obligation also excludes any fundamental obligation to 
supersede this international state of nature. It is the case then that 
the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligation underlies the 
view that the state system is a 'climax' rather than a 'dominant'. 
From the preceding section it would seem likely that Kant 
would reject the motive for distinguishing between perfect and imperfect 
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obligation. The individual is bound to consider his actions with 
reference to his ability to universalise the maxims underlying them. 
The nature of morality iu its constraining influence upon individuals 
who are always likely to wish to place their personal inclinations 
and interests before those of others. There would be no point to 
morality if it were to be interpreted by individuals considering their 
particular desires. If a man has a moral right then he is authorised 
to use coercion to protect it, since " 'right' (or 'justice') and 
'authoriSation to use coercion' mean the same". 1 If a man has a right 
then he has 'immediately' the authority to protect it and cannot allow 
it to be infringed simply on the basis that another finds the corres-
ponding obligation in conflict with his self-interest or perfection. 
According to Kant the individual cannot judge a course of action 
simply with regard to its consequences for his own interests s. - d hap-
piness. He must ask himself if he can allow the same course of action 
to similar persons in similar situations. If he could not do this 
then he would be wrong to perform the act. Although we have found the 
concept of universalisability in the writings of Pufendorf and Vattel 
as a test for a right action, its strictness is immediately relaxed 
by allowing the individual the liberty of deciding the extent to which 
he can honour his moral obligations. But this method is not acceptable 
to Kant. His objection centres on the point that particular empirical 
objectives (perfection and happiness, for example) are made into the 
test of the capacity to perform moral obligations. Pufendorf and 
Vattel begin with particular individual objectives and proceed to 
discuss the extent to which individuals can honour the obligations 
1. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (translated by J.Ladd), 
New York 1965, p.37. 
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they have as men. According to Kant this is inadequate in that these 
individual objectives ought themselves to be tested for their ration-
ality by moral principles. Kant had objected to the method of Wolff 
(which is also the method of Vattel) on the grounds that one cannot 
take for granted some particular human objective, in this case per-
fection, and employ it in the relaxation of the binding moral law. 1 
To do this is to subordinate the world of reason to the world of inclin-
ation. On the contrary human objectives must be tested by reason in 
order to discover whether or not they can be universalised. It is 
this test upon which their moral status depends. 
Let us now consider the consequences of applying Kant's moral 
philosophy to the objectives which humans are held to have by Pufendorf 
and Vattel. With regard to Pufendorf there are two aspects to be con-
sidered. The first point is the view that the separate political 
association has the right to consider its interests first and foremost 
in the state of nature, subject to the qualification that it should 
not impose considerable costs on others in order to gain trivial bene-
fits for itself. 	The second point concerns the view that the politi- 
cal association is only perfectly obliged when it agrees with others 
upon those duties which are to be performed. In this case, perfect 
obligation is inseparable from reciprocity for a state would not be 
so obliged unless there was to be some benefit in return. 2 
The first point is closely related to the doctrine of 'ethical 
1. On this point see K. Ward, The Development of Kant's View 
of Ethics, Oxford 1972, pp. 85-86. 
2. These points correspond to the first two of the five features 
in Pufendorf's thought, see above p.118. 
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eogism , . 1 According to this doctrine the individual or state would 
be entitled to pursue its own interests regardless of the consequences 
for others, and would take account of the interests of others only 
when so doing will have good consequences for its own. The doctrine 
is described as ethical as the individual who believes he has the 
right to pursue his own interests also grants that others have the 
right to pursue their interests too. In this way egoism becomes uni-
versalised. If x has the liberty of pursuing his own interests exclus-
ively, then everyone else must have this liberty also. Therefore, if 
x universalises his own egoism he is committed to allowing other men 
to pursue their own interests although these should prove harmful to 
the interests of x. Surely the egoist must hope that other men will 
not exercise their entitlement to pursue their own interests in such 
a vay as to harm his own interests, which arc after all his main 
concern. Evidently, the egoist who universalises his position creates 
problems for himself. Now it would be true that if other men did harm 
his interests and if he was in a position to harm theirs it would be 
possible for egoists to attempt to come to some arrangement which gives 
every egoist something of what he wants. But an arrangement like this 
can never be wholly satisfactory to an egoist, because he knows that 
if others did not exist, or were not in pursuit of their interests, 
he would gain as a result. Other men must always appear to be obstacles 
to the advancement of his own ends. Therefore, for the egoist to 
remain consistent it is necessary that he remain dissatisfied with any 
compromise or mutual arrangement. 	Moreover, while he takes account 
of the interests of others only insofar as they contribute to his own 
1. For a discussion of this doctrine see B. Meldin, "Ultimate 
Principles and Ethical Egoism",in D.P. Gauthier, 1foraZity and 
Rational Self-Interest, New Jersey 1970, pp. 56-63. 
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satisfaction, he can be accused of treating men as means to his own 
ends. While the egoist may universalise his egoism it is evidently 
a misnomer to regard his position as ethical as he can never regard 
the ends of other men to be equal to his own. 
Now Pufendorf is not a complete ethical egoist although part 
of this doctrine is certainly incorporated within his international 
relations theory. 	As it is possible to conclude that the argument 
that states may pursue their own interests is defective, Pufendorf's 
theory must be held to suffer as a result. Pufendorf's second point 
that individuals become perfectly obliged because it is in their 
interest to do so is equally defective. While it shares some of the 
difficulties of his first point - most noticeably in failing to treat 
the ends of others as independently valuable - it has problems of its 
own. According to Pufendorf men avoid perfect obligations at the inter-
national level since they have no benefits to gain from a civil society 
embracing the whole of mankind. It is not in their interest to come 
to reciprocal arrangements with every other man on the face of the 
earth. This idea contains the assumption that there is no need to 
help another poorer than oneself (however defined) unless he is able 
to perform some benefit in return. Although Pufendorf does not advise 
men to act on this uncharitable maxim, it is evident from what has 
been said that he does not think that states are perfectly obliged 
to help one another without some actual or potential benefit to them-
selves in return. Now this again contains something of that doctrine 
called ethical egoism. The problem for this doctrine here is whether 
or not an ethical egoist, who is unprepared to help another without 
a benefit in return, can happily exist in a condition where there is 
no unconditional kindness. An egoist believes that as long as he does 
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not need help there is no reed to extend any to others. 	However, 
if his situation changed so that he was in need of assistance he 
could not reasonably refuse unconditional assistance from others 
without contradicting that concern for himself which underlies his 
egoism. A man would not be an egoist if he was not prepared to be 
the beneficiary of an unconditional act of kindness. Pufendorf's 
second point is no more satisfactory than his first, since it is 
possible to conceive of situations where egoism as a doctrine would 
not be in the interest of the egoist. There is also the problem that 
Pufendorf's first point may be in tension with his second. If men were 
only to receive benefits on a principle of exchange the self-
interested individual or state might suffer, as there are situations 
when it is in his interest to receive some unconditional assistance 
from another. 
Pufendorf's two main principles regarding self-interest are 
unacceptable. And since these are the two principles which led to the 
abandonment of a rigorous interpretation of the moral law by way of 
an argument for the division of men into separate sovereign states, 
it is now necessary to reconsider the status of the three other points 
made by Pufendorf in his argument for such a division. Neither the 
view that Individuals cannot assist all men to the same degree, nor 
the view that men cannot know how best to help each other, nor the 
view that the moral law is insufficiently precise to serve to order 
political relations, can provide a justification for the division of 
humanity into states possessing the right to advance their own 
interests first and foremost. So without the principles of self-
interest and reciprocity Pufendorf's account of the legitimacy of a 
world divided into separate, sovereign states is untenable. And, as 
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we have seen, there are good moral reasons for discarding those two 
principles. For this reason Pufendorf's defence of the internal 
point of view of obligation cannot be upheld. 
Let us now consider the status of Vattel's principles. Of 
particular interest in the evaluation of Vattel's position is his 
concept of the duty to the self. Kant's own attitude towards this 
concept is unmistakeably critical: 
the one who binds could always release the 
one bound from the obligation. Therefore, 
if both are one and the same subject, then 
he would not be bound at all by a duty he 
imposes on himself, and this involves a 
contradiction.' 1 
Now Kant does not dispose outright of the concept of a duty to the 
self within his own theory although his idea of it has a quite differ-
ent function from that imagined by Vattel. When Kant refers t - o the 
duty to oneself he includes the duty of perfecting oneself morally. 
A human being has the duty of treating rationality in his own person 
as an end in itself - which involves the development of one's capac-
ity to be moral. For Kant the obligation of perfecting oneself is 
necessarily related to promoting the well-being of others (in accord-
ance with universal principles) by virtue of the fact that one is 
promoting oneself as a moral. agent. Vattel's concept of the duty to 
perfect onself does not involve the idea of duties to others but 
rather of rights against others. This point is made very clear in 
Singer's interpretation of a duty to oneself: 
'To say that someone has a duty (or owes it) 
to himself to do something is an emphatic 
way of asserting that he has a right to do 
it - that there are no moral considerations 
1. 	Meatphysical Principles of Virtue, op.cit., p.77. 
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against it - and that it would be foolish 
or imprudent for him not to.' 1 
Now in order to arrive at a conclusion similar to this, Vattel would 
have to have tested the ends individuals and states Set for themselves, 
and indeed there is a principle of equality and universality in 
Vattel's writings which would enable him to do just this. 	However, 
Vattel is unprepared to test these ends and leaves the individual or 
the state the right of deciding how far it can honour its obligations 
to others given its duties to itself. It is reasonable to leave the 
individual or the state a certain area of latitude in respect of 
decisions concerning how moral to be. As we shall see Kant was con-
cerned to take this into account in his ethics and in his theory of 
international relations. No doubt Vattel was concerned with this too. 
However, the recurring theme in Vattel's argument lor such latitude 
is the preservation of the liberty of the state. There is an unwill-
ingness in Vattel to apply his own universalist ethic to all the ends 
of the state. This point finds particular expression in the argu-
ment for the preservation of the state's right to decide whether or 
not to submit its disputes to arbitration. Vattel's pluralist account 
of international relations depends upon the establishment of an area 
of freedom from independent moral judgment for the state. It is no-
where more obvious than in Vattel's thought that the concept of a 
universal morality cannot easily co-exist with the state--system. When 
taken more seriously than by Vattel the concept of a universal moral-
ity must be employed to test all the ends of states in order to pro-
mote a systematic harmony of purposes among them. To leave states 
the liberty of deciding their ends without reference to a universal 
1. M.G. Singer, Generalisation in Ethics, London 1963, 
pp. 314-315. 
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morality is to sanction an area of choice which could not be ration-
ally agreed upon. For to consent to a state having such liberty 
is to permit it to ignore the ends of others, or consider the ends 
of others to be less important than its own. It is in short to allow 
man to be unequally treated without good reason. And for this 
reason Vattel's account of the state-system is as unacceptable as 
that presented by Pufendorf. 
Let us before turning to Kant's discussion of the distinction 
between perfect and imperfect obligation which he wishes to make now 
turn to a possible line of argument that might be used to defend 
Pufendorf and Vattel. It might be argued that although there are philo-
sophical inconsistencies in their theories, there are nevertheless 
important insights into the conditions in which states must act, which 
must be expressed within the theory of international relations even 
if not in the manner attempted by these writers. It might he argued 
that Pufendorf and Vattel were concerned with a particular context 
where only limited agreement'is possible or where the question 'what 
if everyone did that?' is not applicable. Everyone is doing that 
already. ' In this condition, it might be argued, states have no 
choice but to consider their own interests first and foremost, and no 
choice other than to take account of the interests of others only 
insofar as other states are prepared to enter into reciprocal arrange-
ments. This condition is not, then, one in which a state should be 
encouraged to unilaterally act in accordance with the categorical 
imperative. Let us consider, for example, flume's point: 
'that it should be a virtuous man's fate 
1. 'State of nature situations' are discussed by Singer, 
ibid., pp. 152-161. 
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to fall int.() the society of ruffians, 
remote from the protection of laws and 
government; what conduct must lie embrace 
in that melancholy situation? He sees such 
a desperate rapaciousness prevail; such a 
disregard to equity, such contempt of order, 
such stupid blindness to future consequences, 
as must have immediately the most tragic 
conclusion, and must terminate in destruction 
to the greater number, and in a total dissol-
ution of society to the rest. He meanwhile 
can have no other expedient than to arm him-
self, to whomever the sword he seizes, or the 
buckler, may belong: To make provision of 
all means of defence and security: And his 
particular regard to justice being no longer 
of use to his own safety or that of others, 
he must consult the dictates of self-preser-
vation alone, without concern for those who 
no longer merit his care and attention.' 1 
If it were to be maintained that this situation is commonly found 
among states it would have to be said that the whole statement is 
question-begging assuming as it does that justice is of no value 
simply because it does not increase safety. Even in this state of 
nature there is a possibility of moral experience as well as a pos-
sibility that a skilful use of moral principle will enable men to 
escape from their condition. It is not necessary then that moral 
rules be suspended so that states can act simply in their own interests, 
or that the morality may be held to bind merely in conscience while 
states retain the liberty of deciding the extent to which they can be 
moral. Neither of these positions is an acceptable account of right 
conduct in the state of nature, overlooking as they do the means where-
by moral principles could be applied even in those conditions. 
To say that in the state of nature 'anything goes' or that 
each person is the sole judge of how he ought to behave is to overlook 
the fact that even there rational men could form ideas of proportionate 
1. Quoted by Singer, ibid., pp. 154-155. 
200. 
and disproportionate departures from right conduct. A man who lies 
in order to preserve himself from violent men can hardly entertain 
the proposition that otners have thereby a right to kill him. His 
obligation to tell the truth must be held to have lapsed in such miti-
gating circumstances and any 'punishment' ruled out as being inappro-
priate. Rational agents in the state of nature would have to specify 
the conditions which have to be satisfied before a man can depart from 
otherwise binding rules of morality. Indeed, it is likely that only 
through considerable experience and practice would men be able to 
formulate such principles. And this process would constitute an en-
largement of the moral community through recognising that ordinary 
rules of conduct are not fundamental rules but departures from funda-
mental rules for the specific purpose of providing reasonable guid-
ance for men in an insecure condition. Realising this, ratieaal men 
would be obliged to consider the extent to which such rules as ordin-
arily govern them can be justified. The problem before them is 
'Given the nature of the condition before us, are we justified in re-
garding the rules which normally govern us as reasonable departures 
from fundamental moral principles?' 	Rational persons in this condi- 
tion have to see their rules as departures from more fundamental 
moral principles and proceed to ask if they have departed from such 
rules in a proportionate or disproportionate manner. 	Indeed, the 
rules may be found to possess a rationality and not need to be changed. 
On the other hand, existing rules may depart disproportionately from 
fundamental moral obligations, in which case it is the duty of per-
sons to seek to eliminate the gap. Whatever the case it is necessary 
that universalisability should govern the rules of departure and 
that these rules should apply to all persons or states in similar 
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circumstances. 
The fact that such rules govern all persons or states equally 
indicates that persons or states are not at libert:t to formulate uni-
lateral conceptions of how best to behave. Persons or states are 
after all under an obligation to behave morally and if it is impossible 
to achieve this perfectly, at least such departures as do exist should 
be governed by universal principle. Indeed, the regulation of depart-
ures from fundamental moral principle must only be a transitional 
step until states can regulate themselves with regard to those funda-
mental moral principles themselves. If states are to be granted the 
right of choosing exactly how to behave it is difficult to imagine how 
they could ever leave their state of nature or gradually move away 
from the condition they are bound to abolish if their relations are 
to be grounded upon moral principles. Let us consider Hobbes with 
reference to this point. He believed it was a fundamental law of 
nature 'That every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope 
of obtaining it. 1 He maintains in the second law of nature 'That a 
man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, 
and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this 
right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against 
other men, as he would allow other men against himself.' 2 Hobbes 
also wishes to say, however, that a man 'may seek, and use, all helps, 
and advantages of Warre ' . 3 Now this would appear to exclude any 
principle of proportionality or any period of transition between the 
state of nature and the condition of civil society. There would appear 
1. Hobbes, Leviathan, Penguin 1968, p.190. 
2. ibid. 	 3. ibid. 
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to be no possibility of the existence of a period in which men through 
their own reason establish principles which minimise the level of 
arbitrary conflict or disproportionate violence and prepare the way 
for a move towards a civil society by gradually moralising their 
actions. ' What is required then is not merely a moral philosophy 
which sets the goals rational agents should pursue, but one which con-
siders the transitional steps towards such a condition - and is there-
fore aware of the situations in which persons must act. Let us now 
consider Kant's ethics with this point in mind. 
Kant is of particular interest within the boundaries of this 
thesis in his use of the distinction between perfect and imperfect 
obligation in order to come to terms with this problem. We shall note 
in the next section how it is brought to bear upon,the conduct of 
international relations. At this stage it is important to point out 
that this distinction differs from the one found in either Pufendorf 
or Vattel. 	This is made evident in the following quotation: 
'But by a broad duty is not understood a 
permission to make exceptions to the maxim 
of the actions, but only the permission to 
limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., the 
general love of one's neighbour by the love 
of one's parents); and this in fact broadens 
the field for the practice of virtue. The 
broader the duty, the more imperfect, there-
fore is one's obligation to an action ... 
Imperfect duties are, therefore, merely duties 
of virtue. The fulfilment of them is virtue 
but their transgression is not forthwith an 
offence but merely moral unworth, unless the 
subject made it a principle not to conform 
to these duties.' 4 
1. Given Hobbes' account of a 'right of nature' in terms of a 
'right to all things', and his view that there is no morality 
without government and law, it is impossible for him to enter 
into serious discussion of moral principles for the regulation 
of that period between the state of war and the condition of 
civil government. 
2. The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, op.cit., p.48. 
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One is not permitted to make an exception on account of one's desire 
to pursue one's interests or maintain one's liberty from the moral 
judgement of others. An exception to a principle is only acceptable 
if it j.s itself governed by a principle. 
Furthermore, a duty may be considered imperfect if there is 
latitude in the time or manner of its fulfilment. This is best con-
sidered with reference to Kant's remarks about treating others as ends 
rather than merely as means. For reasons discussed earlier, treating 
others merely as means is excluded by Kant's moral philosophy. We 
may be regarded as perfectly obliged not to treat others in this way. 
In addition Kant also argues that men have an obligation to treat 
others as ends in themselves and so are bound to advance the ends of 
others insofar as circumstances allow. But here men have latitude 
regarding the best way in which to discharge this obligation since 
there may be alternative ways of promoting the ends of others, in 
addition to constraints imposed by the environment which make such 
promotion difficult or impossible. 
Both of these imperfect obligations have their part to play 
in Kant's international relations theory. Kant believed that states 
were obliged to bring about a moral community at the international 
level, to bring reason to the forefront of political relations by grad-
ually expanding the boundaries of moral community. This is in accord-
ance with Kant's belief that the state-system is not a climax but a 
dominant and that states are obliged to move as far as possible towards 
perpetual peace. But given their condition - an international state 
of nature - they must reserve the right to realise this freedom with-
out jeopardising what has already been established, namely moral and 
political communities at the local level. In this way Kant sets a 
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goal which goes beyond those asked by the theories of Pufendorf and 
Vattel, while the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligation 
is an explicit recognition of the fact that men 'are already burdened 
with difficulties involved in acting rightly'. In addition, the 
duty, which each man has, to advance the happiness of others is imper-
fect since its content is necessarily varied. Nevertheless, it is a 
duty which embraces all men and requires fundamental changes in the 
ways in which they conduct their external relations. It is to Kant's 
theory of international relations that we now turn. 
IV 
From what has been said of Kant's moral philosophy in previous 
sections it can be concluded that he was opposed to what has been des-
cribed as the internal point of view. All men, by virtue of their 
rational nature, are governed by the same moral law and are obliged 
to bring into being a condition which harmonises their ends. This 
moral goal can only be accomplished through the radical alteration of 
the political condition in which men live. In particular, for Kant 
moral progress requires the reorganisation of the manner of conducting 
the external relations of states so that eventually an international 
moral order will exist. To highlight Kant's opposition to the internal 
point of view and his acceptance of the external point of view this 
section will discuss his international relations theory under three 
sub-sections used in previous sections; the theory of the state's 
rights; the nature of the ethic of the private person and the 
sovereign; and the theory of international co-operation. 
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The Rights of States  
Kant is at one with Pufendorf and Vattel in maintaining that 
the development of a universal state is an impossibility. 	Kant 
contends that the separation of states: 
'is however better, according to the idea 
of reason, than the fusion of all states 
into a universal monarchy by one power that 
has outgrown all the rest and subjected 
them to its sway. This is so because the 
laws always lose something of their definite-
ness as the range of a government becomes 
enlarBed; and soulless despotism when it 
has choked the seeds of the good, at length 
lapses into anarchy.' 1 
Kant is in agreement with, for example Montesauieu, that the division 
of powers within and between states is a condition of human freedom. 
And so his preliminary remarks are concerned with the defence of the 
r'_ghts of peoples to preserve their separate political constitutions. 
He argues that men have an inalienable right to form a state and 
proceeds to argue that states at war must not take action which would 
cause each other 'to disappear from the face of the earth' as this 
would comprise 'an injustice against the people, who cannot lose their 
original right to form a commonwealth ' . 2 The state is a society 
established according to the 'idea of the original Compact without 
which a right over a people is inconclusive'. 3 And it is limited 
groups of people who have the right to form such contracts among 
themselves. 
1. Perpetual Peace in The Theory of International Relations, op.cit., 
p.223. 	Kant added that 'the differences of their languages 
and of their religions' prevented 'the peoples from intermingling', 
although 'as civilisation increases, there is a gradual approach 
of men to greater unanimity in principles, and to a mutual 
understanding of the conditions of peace even in view of these 
differences'. 
2. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.123. 
3. Perpetual Peace, op.cit., p.201. 
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But having said this, Kant proceeds to agree with Rousseau's 
powerful commentary on the international state of nature. He is 
with Rousseau in asserting that the state abolishes the problem of 
the state of nature among individuals only to create a new and more 
terrible conflict at the international level. Rousseau had said 
that with the rise of states men 'committed more murders in a single 
day's fighting ... than were committed in the state of nature during 
whole ages over the whole earth'. 1 But while Rousseau could see no 
possibility of overcoming international conflict, Kant believed its 
solution was possible, at least in principle. However, he was clear-
ly of the mind that the formation of the separate state could not 
be regarded as final: 
'What avails it to labour at the arrange-
ment of a Commonwealth as a civil 
constitution regulated by law among 
individual men? The same unsociableness 
which forced men to it, becomes again 
the cause of each Commonwealth assuming 
the attitude of uncontrolled freedom in 
its external relations, that is, as one 
state in relation to other states; and 
consequently, any one state must expect 
from another the same sort of evils as 
oppressed individual men and compelled 
them to enter into a Civil Constitution 
regulated by law.' 2 
Now according to Kant, freedom (i.e., 'independence from the constraint 
of another's will, insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of 
everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole 
and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of 
his humanity') .3 But this freedom remains insecure in the state of 
1. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, op.cit.,p.206. 
2. Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmo-political Point of 
View, in Forsyth et.al., op.cit., p.183. 
3. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., pp. 43 -44. 
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nature where each m:mi is at liberty to act on the basis of what 
seems good and right to him. Man's fundamental obligation is to 
leave the state of nature in which he possesses and exercises his 
individual judgment and submit to a juridical condition. The pro-
tection of law enables men to exercise their freedom in accordance 
with universal moral principles. Government, then, is not a question 
of giving up rights in order to safeguard one's interests and promote 
one's welfare. It is a duty in accordance with the universal laws 
that govern all men in order that men have a condition within which 
they may reach a higher level of moral experience. 	Therefore, al- 
though Kant upholds the right of persons to establish government 
among themselves he is not content to allow separate states to remain 
in a natural condition of liberty. 
Since the state does not come into existence to promote only 
the interests of its members, Kant will not allow that the state has a 
right to enact any internal point of view. He rejects, for example, 
the liberty of the state to ground its external relations on power 
and he does not accept that the state can promote the interests of 
others only when it stands to benefit itself. The state comes into 
existence to protect freedom, and since all men have the right to have 
their freedom respected, it follows that the state is obliged to con-
duct its external relations in such a way that its exercise of freedom 
will not jeopardise the equal freedom of others. States which ground 
their relations on power alone are in conflict with the moral order, 
and it is for this reason that Kant declares that condition, in which 
states are subject only to themselves, intrinsically unjust. 	Kant 
says of the international state of nature: 
'This condition is a state of war (the 
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right of the stronger), even though 
there may not be an actual war or continuous 
fighting (hostility). Nevertheless (inasmuch 
as neither side wants to have it better), 
it is still a condition that is in the 
highest degree unjust, and it is a condition 
that states adjoining one another are obli-
gated to abandon.' i 
The international state of nature is unjust (as was that state of 
nature among individuals) because rights are not treated on their 
merits. It is a chance factor, the relative power of states which 
decides how states are treated. However, since men are rational, 
their relations must be grounded on the necessary moral laws of their 
nature and their rights cannot be left at the mercy of such a contin-
gent factor as the configuration of power. States are obliged (as 
men were earlier) to ground their relations on the recognition of 
just principles which requires in turn the free federation of nations 
to ensure that external political relations are regulated by the moral 
law: 
'every state, including even the smallest, 
may rely for its safety and rights, not 
on its power or its own judgment of Right, 
but only on this great International Federa-
tion (Foedus Amphictionum), on its combined 
power, and on the decision of the common 
will according to laws.' 2 
Unlike Pufendorf, Kant maintains that men ought to contract with each 
other to indicate their desire to exist in a condition of justice. 
The extension of moral community requires a universal contract: 
'But the state of Peace cannot be founded 
or secured without a compact of the nations 
with each other. Hence there must be a 
compact of a special kind which may be 
called a Pacific Federation (Foedus Pacificum) 
and would be distinguished from a mere treaty 
1. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.116. 
2. Idea for a Universal History, op.cit., pp.183 -184. 
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or Compact or Peace (pactum pacis) 
in that the latter merely puts an end 
to one war whereas the former would seek 
to tut an end to all wars forever.' - 
In this way the state discharges its obligation to take part in an 
international moral community where each member acts in accordance 
with universal law. The state does not have a right to remain in the 
international state of nature but must take its place within such 
an international community where men attempt to systematically harmon-
ise their purposes. Kant's ethic cannot permit the state any rights 
in opposition to such an ideal. 
The Morality of the Private Person and the Sovereign, 
Since all rational beings are bound by the same moral law, 
bo..h private persons and statesmen must ultimately be referred to the 
same system of morals. Whether or not Kant thought that the role of 
statesmen was sufficiently different from the roles of private persons 
to require a substantially different ethic is impossible to say as 
he offered no systematic discussion of this subject. Nevertheless, 
given his position on the rights of states it seems reasonable to 
infer that all men have international obligations although statesmen 
by virtue of their roles may have significantly different duties to 
perform. By applying these obligations in their political relations 
men would eventually create a cosmopolitan political society which 
would be the culmination of man's rational and moral capacities. 
However, Kant did not think that this world political society 
would be the creation of reason alone. Rather since 'history is the 
process by which man becomes rational, he cannot be rational at the 
1. Perpetual Peace, 	op.cit., pp.212 -213. 
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beginning'. 1 	In asserting that to understand history it is neces- 
sary to assume that nature has a purpose in history, Kant wished 
to suggest that nature employed human passions in order to bring 
about a deepening and enlarging of man's rational capacities. He 
believed, for example, that war was nature's way of teaching man by 
experience what he could have discovered had he been more rational - 
namely, the need on moral grounds for a civil society for the whole 
of mankind. However, man belongs to the world of inclination as well 
as to the world of reason, so that the fuller development of his 
rational powers can only emerge in the course of a historical process. 
Men are capable of pursuing limited goals 'while the whole as such 
is viewed as too great for them to influence and as attainable by 
them only by idea'. 2 	Neverthless, the situations they arrive at 
though pursuing their inclinations develop their reason and load 
them to consider new political possibilities. Kant appeared to 
believe, to use a distinction used earlier, that men had to be causal-
ly connected before they could become morally connected: 
'Finally the war itself comes to he regarded 
as a very hazardous and objectionable under- 
taking, not only from its being very artificial 
in itself and so uncertain as regards its 
issue on both sides, but also from the afterpains 
which the state feels in the ever increasing 
burdens it entails in the form of national debt 
- a modern infliction -- which it becomes almost 
impossible to extinguish. And to this is to 
be added the influence which every political 
disturbance of any state of our continent -
linked as it is so closely to others by the 
connections of trade - exerts upon all the 
states and which becomes so observable that 
they are enforced by their common danger, 
although without lawful authority, to offer 
1. H. Reiss, Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge 1971, p.38. 
2. On the Conynonplace: That may be correct in Theory but is 
useless in Practice, in Forsyth et al., op.cit., p.192. 
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themselves as arbiters in the troubles 
of any such state. In doing so they are 
beginning to arrange for a great future 
political body, such as the world has 
never yet seen. Although this political 
body may as yet exist only in a rough 
outline, nevertheless, a feeling begins, 
as it were to stir, to stir in all its 
members, each of which has a common 
interest in the maintenance of the whole. 
And this may well inspire the hope that 
after many political revolutions and trans-
formations, the highest purpose of Nature 
will be at least realised in the establish-
ment of a universal Cosmo-political Institu-
tion, in the bosom of which all the original 
capacities and endowments of the human 1 
species will be unfolded and developed.' 
Although self-interest would appear to be crucial in assisting the 
development of a world political community men eventually reach a 
stage (Kant does not indicate when this will be reached) when they 
are responsive to the laws of reason. And indeed Kant proposes a 
number of moral considerations which ought to influence states in 
the conduct of their external relations. Furthermore, Kant's defence 
of an international political community does not depend upon argu-
ments in terms of consequences for interests, but in the terms of 
moral duty. Kant's defence of an international community repudiates 
the instrumental view of co-operation which was so fundamental to 
those theories which formulated an internal point of view. 
Of those moral principles which Kant believes men should 
follow in order to create a 'systematic harmony of purposes' aswidely 
as possible, some are addressed to all men and some more particularly 
to those who enact the role of statesman. Of those which oblige all 
men first place should be given to the idea of the republican consti-
tution which was that system which best represented the nature of 
1. 	Idea for a Universal History, op.cit., p.188. 
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men as ends in themselves. 	Now in the establishment of such a consti- 
tution men were not simply obtaining a recognition for their own 
rational nature but ware creating a political society more able than 
others to incorporate itself within an international political commun-
ity. For a republican constitution was one in which men were treated 
as ends in themselves, and would by its very nature provide a core 
around which other states could gather to form a free federation. A man 
taking his place within a republican consitution may also see himself 
as taking part in a historical process which will eventuate in the 
establishment of a world order which treats men as ends in themselves. 
This point reflects Kant's view that moral progress at the internation-
al level depends upon 'a long internal process of improvement' within 
each commonwealth. 1 
	
This is a reminder of an earlier point that 
progress at the international level requires more than a mechanical 
re-arrangement of the relations between states. It requires a re-
definition of the obligations of citizens to outsiders. Insofar as 
the separate state has nothing in its nature which makes it inevitably 
prone to international conflict, and everything in its nature which 
makes it prone to becoming incorporated within an international commun-
ity, it would have to be according to Kant a republic. And it has 
this tendency towards a particular kind of international community be- 
cause it is its very nature that men be respected as ends in themselves. 
• 
As far as the sovereign is concerned, Kant regards him as 
1. ibid., p.186. 
2. Kant added that 'the Republican Constitution, in addition to the 
purity of its origin as arising from the original source of the 
Conception of Right, includes also the prospect of realising 
the desired object: Perpetual Peace among the nations'. The 
reason for this is that the citizen body would be 'very loth' 
to commit itself to taking part in 'all the horrors of War'. 
ibid., pp.207-208. 
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bound by a 'double function'. 1 His duty is certainly towards preserv-
ing and protecting his state (according to the moral law), but also 
to create the conditions in which the highest political good will 
become possible. In order that this political good can be approached 
Kant emphasises the value of mutual faith - presumably as one of the 
necessary conditions of any enlargement of community. This value 
requires the elimination of certain practices in war, for example 
assassination and poisoning; but it requires a great deal more, 
namely an increased sensitivity to the maxims underlying foreign policy. 
Kant regards the solution of international conflict and successful 
international co-operation to rest in an increased concern for acting 
in accordance with maxims which can be universalised. And, of course, 
by recommending this approach Kant is applying the main principles of 
his ethics to the relations between states. To judge the rightness or 
wrongness of an action on the international plane it is necessary to 
test it by considering whether or not its universal adoption would 
hasten or postpone the attainment of a world-wide 'systematic harmony 
of purposes'. Kant's recommendation that this is the test of the 
acceptability of a foreign policy act is indicated by the following 
words: 
'But what, then, is an unjust enemy according 
to the concepts of the Law of Nations, which 
hold that every state is a judge in its own 
cause as in a state of nature in general? An 
unjust enemy is someone whose publicly expressed 
will (whether by words or by deeds) discloses 
a maxim that, if made into a universal rule, 
would make peace among nations impossible and 2 
 would perpetuate the state of nature forever.' 
Kant is quite clear that statesmen are obliged to make sure the maxims 
1. See above, p.53, for a description of this expression. 
2. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, cp.cit., p.123. 
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of their foreign policy acts can be universalised - even in the state 
of nature. 	Furthermore, right acts are defined in the state of 
nature in accordance with their compatibility with one fundamental 
obligation, namely the abolition of the state of nature itself. Kant 
maintains that 'all men who can reciprocally influence each other must 
stand under some civil constitution', therefore right conduct has to 
have the specific aim of removing obstacles to that goal and positively 
advancing it. 1 Furthermore, it is the sovereign, who is authorised to 
act on behalf of the state, who has the specific obligation to work 
with others to attain this end: 
'If certain defects which could not be prevented, 
are found in the political constitution, or 
in the relations of the state, it becomes a 
duty especially for the heads of the state to 
apply themselves to correct them as soon as 
possible, and to improve the constitution so 
that it may be bought into conformity with 
natural right.' 
This principle reflects the fact that the move towards the goal of 
'perpetual peace' requires the collaboration of sovereigns who have 
particular obligations to work for the good of the international 
community. 	Let us now turn to a more detailed discussion of Kant's 
approach to international co-operation. 
The Theory of International Co-operation. 
Men who can 'reciprocally' affect one another are bound to 
progress towards that condition where their relations will conform to 
principles of law. States, like individuals, are obliged to establish 
the rule of law among themselves which involves giving up their 'wild, 
1. Perpetual Peace, op - cit., p.206. 
2. ibid., pp.228-229. 
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lawless freedom' for the legal freedom of the civil condition. 1 
States will form a federation but not a universal state above them 
all: 
'This Federation will not aim at the acquisition 
of any of the political powers of the state, 
but merely at the preservation and guarantee 
for itself, and likewise for the other confeder-
ated states, of the liberty that i!; proper to 
a state, and this would not require these 
states to subject themselves for this purpose 
- as is the case with men in the state of 
nature - to public laws and to coercion under 
them.' 2 
Kant was of the opinion that states could regulate themselves in accord-
ance with the moral law, although in the face of violation of funda-
mental law they could 'unite' to protect their freedom from any state 
which threatened it. However, their goal is that condition where 
'There will be no war' since 'this is not the way in which anyone 
should prosecute his rights'. 3 The perfect expression of man's capa-
city to be rational and moral is his submission to the law of the inter-
national community so that 'nations will settle their differences in 
a civilised way by judicial process, rather than in the barbaric way 
(of savages), namely, through war'. 4 Accordingly, each man's freedom 
will have legal guarantee and will be compatible with equal freedom 
for others - a condition which enables each man to pursue his ends and 
realise his capacities without infringing the rights of other men. 
Kant's theory is then most certainly a theory of international 
co-operation in its literal sense - that is, collaboration between 
1. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.81. 
2. Perpetual Peace, op.cit., p.213. 
3. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.128. 
4. ibid., p.125. 
216. 
equal states in order to establish a legal order among themselves. 
It is of particular interest to consider Kant's views as to how men 
might gradually bring moral rules to bear upon their external politi-
cal relations. He was of the opinion that states must progress grad-
ually rather than endanger what they have achieved already 'by over-
haste'. 1 Certain obligations need not be discharged immediately if 
conditions are not favourable. Some laws 'include permission to delay 
their fulfilment without, however, losing sight of their end; for 
their end allows such delay'. 2 Not all obligations have equal value 
or are of the same urgency and states have a certain latitude regard-
ing their implementation. In language reminiscent of his distinction 
between perfect and imperfect obligations, Kant refers to 'strict 
laws' which are 'valid without distinction of circumstances, and press 
immediately for the abolition of certain things' and those rules which 
have 'a certain subjective breadth in respect of their application' 
as 'they imply a regard to circumstances in practice'. 3 Those rules 
which Kant describes as strict include the duty to avoid endangering 
'mutual confidence', the duty of non-intervention and of concluding 
peace treaties without any secret intention to re-start the war. Those 
rules which have 'subjective breadth' include the duty not to acquire 
other states as 'property', the duty of avoiding 'national debts' and 
of abolishing standing armies 'in the course of time'. 4 While it 
would no doubt be of advantage to have a different list in the modern 
world, this list does indicate the bearing of Kant's ethic upon inter-
national relations in a practical manner. It indicates his conviction 
that perpetual peace ought to be approached 'through gradual reform 
1. Perpetual Peace, op.cit., p.205. 	3. ibid. 
2. ibid. 	 4. ibid., pp.200-205. 
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according to fixed principles' . 1 
It is one of the fundamental features of Kant's ethics that 
individuals and states alike are obliged to conduct their affairs 
not on the basis of 'one-sided maxims', for which there is no moral 
justification, but on rules conducive to the realisation of the kingdom 
of ends. 2 Now one of the principles which Kant regards as 'fixed' 
and which is employed to assist human beings to test the morality of 
their maxims is that of publicity. If one is sure that the publication 
of one's maxim would not lead others to complain of its injustice 
(presumably, on account of the fact that the state was claiming more 
for itself than it would allow others), then it can be acted upon: 
'For a maxim cannot be a right maxim which is such 
that I cannot allow it to be published without 
thereby at the same time frustrating my own 
intention, which would necessarily have to he 
kept secret entirely in order that it might 
succeed, and which I could not publicly confess 
to be mine without inevitably arousing thereby 
the resistance of all men against my purpose. 
It is clear that this necessary and universal 
opposition of all against me on self-evident 
grounds, can arise from nothing else than the 
injustice which such a maxim threatens to 
everyone.' 3 
Now it is arguable that the publicity principle alone will not suffice 
as a test. In a condition where one man or state was submissive to 
1. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.129. It is this 
emphasis upon gradualism that separates Kant from the thinker . 
who most influenced his political writing, namely Rousseau. 
'Rousseau is right to criticise historical institutions but they 
are the germs of future good ones'. Quoted in M. Despland, Ifant 
on History and Religion, Montreal 1973, p.49. In addition, Kant 
remarks in Perpetual Peace that 'it would manifestly be contrary 
to that political expediency which is in agreement with morals, 
to destroy the existing bonds of National and Cosmopolitan Union 
before there was a better constitution ready to take its place.. ? 
ibid., p.229. 
2. Perpetual Peace, op.cit., p.213. 
3. ibid., pp.238-239. 
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the will of another the publicity principle would not be sufficient. 
Since Kant is concerned with a principle to the effect that men must 
be treated as ends in themselves, the principle of publicising one's 
maxim would only be effective when declared before those who are 
committed to the idea of the kingdom of ends. 	For Kant's principle 
of publicity to be acceptable it would have to be closer to a particu-
lar version of the social contract doctrine elaborated by him with 
reference to the validity of law within the state. 	Kant refers to 
the social contract by which the lawful constitution is established 
and proceeds to state that: 
... we need by no means assume that this 
contract (contractus originarius or pactum 
sociale), based on a coalition of the wills 
of all private individuals in a nation to 
form a common, public will for the purposes 
of rightful legislation, actually exists as 
a fact, for it cannot possibly be so. Such 
an assumption would mean that we would first 
have to prove from history that some nation, 
whose rights and obligations have been passed 
down to us, did in fact perform such an act, 
and handed down some authentic record or 
legal instrument, orally or in writing, before 
we could regard ourselves as bound by a pre-
existing civil constitution. 	It is in fact 
merely an idea of reason, which has nonethe-
less undoubted practical reality; for it can 
oblige every legislator to frame his Jaws in 
such a way that they could have been produced 
by the united will of a whole nation, and to 
regard each subject, insofar as he can claim 
citizenship, as if he has consented within 
the general will. This is the test of the 
rightfulness of every public law.' 1 
The test of a right action, either in domestic or international poli-
tics, is its compatibility with the consent of members of the kingdom 
of ends, who are attempting to create a moral community among all men. 
This principle brings Kant into the most direct opposition 
1. Reiss (ed.), op.cit., p.79. 
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with the ideas of Pufendorf and Vattel. Their theory of internation-
al co-operation tended to value co-operation in terms of its conse-
quences for the interests of separate states. Kant's ethical 
doctrine leads him to explicitly challenge this approach to inter-
national co-operation. The principles underlying international co-
operation: 
must not start from the prosperity and 
happiness that are to be expected in each 
state from following them, nor from the end 
which each of them makes the object of its 
will as the highest empirical principle of 
politics; but they must proceed from the 
pure conception of the duty of right or 
justice, as an obligatory principle given 
a priori by pure reason.' 1 
Rational morality rather than 'a standard of conduct ... based on the 
experience of those who have hitherto found it most to their advant-
age' ought to underly international co-operation. 2 
	
Kant proposes 
the most far-reaching critique of the instrumental approach to inter-
national co-operation and offers to replace it with a theory of its 
intrinsic value and obligatory status. It is the duty of rational 
citizens and the 'moral politician' to apply the idea of justice to 
the relations between communities so that men complete their history 
by forming a world-wide moral and political community as required by 
reason. 
1. Perpetual Peace, 	op.cit., p.236. 
2. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.129. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Moral Freedom 
and the  
Theory of International T;elations  
It has been argued in the course of this thesis that the 
internal point of view formulated by Pufendorf and Vattel is unac-
ceptable. 	In particular, while these theorists argued foi a moral 
law which bound all persons they were unprepared to forego the con-
sequences of their individualist premises. And so they argued for 
the division of mankind into separate, sovereign states and failed 
to adequately express man's moral nature in the relations between 
communities. 
However, an objection to their formulation of the internal 
point of view must take account of more than problematic areas in their 
internal chain of reasoning. For problems arise in the overall ap-
proach adopted by these writers. In short, the individualism of these 
writers has become so exaggerated that their thought suffers from not 
duly pointing out the dependence of the individual upon the society 
in which he lives for both intellectual and material needs. In addi-
tion, these writers did not make as much as they might have of the 
fact that'man's social and political institutions and ideas have a 
historical context and are thereby subject to change and development. 
It is not part of this argument to maintain that for 
example, Pufendorf reduced society to the individual and that he 
failed to understand that the individual is constituted largely by 
his social relationships, 	It is arguable that Pufendorf was aware 
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of this dependence especially as he makes it clear that the state of 
nature probably never existed between individuals. 1 According to 
Pufendorf, men are always to be found in a social condition. But it 
is not part of seventeenth century man's concern to consider the 
variety of social conditions in which men are to be found . 2 For a 
later age, the individualism of Pufendorf's individuals would appear 
to be no more than a reflection of a particular kind of society, 3 a 
modern society based less upon 'status' than 'contract'. And the inter-
national relations theory based upon this individualism would simply 
appear to reflect the cultural outlook of what are sometimes referred 
to as modern societies. It is at a later stage of intellectual history 
that the variations of culture and the movement of history become 
fundamental to the outlook of reflective men. 
Let us not blame Pufendorf for having lived too early! 	But 
let us note one of the difficulties in method which pervades his whole 
system. If mcn lived originally in small groups - as indeed anthto-
pology suggests - then their morality was, first of all, a social moral-
ity. Men belonged to groups, identified with them completely, and 
1. See above, p.72. 
2. 'This process was a moral version of Cartesian doubt, through which 
seventeenth century thinkers followed their penchant for making 
a cosmos comprehensible only by first breaking it down to its 
simplest, interchangeable parts and then reconstructing it from 
them.' L. Krieger, The Politics of Discretion: Nfendorf 
the Acceptance of ilatural Law, Ch:!cago 1965, p,91. 
3. 'This is how it is possible, without contradiction, to be an 
individualist while asserting that the individual is a product 
of society, rather than its cause. the reason is that individual-
ism itself is a social product, like all moralities and all 
religions. The individual receives from society even the moral 
beliefs which deify him.' Durkheim. in S. Lulles,'Pu:Aheim's 
'Individualism and the Intellectuals', Political Studies, 1969, 
p. 28, 
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were therefore far from believing that there was a morality which 
tied them to outsiders, let alone to the whole of humanity. This 
point is emphasised by the fact that 'in the early stages of ethics, 
rights and duties do not attach to a human being as such. They attach 
to him as a member ot a group'. For 'morality is in its origin group-
morality ,1 However, Pufendorf writes as if there was a universal 
morality ever-present in the minds of individuals even at the earliest 
stages ot human history. But since this is not the case, Pufendori's 
method must give way to one more sensitive to the fact that the cbn-
cept of the individual (and of a morality binding all individuals) is 
the product of considerable social experience and moral sophistication. 
A different method (from that of Pufendorf) would have to consider 
the fact that man's earliest moralities are customary moralities and 
that it is only in the course of his historical development that man 
reflects upon his morality, considers himself to possess rights and 
obligations as a man, which prepare him for the enlargement of his 
moral community and the eventual identification with that moral commun-
ity which is mankind itself. 
Now, in the course of a move from the customary morality of 
early societies to the reflective, universalist moralities which many 
currently hold, it is necessary that the individual should place him-
self at odds with his society. For he has to free himself from :it, in 
order to enact his 'human' obligations to outsiders. It is important 
to consider what exactly is involved in this transformation, how it is 
to he. explained and what it can be taken to signify. Two contrasting 
accounts are possible, the one depending upon a theory of natural law, 
1. 	Hebhouse, op.cit., p.233. 
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the other depending upon a philosophy of history. 
Traditional natural law theory would argue that the awareness 
of moral equality, et of obligations to the whole of humanity, aeises 
from the fact that men, by virtue of their common creation, share a 
common human nature in which is embedded permanent moral truths. 
There is a basis within human nature for such obligations irrespective 
of the particular stage of historiCal development. It is of interest, 
given this assumption, to consider a possible natural law argument for 
the failure of early societies to appreciate that such a universal 
morality exists. According to Yves Simon, a prominent natural lawyer, 
we should not expect the natural law to be 'known to all men at all 
times, in all societies, in an equal degree of perfection ' . ' The 
fact that the natural law is not observed in all times and places is 
not then a refutation of the fact that the whole of mankind is bound 
by one moral law. What it indicates is that men have not come to know 
the nature of this moral law, a law which exists independently of 
man's knowledge of it. Simon contends that: 
'knowledge of natural law is not given all 
at once, either in the development of the 
individual man or in the development of 
mankind ... but is itself subject to a 
law of graduality in perfection, like 
everything else human.' 2 
It follows that since the natural law is always contained within human 
nature it is not itself subject to 'graduality'. It is man's knowledge 
of the natural law which is alone subject to 'graduality', the natural 
law remaining true whether man knows it or not. Therefore, the move-
ment from customary, group-morality to the morality of man as such 
is a development in which man comes to know what was already true. 
1. Yves, Simon, The Tradition of Natural Law, New York 1965, p.161. 
2. ibid., p.I62. 
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Now the above approach rests directly upon a theology since 
it maintains that human nature is constituted by Cod. This invites 
the question of how the move from group to universal morality might 
be understood by a philosophical position which did not have this be-
lief or did not grant it such central importance. Let us consider, 
for example, the view of Rousseau and of Kant that in the course of 
history men come to conceive freedom not in terms of the independence 
from others, but in terms of moral life in a community which is regu-
lated by principles which individuals prescribe for themselves. For 
these thinkers, and for Hegel after them, in the course'of their history 
men have come to consider themselves as being worthy of respect in 
their own right, as ends in themselves. Referring to the stage through 
which humanity has evolved, Kant discusses the final stage where man 
set himself 'above community wit', the animals' since he claimed: 
... a relation of equality with all rational 
beings, whatever their rank, with respect 
to the claim of being an end in himself, 
respected as such by everyone, a being which 
no one might treat as a mere means to ulterior 
ends.... This is because of his reason - 
reason considered not insofar as it is a 
tool to the satisfaction of his inclinations, 
but insofar as it makes him an end in himself. 
It is in the course of history, then, that men come to see themselves 
as ends, that is as beings whose nature demands that they are so recog-
nised. Their self-conception does not depend upon a process whereby 
men come to understand what was always objectively true. It depends 
rather on their own historical experience whereby men redefine what= 
they are about and come to make new claims (for the recognition of 
their status) upon the societies in which they live. Inherent in this 
1. Corjectua Beginning of Hurion history in :ant: On History 
(ed. Beck), New York 1957, pp. 58-59. 
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process is man's detachment from the societies of which he is a 
member, and which know only group morality, in order to claim that, 
since true morality 	connected with his rational nature, the prin- 
ciples which he obeys ought to be those which he has prescribed for 
,, himseil. 1  
While natural law doctrine would declare that it was always 
wrong to ignore obligations to outsiders, the view of ethics, which 
has just been discussed, would be inclined to maintain that those soc-
ieties which do not recognise obligations to outsiders have simply not 
reached that stage where men associate rights and obligations with the 
concept of humanity. A society which does not possess the concept of 
an obligation to humanity is not in conflict with a permanently true 
moral standard. Its experience is that of group morality and its out-
look has not developed to appreciating a view of ethics which it is 
always potentially capable of grasping, namely that men as such, irre-
spective of group membership, are ends in themselves. Such societies 
are by virtue of the absence of this perspective (which is clearly a 
formulation of the internal point of view) incapable of 'international' 
theory, since it is only through thinking that men as men have rights 
and obligations that a society can think of a system of obligation that 
could embrace the whole of mankind. And only at this stage may men 
feel compelled to think anew the obligations to their separate commun-
ities and their obligations to the rest of mankind. 
1. 	It is certainly Hegel rather than Kant who chooses to write of 
the whole of human history as a process whereby men who are 
totally immersed in their cultures and who enact their moralities 
uncritically come to assert their own individuality and claim 
that their own individual reason gives them access to moral 
truths. 	Kegel, The Philosophy of History, (translated by 
J. Sibree) , New York 1956. 
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The argument against Pufendorf - if the above philosophical 
perspective were to be accepted - is that he did not possess the insight 
of say a Gentili who held that the Greek thought the barbarian an 
enemy by nature, while he was an enemy only through culture on account 
of the symbolic distinctions established between these two groups. 1 
Or, if he did possess that insight he did not employ it in defence of 
a philosophical history which claimed that history was a process in 
which man came to regard themselves as beings of worth and sought to 
change their societies in order to find expression for their conception 
of their own dignity. Thus, when men make a claim to obey only those 
principles which emanate from their own rational nature, they seek 
expression of their pre-eminently human desire, which is to be treated 
as ends in themselves and to belong to communities which recognise 
their self-image. 
Now this doctrine can be found both in the thought of Kant and 
Hegel. Hegel, however, despite some remarks on the need to spare in-
nocents undue iniury in the conduct of war, did not consider that inter-
national relations would have to be re-ordered in order to render its 
activities compatible with man's moral freedom. Men could find satis-
faction of this principle within the sovereign state, or had done so 
up to that point. however, with the division of humanity into separate 
states, moral freedom must be regarded as existing rather precariously. 
For the citizens of any one state may find their lives influenced 
quite fundamentally by decisions taken elsewhere and without any con-
sideration for them as ends. It was on account of the threat posed by 
international relations to the moral freedom of citizens within the 
sovereign state that Rousseau proposed, as the ideal solution ; the 
1. 	See above, pp. 74-75. 
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complete independence of states. However, there Is another option 
open to international relations theory at this point, which is to 
argue for the progressive development of an international community 
based upon principles reflecting man's moral freedom. - Now this is 
the option that Kant takes. Such rational principles ensure that one 
state does not use other states and their citizens merely as means, 
so eliminating the moral freedom they may have established within their 
communities. If moral freedom is to be secure within the state, it 
is necessary to so structure the environment in which states exist 
that rational principles can regulate the whole of social and politi-
cal life. However, it is not sufficient, according to Kant, for men 
to seek the obedience of rational principles in international relations 
simply that their moral freedom may be secure within their separate 
states. Their interest must be :a the right of each man to live in a 
social and political environment where the laws he obeys are the ones 
he would prescribe for himself. The establishment of such principles 
within the context of international relations is therefore a duty 
which each man owes to all the rest. For this reason, Kant could re-
fer to man's progress in terms of the continuing expansion of a moral 
community in which more men were respected as ends, and could say of 
the modern world that: 
'the social relations between the various Peoples 
of the world, in narrower or wider circles, have 
now advanced everywhere so far that a violation 
of right in one place of the earth, is felt all 
over it.' 1 
And the completion of this moral progress would consist no less than 
of the establishment of a moral order at the international level. 
Kant's idea that in the course of their history men engage in 
1. Perpetual Peace, op.cit., p.216. 
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more complex social and political relations as their sense of moral 
freedom intensifies and their morality becomes more inclusive provides 
one main point of departure for the remaining arguments in this thesis. 
His theory of history provides us with a more convincing sociology of 
morals than is to be found in the non-developmental theories of. Pufen-
dorf and Vattel. Not only does Kant improve upon them in his account 
of moral philosophy; he improves upon them through having a more 
developed historical sociology. 1 If we are to theorise anew about obli- 
gations within a humanity divided into separate, sovereign states it 
is useful to incorporate his insights into society, history and morals. 
The insight, is, in short, that men have lived in a state of nature 
never as individuals but as members of societies which exclude each 
other. The state of nature has existed, and continues to exist, only 
between men organised into distinct social groups which are not disposed 
to understand each other as members in turn of a larger moral commun-
ity.. The idea of the state of nature is only useful when applied to 
the idea of men divided into exclusive social groups each possessing 
its own internal point of view. Indeed, their condition changes as 
they come to understand their common ground, or remove the symbolic 
differences which divide them, and organise their relationships in accord-
ance with a morality held to be common to all. Nevertheless, insofar 
as men remain divided into distinguishable social groups possessing 
their oon internal points of view, the state of nature continues among 
1. 	It ought to he added that it is Hegel who presents the more 
ambitious account of the historical and the cultural. However 
for present purposes, which are to contrast a developmental 
with a non-developmental account of human association, Kant 
is to be preferred since he understood man as having developed 
the capacity to associate int2rnationally in the course of his 
history. Hegel, as we noted earlier, resisted this conclusion. 
See above p. 103. 
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them although that condition may become more problematic as man's 
moral sophistication develops. In accordance with this view, Kant 
held that the difference between the state of nature which existed 
among families originally and that which existed among nation-states 
in the modern world was to a large extent a difference in degree of 
moral complexity: 
'The principal difference between the state 
of nature that exists among individuals or 
families (in their relationship to one 
another) and that which exists among nations 
as such is that the Law of Nations is con-
cerned, not only with the relationship of 
one state to another, but also with relation-
ships of individuals in one state to indivi- 
duals in another and of an individual to 
another whole state.' 1 
The difference between the state of nature formed by exclusive kinship 
groups, for example, and the state of nature comprising modern steles 
is, of course, a profound one. There is, for example, in the 'modern' 
state of nature an awareness of the rights and obligations which men 
have as men, an idea unfamiliar to earlier societies. 	Nevertheless, 
despite these differences the condition formed by exclusive, kinship 
groups and that condition formed by nation-states remains in both cases 
the state of nature. However, a different condition entirely would 
result were men to establish a civil society for the whole of mankind, 
for then the state of nature would cease altogether. 	In this condi- 
tion, there would be no social group in possession of an internal point 
of view, however formulated, placing it in opposition to the interests 
of other social. groups. This final condition would, in Yantian terms, 
represent the fullest eypression of the principle of moral freedom. 
The manner in which societies coma to dissolve some of their 
1. Metaphysical Elerwnts of Justice, p.115. 
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differences, so enabling them to expand the moral community to include 
outsiders, or to include themselves in a wider moral community, is 
one for sociological and anthropological studies. 	is outside the 
scope of this thesis to attempt to offer accounts of this type of 
social change. What the forthcoming arguments will attempt to do is 
incorporate what might be described as the 'sociological' perspective 
on man, namely that the individual is constituted by the society in 
which he lives. This perspective exists in opposition to the view 
portrayed (and criticised) by Bradley, namely that: 
1 ... individuals are real by themselves, and 
it is because of them that the relations are 
real. They make them, they are real in them, 
not because of them, and they would be just 
as real out of them. The whole ig the mere 
sum of the parts, and the parts are as real 
away from the whole as they are within the 
whole.' 1 
If one adopts the sociological perspective in opposition to the one 
outlined by Bradley the problem of society is no longer that of ex-
plaining how individuals in the state of nature decide to leave it 
behind in order to join society and the state. It is already assumed 
by the sociological perspective that man is social by nature. However, 
another question arises in the place of the problem of the existence 
of society, and that is how it is that exclusive, or 'closed', societies 
come to adopt the idea of a more embracing moral community and come 
to incorporate themselves in more inclusive, more 'open' societies. 2 
The non-sociological perspective ; which exists to some degree in the 
writings of Pufendorf and Vattel, would appear to believe that men in 
the original state of nature had the capacity to form a society as 
1. F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, Oxford 1962, p.164. 
2. A distinction employed by H. Bergson, The Two Sources o. 
ifora7ity and Religion, New York, 1956. 
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large as humanity itself, although man's capacity to satisfy his 
interests within smaller groups did not require him to exercise his 
ability to associate on the global scale. But man's capacity to 
associate globally is not something he has early in his career for it 
is only possible for him to think in these terms after considerable 
historical development where he develops the concept of a morality 
which applies to all men irrespective of their group membership. But 
if this development is to be analysed in a manner which incorporates 
the sociological rather than through the sociological itself, what_ 
is this analysis to be? 
The analysis to be employed is concerned simply with the iso-
lation of some of the main stages in the development of moral freedom 
between man's division into small, exclusive kinship groups and his 
unification in the form of a civil society for the whole of mankind. 
Kant, himself, suggested that a 'minor motive' for attempting a 
'philosophical history' would consist in attempting to answer 'the 
question of what the various nations and governments have contributed 
to the goal of world citizenship, and what they have done to damage 
it , . 1 Now the present analysis will attempt nothing as grandiose 
as that, because it is concerned simply with identifying some central 
stages in the development of human associations understood in terms 
of their gradual progression towards a world society based upon the 
idea of moral freedom. The approach to be considered in the next 
sections is concerned with a theory of the relations between separate 
communities within the context of their development from closed to 
open societies, from limited to extended moralities, from the internal 
point of view based upon unity of kinship to an external point of view 
1. Idea for a Universal Eistory, op.cit., p.191. 
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based upon moral freedom itself. 
The approach to be taken then cannot be regarded as a histor-
ical approach. Although some of the earlier stages in the development 
of society - according to the analysis of this thesis - can claim to 
have some basis in recorded history, the entire process cannot be held 
to correspond to anything that has ever happened. Nor is the approach 
concerned to illustrate a process which must inevitably occur in 
accordance with the premises of some philosophy of history. The issues 
involved in making a much greater claim than is being made here cannot 
be seriously considered within this thesis. Nor can the approach pre-
tend to be involved in indicating some of the social and political 
stages which might correspond to man's knowledge of the natural law 
as it (knowledge) unfolds according to its principle of 'graduality'. 
Nor can the analysis be taken to reflect any belief to the effect that 
the criterion of right and wrong changes according to historical 
period in a 'philosophical' rather than in a sociological sense. 
These are more extravagant claims, too complex to be discussed further 
at present. 
The approach is best regarded as a 'myth', although only in 
a rather specific sense. It is concerned with a process in which men 
move from a state of nature comprising 'closed' societies to a condi-
tion where men recognise an international morality governing them all 
and proceed to establish an international government among themselves. 
Since the approach developed here does not assert that this process 
is inevitable, and does not proceed to attempt to justify that'asser-
tion, this process is best regarded as mythical. On the other hand, 
the stages which are identified within this process are not randomly 
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selected, nor is the description of the process as 'progress' merely 
arbitrary. The development from one stage to another is identified 
through its tendency to promote the value of moral freedom in man's 
social and political relations, while the concept of 'progress' in 
the description of the process as a whole indicates the view that 
societies can reasonably (rather then arbitrarily) be graded according 
to their proximity to expressing the idea of moral freedom in their 
external relations. And the use of the concept of moral freedom as 
a criterion with which to evaluate societies reflects an agreement 
with the fundamentals of Kant's moral philosophy as described in a 
previous chapter. Therefore, while the approach is mythical in one 
sense, it appears rational in another. 
It is as an imaginative exercise that the approach is most 
usefully regarded. It is designed to enable more serious reflection 
about our obligations as citizens and as men, as participants in 
particular political associations and as moral agents with the capacity 
of obeying universal laws. It is designed to highlight obligations 
to the rest of mankind. In this respect it is most at odds with the 
myth of the social contract employed by Pufendorf and Vattel. This 
myth permitted self-interested men (albeit subject to a higher moral 
law) to establish limited political associations and defended the 
idea that the establishment of the separate state was a purely internal, 
exclusive matter. The approach to 're employed here is specifically 
concerned with undermining this idea, within the context of a myth 
which understands the state as simply one of the associations men may 
establish in the course of their development towards a civil society 
for the whole cf mankind. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
From Ethnc,centrism to the State  
The myth is concerned with four separate stages in the moral 
development of societies. It will be argued that the later stages 
are more advanced than preceding stages and that this can he shown 
through an appeal to Kantian morality. The four fundamental stages 
are as follows: 
In the first place, a state of nature consisting of a variety 
of ethnocentric societies where members recognise obligations only 
among insiders. 	At this stage morality is social since it is held 
to be applicable only to members of the same society. Conversely, 
there are no external obligations since there is no concept f a 
morality which applies to man as such and, by implication, to those 
who belong to different societies. 	Tn this condition, morality 
exists customarily and is accepted by men as a necessary part of their 
belonging to their particular societies. Men have not reached a con-
dition where they reflect upon their moralities or believe they can 
be changed. Men are absorbed within their groups and have not detach-
ed themselves from them by making specific individual claims in con-
flict with the dominant customary morality. There is no sense of the 
individual conscience or of duties between individuals living in diff-
erent societies. 
In the second condition, men have set themselves at odds with 
their particular groups by claiming the right to conduct relations 
with outsiders. As individuals they seek the freedom to enter into 
their private relations with outsiders - which would never have 
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existed before. When a number of societies permit their members 
this freedom of action a new context develops, which may be described 
as interethnic society. This type of society 'reveals itself by 
commercial exchange, migration of persons, common beliefs, organisa-
tions that cross frontiers and, lastly, ceremonies or competitions 
open to the members of all these units'. 1 It flourishes in propor- 
tion to the freedom of exchange, migration or communication, the 
strength of common beliefs, the number of non-national organisations, 
and the solemnity of collective ceremonies'. 	The freedom which 
individuals have claimed for themselves leads to their increasingly 
becoming causally connected. Nevertheless, the state of nature con-
tinues to exist among them although in a more elaborate form. For 
the development of contacts and relationships between the insiders 
and outsiders of different societies adds another kind of state of 
nature to the one which already exists. As well as being in a state 
of nature with other societies by virtue of his membership of one 
exclusive society, the individual is a member of a state of nature 
with all other men as a private individual. Individuals are free to 
enter into relations with outsiders, but these relationships are not 
governed by a system of rules which ensures that they are conducted 
fairly. In this sphere of free action, men are not governed by the 
customary rules of the societies to which they traditionally belong. 
They are thrown back upon their own resources and since the new state 
of nature is not a secure one the fact that fundamental innovations 
have to be made develops their capacity to think in terms of a reflect-
ive morality, a morality which men establish for themselves through 
their reason. 
1. 	R. Aron, Peace and War Among Potions, London 1966, p.105, 
where Aron discusses 'transitional society'. 
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This will take us to a third condition where men attempt to 
create legal and political institutions in order to take control of 
their new social reality. In this condition men wish to move beyond 
their causal connection to their moral connection, for they seek to 
acquire the recognition of the rights they have as individuals through 
the establishment of legal and political authority. This section will 
be concerned with a point made by many political theorists, namely 
that men reach a situation where tribal authority or private vengeance 
are inadequate mechanisms of social control and, consequently, these 
give way to a new kind of authority, political authority which is in 
the hands of a specific agency, namely the state. According to the 
myth the break with ethnocentrism and the development of new types 
of relationship leads to the point where traditional methods of social 
control cannot mediate between group interests. Consequently, new 
types of disagreement (those involving a private individual in his 
relations with individual outsiders) cannot be 'exposed to private 
vengeance or to the mere displeasure of his community; his offence is 
investigated and he is liable to fines, imprisonments, whippings, or 
even death at the hands of a public executioner' . l The move from ethno- 
centric society to transnational society, or the development of indivi-
dualism from an internal point of view based upon ethnocentrism, leads 
to the development of the state - according to the myth being developed 
here. 
The formation of the state occurs within the fourth stage of 
the myth because men have come to make new types of claim upon one 
another, a condition which has arisen with the idea of the individual 
having the -right to pursue his ends as an independent person. The 
1. 	Plamenatz, Man and Society, Vol.2, London 1969, p.352. 
For this account of the origins of the state, see Plamenatz, 
on•Engels, pp. 351-354. 
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state is concerned with maintaining an order among these individuals 
within a certain political space. Now within this condition the 
state appears as an instrument, a means whereby individuals establish 
an order within which they are free to pursue their interests. It 
is similar then to Pufendorf's concept of the state and comes into 
existence as men understand themselves as possessing rights to advance 
their interests, albeit within a legal and political framework which 
is concerned with the preservation of justice. Individuals regard 
the state as an entity which has come to exist in response to their 
new social condition; they regard it as their property, as a reflect-
ion of their particular development, and as the highest association 
with which they identify. Underlying the state is a sense of terri-
toriality, a sense of place and a feeling of belonging to a community 
which reflects the social bond among its members. 
Now, it will be assumed that at this stage, men in the state 
have few relations with outsiders. I shall assume that they have 
some relations with groups who appear to them to be at an 'earlier' 
stage of human development and that these relationships are conducted 
fairly. Therefore, although members of the state have a sense of 
identification with the state they do not exclude outsiders from fair 
treatment. Let us assume, however, that with the passage of time, 
the members of this state come into contact with other advanced 
societies which possess legal and political apparatus not unlike that 
with which they are familiar. 	Their relationships with these states, 
as opposed to their relationships with earlier societies, compel 
the state to reconsider what it is about. While the state recognises 
obligations to earlier societies it does not consider these'obliga-
tions as requiring the establishment of fundamental social and 
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political co-operation since their cultures are so dissimilar. But 
with the discovery of similar societies the possibility of more 
complex and more developed external relations develops. There is, 
in the first place, the necessity for the elaboration of particular 
rules for regulating the relations between separate states. There 
is an immediate need for agreeing upon the rules of diplomacy and 
for articulating principles for the harmonisation of conflicting 
interests. The development of such rules would represent the gradual 
extension of the boundaries of moral community and states might 
regard themselves as members of a kind of society. 
However, there is a sense in which the relations the state 
has with other states will develop its moral capacities in new 
directions. For in the elaboration of rules which govern all the 
states, communities, in a manner of speaking, are developing prin-
ciples which may be held to bind all men simply as men. They are 
establishing certain universal principles of justice through agreeing 
that there are various fundamental rules which ought to be observed 
in the relations between all states. The main feature of this fourth 
stage in the myth is the development of a new type of moral conscious-
ness which maintains that there are rational principles of morality 
which oblige all men by virtue of their possession of rational nature. 
Men were to some extent aware of this, albeit implicitly, with the . 
establishment of the state. But at that stage their attention wcs 
focussed rather more intensely upon their individual capacities, and 
in particular upon having emancipated themselves from the customary 
morality of their early societies. They were concerned then with 
having secured the freedom to define and pursue their own interests 
and, by virtue of the fact that others claimed a similar right, with 
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the establishment of a state for the maintenance of order among 
themselves. At that stage, it was allowed rather implicitly that 
other men had the equal right to pursue their interests, but given 
their previous history it will be assumed they were concerned more 
with the value of the independent individual first and foremost, and 
only then with the moral equality which he shared with others. In 
the fourth condition, men turn their attention more in the direction 
of their moral nature and its capacity for establishing rational 
principles which govern all men. It will be assumed then that they 
seek satisfaction through the transformation of their social and 
political environment so that it more perfectly embodies the prin-
ciples which govern all men qua men. 
At this stage, men come to radically redefine their attitudes 
towards their state. They are now capable of imagining a condition 
where states may collaborate in order to establish a civil society 
among themselves. For this reason men are not satisfied with the 
belief that the state is the highest form of association since they 
believe that the state is incapable of satisfying their demands for 
a form of association which expresses their belief that men share 
fundamental moral principles. They no longer consider the state as 
the most perfect association maintaining the harmony of interests be-
tween similarly constituted individuals who share a common territory. 
Rather, they understand it as an association which maintains justice 
first and foremost among men, who, for a variety of historical 
reasons, happen to have developed together and to have developed 
close sympathies. In the third condition, the essential nature of the 
state was its concern with the maintenance of order, and with justice 
as a means to that order, within a definable territorial area. Now, 
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in the fourth condition, the state is understood as first and fore-
most an instrument of justice, and as limited within a particular 
territory through Lhe accident of history. The objective men set 
for themselves at this stage is the establishment of an internation-
al association which overcomes the fact that through historical 
accident the observance of just principles has been confined to sepa-
rate political associations occupying particular territorial areas. 
In a previous condition the state had appeared to be the highest form 
of association; now it appears as one form of association within 
the development of men towards a situation where they can bring their 
universal ethic to bear upon their entire social and political 
condition. 
In this fourth condition, men are concerned with two sets of 
objective. In the first place, they are concerned with grounding 
the relations between separate states on rational, moral principles. 
But this objective is not self-sufficient, as men are concerned to 
'cultivate a friendly society' with outsiders with a view to the 
eventual establishment of international forms of association. For 
this reason, members of separate states do not regard their condition 
as climactic, but merely as dominant, and in seeking to discover 
rules for regulating the relations between states, they are not est-
ablishing some 'system of states' which maximises their interests, 
but rather preparing the way for the transformation of states con-
sidered as separate, sovereign associations. 
There are then two essential transitions within the Moral 
development of societies as understood through the myth. In the 
first place, there is the move from ethnocentrism to individualism; 
and, in the second place, there is the move from considering the 
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state as an instrument for the administration of justice for a 
particular population within a specific territorial area to under-
standing it as a particular mode of association within a larger 
historical context. Let us now consider these stages and their 
transitional steps in some greater detail. 
II 
Let us begin with a description of the original state of 
nature composed of distinctive and mutually exclusive cultures. In 
this original state of nature there is no such concept as an obli-
gation to an outsider and no such event as a transaction with an 
outsider. What is more, as far as these cultures are concerned the 
absence of obligation and the absence of transaction are connected. 
For since this condition is one of entirely closed societies, which 
have no idea of a morality between groups, it is impossible for 
groups or their members to enter into relations one with the other. 
There is no concept of a claim separable from sharing the status of 
a member within a particular group, the group of one's origin, To 
be good, to receive the commendation of the group, it is necessary 
to perform one's allotted functions well. And since there is no 
concept of a morality between groups it is necessarily the case that 
a member will only receive approval by enacting customary rules. In 
the absence of an intergroup morality, members are at liberty to 
plunder and kill the members of other societies. The condition is 
therefore a state of war where, apart from the security afforded by 
society, there is 'no mine and thine'. 
It is certain that within any society in this condition there 
will be numerous prohibitions and sanctions designed to prevent 
243. 
contact with outsiders as contact would involve infringing one of 
the fundamental rules of the group. In addition, members of the 
group may derive considerable status from inflicting harm on an 
outsider. There is no possibility of entering into a relationship 
with an outsider and indeed positive incentives to be gained by 
reinforcing the fundamental differences between insiders and out-
siders. So although the condition is a state of war marked by ven-
geance and feud - not unlike the one imagined for individuals by 
Hobbes - it is not one which men would wish to abolish through the 
establishment of 'a Common Power to keep them all in awe'. 1 Men 
are social beings with an interest in maintaining their membership 
and status within the group before all else. The state of war is 
full of fears, but no fear is greater than the loss of one's place 
within the society of one's birth. Mumford describes this c•mdition 
as one marked by: 
"the fear of the nontraditional, the unaccustomed, 
.the strange, the foreign: hence, too, the 
love of the accepted, the conventional, the 
often repeated, the proved: the veneration 
for ancestral ways 2 'This is done', 'That 
is not done' ..." 
All of this is reinforced by the fact that no member of society can 
lose more than his status in society, for 'unless one belongs one 
does not exist'. 3 
Clearly, this way of life must have passed away in many 
societies although it is no part of the present concern to speculate 
about the sociological or psychological mechanisms which may have 
initiated its downfall. It is no part of the present concern to 
1. Hobbes, Leviathan, op.cit., p.185. 
2. L. Mumford, op.cit., p.28. 
3. ibid., p.28. 
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argue that this condition was, as a matter of sociological fact, one 
that existed 'for the greater part of human history and surely for 
all prehistory ' . ) When it is maintained that this condition is the 
lowest in the sequence discussed in the myth, this is not on account of 
the fact that it is historically prior to those which it precedes. It 
is considered the lowest because it is the point farthest from the 
condition which will conclude the sequence, namely, a universal kingdom 
of ends.. Accordingly, the first stage in the sequence is defined not 
on account of its sociological priority in time, but on account of 
being the most elementary of the sequence as defined only from that 
point which will conclude the sequence itself. 
The first condition is regarded as inferior within the process 
only partly because there is within it no awareness. of moral standards 
which can regulate the activities of separate societies. It is rather 
the implications of that lack of awareness that is of interest in the 
first instance. 	For example, within this condition the members of 
each of the societies are unaware of the possibility of social rules 
and moral principles which might not only regulate the relationships 
of their separate societies, but in addition allow the incorporation 
of these societies within a more inclusive social system. 	This condi- 
tion is located at the beginning of the process because men within it 
have not realised that it is possible to constitute societies, or 
indeed ad hoc relationships, on quite different principles from those 
traditionally accepted. Customary beliefs insist that there can he no 
relationships with members of other societies as relationships are 
conducted exclusively among members of the same culture. While men 
1. ibid., p.24. Indeed it has been argued that 'Great, sprawling, 
polyethnic empires have been perhaps the historical norm'. 
A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, London 1971, p.65. 
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remain in this condition they are unaware of one of their fundamental 
potentialities which is to create a new context where there are 
relationships with outsiders and rules established ny men for the regu-
lation of this form of conduct. This condition is the lowest one in 
the series not on account of its immorality from the perspective of 
some more advanced moral understanding, which would be a trivial obser-
vation, but because men remain unaware of their freedom to create new 
relationships and establish new ends for themselves. 	In this sense, 
they lack one of the important freedoms which consists in being able 
to formulate new goals which cannot be satisfied within existing cul-
ture and which lead men on to transform their social condition. 
Furthermore, for men to become part of a universal kingdom of 
ends it is necessary for them to become moral agents, that is to re-
flect as individuals responsible for their conduct upon the courses of 
action open to them. Now, in the first condition men do not regard 
their morality as something to reflect upon or to work over. They en-
act it uncritically in accordance with their status as members of ex-
clusive societies. It is necessary then for the purposes of the myth 
that men should challenge traditional authority by establishing new 
ends which threaten their existing social order. 
Let us now consider one method by which men gradually come to 
be dissatisfied with their condition. 	Given their condition it would 
be unreasonable to proceed on the assumption that men could suddenly 
formulate the idea of an obligation to an outsider. Rather, let us 
work on the assumption that such an idea develops over time in the 
wake of some contact between insiders and outsiders which extends 
the range of sympathy. 
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It is conceivable that in the face of some economic or social 
necessity some of the societies in the first condition are faced 
with very little alternative but to relax their ethnOcentrism for 
the purposes of survival. Previous standards are relaxed in order to 
permit the development of insider-outsider relationships. At this 
stage, it becomes possible for the members of one group to make con-
tact with the members of others though not on their private initiative 
and for their own individual benefit. The ethnocentric barrier is 
weakened simply to allow the development of relations between members 
and non•members for the sake of the benefit of the group as a whole, 
not to enhance the welfare of a member as a person with some measure 
of independence from the group. At this stage the member is not re-
garded as an individual with the right to conduct relations with out-
siders as he will for his own benefit, but as an agent for the group 
specifically entrusted with engaging in relationships with outsiders 
over matters where the group believes it can derive some interest. 
The group will therefore be careful to exercise new forms of social 
control in order to manage its new context. For, on the one hand, it 
is necessary for it to enter into the spirit of new rules, perhaps 
involving the keeping of promises, while, on the other hand, it must 
attempt to ensure that its members do not become over-attached to the 
members of other societies in the course of their dealings with them. 
The problem of the possible extension of sympathy is one of 
the difficulties societies would face in this context. However, such 
co-operation as does exist can be handled without there being any 
threat posed to the separate identity of the group, by specifying the 
limits of co-operation to members of the group. Co-operation is under-
taken for the specific purpose of improving the circumstances of the 
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group. Relationships with outsiders do not exist for altruistic 
reasons, and the ends of outsiders are advanced incidentally as it 
is only through some exchange with them that the group can hope to 
improve its own circumstances. The group may experience some weaken-
ing of its ethnocentrism, but not of its egocentricity. Rules for 
regulating relationships with outsiders are of purely instrumental 
value, and they will be ignored when the group believes its circum-
stances no longer require relations with others. Nevertheless, while 
such relations occur, any obligations incurred in its relations with 
outsiders will be considered inferior to its internal system of obli-
gation, for the status of member is a necessary pre-requisite for 
counting morally. Therefore, should any member feel a tension between 
his customary obligations and sympathy towards outsiders, social con-
trol will immediately be exercised in order to impress the tie of 
membership upon the one involved. 
Although the new condition has not permitted the member the 
right of engaging in external relations with a mind to promoting his 
independent interests, it has given him an opportunity for developing 
relations with outsiders and employing his reason in order to create 
a new kind of rule for relations with those who are not members. He 
has been given an opportunity, albeit incidental to his main purpose, 
to discover something about outsiders through his own experience rather 
than through the collective interpretation of the whole group. And, 
in addition, he has been given some opportunity to have some moral 
experience of outsiders through, for example, keeping the promises he 
makes to them. He may come to feel a certain sympathy for outsiders, 
and come to think that relations of trust are possible with them. It 
is possible that through the new type of eNperience made available to 
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him he may come to reel that the customary way of life cannot contain 
within it all the possibilities he should like to have open to him. 
For this reason some members may make a claim against the group for 
recognition of their liberty to continue conducting relations within 
outsiders. They may make a claim for a freedom, which had never been 
recognised before, the freedom to conduct relations on their own 
individual account. 
In this process the member is simply claiming for himself what 
the group had already'allowed to itself, namely the liberty of conduct-
ing relations with outsiders for the purpose of advancing its interests. 
Members are now prepared to reconsider their status as members who are 
excluded from all contact with outsiders. They are prepared to chal-
lenge the conventional rules of their societies in order to attain 
recognition for themselves as individuals as well as members. The 
making of this claim is necessary for them if they wish to secure the 
liberty of entering relationships with outsiders on their own behalf, 
and it represents their gradual move from a customary and traditional 
life to one marked by a greater sense of reflectiveness and individu-
ality. The member's previous experience has led to the conviction 
that he cannot be satisfied by traditional culture and that he must 
have the liberty of setting ends for himself, ends which involve him 
in more complex relationships and obligations with outsiders. By devel-
oping himself as an individual, he is separating himself from his 
group, at least to the extent of asserting that the uncritical perform-
ance of customary morality, through which he formerly derived his 
standing and security, is no longer sufficient for him. 1 
1. This element in the myth is derived from Hegel. Consider, for 
example, his remark: 'Of the Greeks in the first and genuine form 
of their freedom, we may assert, that they had no conscience; 
[over] 
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Let us assume then that the member is capable of receiving 
recognition for his desire for a private sphere where he is allowed 
to cultivate relationships with outsiders without the harrassment of 
fellow-members. If this claim is conceded, two consequences immediate-
ly follow. In the first place, the member can only regard his indivi-
dual sphere as having full recognition from his society if he is able 
to create obligations for himself through his relations with outsiders, 
and if his society allows that he is entitled to do so. Indeed, from 
the individual's point of view, his capacity to enter into obligations 
with outsiders and be able to honour them without pressure from his 
peers to break the obligation for the social good, represents a seal 
upon his individuality. If society is to recognise this sphere of 
individual liberty with outsiders, it is necessary that it make various 
readjustments to its social morality. For, previously, members would 
not have been permitted this liberty and any attempt to enter relations 
with outsiders would have met with severe social sanction. In the 
second place the present context makes it necessary for society to re-
flect upon its morality in the attempt to draw a line between the area 
in which the individual is free and the area where he is obliged as 
a member of society. By drawing this line, which will necessarily 
take place gradually over time through situations where the individual 
comes into conflict with society or finds himself pulled between his 
the habit of living for their country without further (analysis 
or) reflection, was the principle dominant among them', but 
that there developed 'a subjective independent freedom, in 
which the individual finds himself in a position to bring 
everything to the test of his own conscience, even in defiance 
of the existing constitution'. The Philosophy of History, 
op.cit., p.253. And see also his remark that 'the individual 
is thus sent forth into the world by his own spirit to seek 
his happiness', The Phenomenology of Lind, London 1971, p.350. 
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obligations to insiders and obligations to outsiders, society attempts 
to reach a condition of harmony, a condition as harmonious as the first 
but now involving an area of liberty for its members. These two conse-
quences must, in their turn, be supposed capable of developing further 
man's powers of moral reflection. For the present condition is an 
unprecedented one which will require the development of man's capacity 
to create a reflective morality to match the problems and possibilities 
of the new condition. 
Now the development that has taken place and the need for the 
creation of a reflective approach to morality stem from the fact that 
the individual is gradually advancing the idea of membership of two 
societies, the one of his birth, the other of his own creation. He is 
beginning to promote the idea of dual membership as,he is not only a 
member of his natural society but also associated with an emerging com-
munity which embraces insiders and outsiders alike. This situation 
arises in the following way. In the first place, the individual seeks 
the liberty of making transactions with outsiders, of enlarging the 
sphere of his relations and increasing his possibilities for new exper-
ience. He will want to enter into commercial relationships, to create 
opportunities for friendship and conjugal relationships and indeed to 
enlarge his experience through familiarity with the culture of others. 
Now let us consider what is involved in society's willingness to allow 
the individual to conduct these relations and honour related obligations. 
Society refrains from making demands on the individual to deal unfairly 
with outsiders for the sake of the greater good of the individual's 
natural society. It refrains then from placing pressure upon the indivi-
dual to act as if he were an agent of the group - as indeed he had once 
been. Society recognises that for the purpose of conduet1nc specified 
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relations the individual is at liberty to treat outsidere as he would 
treat insiders in relevantly similar circumstances. There is a 
recognition of the fact that within a socially recognised realm the 
individual can apply fair standards both in his internal and external 
relationships. He is not called upon to apply one standard for rela-
tionships within the group and a quite different and less fair stand-
ard for relationships outside the group. One standard of morality will 
suffice.for both sets of transaction. What has been accomplished so 
far is a move to that Situation where the individual is at liberty to 
treat insiders and outsiders alike for particular purposes. 	He has 
been granted then an entitlement to act in correspondence with univer-
salisable principles which regard differences of membership status as 
irrelevant to the question of right conduct within specified areas. 
And by granting the individual this entitlement, society acknowledges 
the fact that the individual has a status within two societies - as a 
member within one, as a private individual with the capacity to enact 
a rational morality within another. And in this sense, membership of 
two moral communities is coming into existence. 
When he comes to consider what has hitherto been achieved, the 
individual will notice the decline of ethnocentrism and the rise of 
the entitlement of regarding himself as a being with personal interests 
which he may seek to maximise through relations with outsiders. He has 
also been granted the right of establishing obligations for himself 
in his external relations without being subjected to social pressure 
to dishonour them. 	The process would appear to him as one of pro- 
gressive development of his sense of being an individual through a 
gradual emancipation from the control of customary morality. The indi-
vidual is no longer absorbed within his naturalsociety, a transformation 
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displayed in his capacity to set his own ends and to pursue their 
satisfaction through his private, external relations. The process 
appears first and foremost as the progressive developtent of indivi-
dual freedom marked by the existence of an individual sphere which 
stands beyond the control of and is affirmed by his natural society. 
Now in securing the liberty to conduct his private, external 
relations the individual has secured a right of individuality against 
the group, although at this stage for himself only. He has success-
fully opposed the customary principle that relations can be conducted 
only among insiders. His right of individuality consists in the fact 
that he has won recognition for a principle that a person's membership 
of a different culture cannot be regarded as sufficient reason for 
excluding the possibility of social relations with him. Now what the 
individual has achieved is recognition as an end in himself, that 
simply as an individual he is entitled to set and pursue his ends 
without reference to the customary morality of the group. At the same 
time, he has recognised the right of society to attempt to establish 
principles which harmonise his obligations as member with his liberties 
as an individual. But, as we have seen, beyond this point society does 
not exercise jurisdiction over the activities of the individual. He 
is his own master in those private, external relations of which society 
approves. There are, however, a number of reasons why this individual 
sphere which stands beyond the control of his natural society cannot 
remain so for long. 
In the condition currently enjoyed the individual has won a 
new status within his society which mirrors this by altering some of 
its customary moral principles and by introducing others. It is a new 
social condition where society makes a commitment to individuals as ends. 
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However, at this point society recognises only members as individuals 
and makes its commitment to them alone. No commitment of a similar 
kind has been propo!-,ed for outsiders with whom insiders have relations. 
The individual has been granted the right to conduct his relations 
and introduce obligations for himself into these relations. But he 
has similarly been allowed the liberty of dishor .ouring his obligations 
since society at this stage has not undertaken to exercise any con-
trol over these areas of his life. While society remains disinterest-
ed its individuals may honour their obligations to outsiders, but 
they are equally entitled to ignore them if they choose to place their 
separate interests before the ends of others. 
For a variety of reasons this condition could not be long-
lasting and society would become more deeply involved in making com-
mitments directly to outsiders. In the first place, individuals, who 
have seen their ability to discharge obligations to outsiders as a 
seal upon their independence from the group, may find that their in-
fringement brings the disapproval of other members whether or not 
these are also involved in private, external relations. To the extent 
that some members may place rather greater emphasis upon right con-
duct in relations with outsiders and may have a greater sympathy 
towards outsiders, the honouring of obligations may come to be under-
stood as a duty by those members of the group who are actively involv-
ed in rethinking their morality. It is conceivable then that certain 
members of the group may be pressing for a situation where the group 
as a whole makes a commitment to outsiders in the form of being pre-
pared to punish insiders who fail to discharge their obligations. In 
this condition one of the tensions within society will exist between 
those who believe individuals should be compelled to discharge their 
obligations to outsiders and those individuals who wish to preserve 
their freedom from this extension of social control. 
Both groups, however, may wish the extension of a principle 
which has already been conceded although hitherto to insiders alone - 
the principle of the right of individuality. 	Individuals may claim 
that if insiders have the right to promote their ends by conducting 
relations outside the group, then outsiders ought to be able to enter 
other societies too. What is granted to insiders ought to be granted 
to outsiders also, since society has already agreed that the indivi-
dual has the liberty of engaging in new relations with the members 
of other groups. The right of individuality, so it is argued, ought 
to be acknowledged not only in insiders but also in outsiders. There 
can be no justification for treating insiders and outsiders differ-
ently with respect to the liberty of formulating individual ends 
which can be promoted through contact with individuals from other 
societies. 	When one society allows that outsiders have the liberty 
of pursuing their individual ends through co-operation with its own 
members, an important step has been taken in the direction of the 
development of an interethnic society. 
The reasons for change in the direction of an interethnic 
society may be manifold. Some individuals will regard the freer 
communication between societies as worthwhile since it enlarges human 
experience and encourages diversity to develop. 	Others may see it 
more specifically as encouraging the development of man's moral powers 
and promoting the development of a wider moral community. Others 
still may regard the freer movement of persons simply in terms of the 
promotion of their own individual interests. However interethnic 
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society is interpreted, separate societies will be required to take 
a greater interest in the ways in which insiders treat outsiders. 
For, once interethnic society has reached a certain level of devel-
opment, each separate society will be compelled to reconsider that 
personal sphere which has until now stood beyond the control of 
natural society. 
What, then, are the mechanisms which press separate societies 
to become concerned with the commitment to non-members within their 
midst? In the first place, there are those who, concerned with the 
greatest development of moral community, wish society to make an irre-
vocable commitment to assist outsiders in the promotion of their indi-
vidual ends. They are concerned with the extension of sympathy and 
with the development of man's capacity to become benevolent. These 
men simply extend the view that a higher moral experience not only 
requires the demise of an uncritical enactment of earlier social moral-
ity, but that it also requires interaction with non-members whereby 
both insiders and outsiders may develop their moral capacities through 
interethnic society. 
However, even those who are concerned that society should not 
make such a moral commitment to outsiders (since they wish merely that 
they be able to promote their own interests by having access to out-
siders) are creating a situation whereby society's commitment to the 
welfare of outsiders is inevitable. Let us consider how this commit-
ment might develop with regard to the individual's liberty to marry 
an outsider who is then permitted to reside within the group. Society 
develops to that point where it allows marriage outside the group 
and so creates certain rights for its individual members, but it does 
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not at this stage acknowledge that the outsider has any rights as a 
separate person. In this context there would be no sanctions applied 
to an insider who maltreated an outsider married to'him. Now it may 
be argued by the more reflective members of the group that while this 
situation remains society has not committed itself seriously to the 
right of individuality in outsiders, and that this is a legacy from 
those times in which recognition of insiders and outsiders as equals 
was inconceivable. Where society is prepared to accept that outsiders 
have ends which they may promote within its own boundaries, it will 
not be sufficient to extend merely liberty of access to the outsider. 
If the outsider's ends are to be treated seriously it will be neces-
ary to ensure that an insider cannot use an outsider merely as a 
means to his own purposes with impunity. It will be necessary to 
extend guarantees to the outsider as a person in his/her own light. 
So it will be argued by those concerned to promote a more reflective 
morality. 
There is another reason why society may feel compelled to intro-
duce the idea of guarantees for outsiders. An outsider remains a 
member of another society which may not be prepared to stand idly by 
while one of its members is abused elsewhere. In the original state 
of nature an injury to a member would have involved the whole group in 
an act of revenge directed indiscriminately against the members of 
another society since the whole society would be held collectively 
responsible for the act. However, with the level of social chaw, e 
which has taken place society is no longer prepared to uncritically 
spring to the defence of an insider. From its point of view the mem-
ber's claim to act as an individual outside the group cannot be separ-
ated from his duty to accept responsibility for the consequences of 
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his actions. While his society is prepared to protect him, it can-
not offer assistance simply on account of his claim to he a member 
- which would have sufficed before. Prior to offering its assistance 
fellow-members will wish to know more about the way in which the 
individual has conducted himself. 	It will want to know if he de- 
serves their assistance since he cannot claim it on account of his 
status alone. 
Social development has brought about a new and more complex 
state of nature. In the original one societies were in such a condi-
tion by virtue of the exclusive and hostile nature of their moralities. 
Although this exclusiveness has been relaxed the state of nature has 
not yet ceased. In the first place, those individuals who are involv-
ed in insider-outsider relationships form a state of nature of their 
own. A person who lives within another society which does not protect 
him is as insecure as he was before. Until he receives guarantees 
from that society as an independent person his condition is not a safe 
one. Similarly, if he is abused within another society he can no 
longer be confident of the automatic protection of his natural society. 
These are problems necessarily related to the individualism he has 
introduced into his social condition. On the other hand, his natural 
society faces new problems with the development of individualism. For 
while it wishes to assist him since it considers him a member as 
before, it now requires of him some justification that it has a rLspons-
ibility to do so. And if a society should protect its member without 
question it can he sure to meet with the organised resistance of his 
host society. On account of the uncertainties of this modified state 
of nature individuals and societies alike are concerned to establish 
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new methods of social control for the purposes of maintaining order 
and promoting justice. It is through granting guarantees to out-
siders as independent persons that these uncertainties can be over-
come while these ends may be promoted. 
With regard to this aspect of social change, where society 
gives a guarantee to outsiders, society takes a major step forward in 
developing a wider mural community. For in this condition it is pre-
pared to enter into an investigation of the behaviour of one of its 
members with the explicit intention of ruling against him should he 
be found to have committed a. wrong. The introduction of the idea of 
a guarantee to an outsider, which is the recognition of an obligation 
towards him, carries the idea of upholding his rights whenever these 
are infringed regardless of the status of the person who infringes them. 
And this is a development of fundamental importance as it involves 
upholding a principle of justice in a relationship between an insider 
and an outsider. When a society brings an impartial standard to bear 
upon insiders and outsiders alike, when it is less concerned with the 
membership of a possible wrong-doer than with whether or not he has 
committed a wrong, it advances considerably towards a more inclusive, 
moral community. What has been established is a principle to the 
effect that for certain types of relationships the distinction between 
insider and outsider effectively ceases to exist as it is morally 
irrelevant to the judgment to be made. 	The measure of the advance is 
best indicated by stating that within the present condition those who 
investigate any dispute between insiders and outsiders are concerned 
simply with the character of actions rather than with the membership 
of the persons who committed them. In the original state of mature 
nothing else mattered. 
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The development of individualism, in its more specific mean-
ing employed here, accounts for the emergence of a gradual 'ration-
alisation' of life. Formerly, individuals had acquired their status 
through securing a sphere remote from normal social control. However, 
the exercise of individual liberties brings uncertainties for indi-
viduals and societies alike, and the need is for a method of super-
vision which removes instability without eliminating the individual's 
domain: In the first place, it is likely that rather ad hoc and 
optional mechanisms might be employed for the purposes of resolving 
disputes between insiders and outsiders. However, they need only to 
assist marginally in the search for greater stability to have the 
effect of increasing the level of interethnic relations, as the est-
ablishment of some minimal institutional device will provide a more 
secure context within which interethnic activities can develop. Never-
theless, at a certain level of activity the ad hoc and optional 
recourse to some form of adjudication will appear inadequate, and 
the need for more powerful agencies will develop. The emergence of 
individualism and the gradual rationalisation of life develop in an 
elementary form some of the basic features of the state. 
Now such institutions will necessarily have an impact upon 
the circumstances and conditions which gave rise to them. Continual 
use of agencies for adjudication will have the effect of stimulating 
reflective morality even further and in turn establishing reasoned 
customs which contain society's judgments about right conduct. Adju-
dicators, rather like the Roman praetor, will have to establish new 
rules for the novel event, a process which may be facilitated by 
seeking to formulate principles which have their roots in several 
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different cultures. 1 Such a technique has the effect of integrating 
the members of different societies into a more inclusive community, 
one which is concerned with their ends and involver. in the creation 
of reasoned principles which will protect them. That is developed 
through the operation of these agencies for adjudication are more 
universalisable principles, which apply to situations defined in 
terms of their salient features which include the person's intentions, 
the probable consequences of action upon others and exclude such 
arbitrary features as the person's natural society. What is develop-
ing then are universalisable principles deemed to apply to like per-
sons in like situations and which take into account the ends of per-
sons irrespective of their membership. Over greater areas of life 
insiders and outsider's come to be respected as equals. 
With the development of interethnic society individuals see 
themselves as belonging to two societies, the one being natural the 
other being created through the development of individualism. And 
they are also subject to two different sets of rules, the one being 
the customary rules of their natural societies and the other being 
the rules men have established for themselves in response to the un-
certainties of interethnic society. Now insofar as established rules 
may uphold the rights of an outsider against the insider, outsiders 
can identify with interethnic society and its agencies since these 
are prepared to do justice to their ends. 	Since the rational stand- 
ards of interethnic society are in principle capable of assisting 
him in the pursuit of his ends, an outsider can understand himself as 
participating in the development of a society where he feels a sense 
1. 	On the Roman praetor, the praetor peregrinus, see J.B.Scott, 
Law, the State and the International Community, Columbia 1939, 
pp. 10S-109. 
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of his worth. He may consider himself not merely as a free individual 
but as a member of such a society, and he may eventually come to 
consent to the establishment of a more inclusive cemmunity with its 
independent institutions and its authority to control him. With the 
development of confidence in the institutions of interethnic society 
and with a desire to preserve his individualism, both insiders and out-
sider., may be prepared to incorporate their natural societies within a 
more inclusive society, namely the state. And when this condition 
arises men give their loyalty to a set of legal and political institu-
tions which are concerned with them as individuals, while they pre-
serve their attachment to their natural societies which are contained 
within the more inclusive association. 
In a society in the original state of nature social rules were 
traditional and customary. Society was homogeneous and cohesive and 
as change was barely imperceptible there was no need for institutions 
to change rules in order to adapt society to changing circumstances. 
In a small, face to face society social control could operate through 
group pressure and opinion, therefore specialised institutions were 
required neither for adjudicatory nor punitive purposes. 
The emergence of an interethnic society has totally transformed 
man's condition. Men from different communities could not apply their 
indigenous rules to these new relationships but had to set their 
reason to work for the development of new guidelines. 	They had to 
discover some common ground which would appear fair to all participants 
and so in the course of time a kind of ius gentium evolved. 	The 
complexity of this condition leads traditional methods of social con-
trol to lose their efficacy. Similarly, earlier methods of slowly 
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changing customs to meet new situations cannot suffice within the 
new condition. In addition, insiders and outsiders wish the develop-
ment of independent institutions to consider their circumstances as 
individuals. They wish to see the limitation of the jurisdiction of 
traditional modes of pressure and their replacement with established 
institutions which reflect the fact that the new condition in which 
they find themselves requires expression in institutions of their own 
creation. They measure their individuality in terms of the extent to 
which it finds expression in newly created interethnic institutions. 
What is being witnessed in the course of this social develop-
ment is the step from the 'pre-legal to the legal world ' . 1 Men in 
the condition in which they now find themselves see the 'advantages 
of further centralisation of social pressure' and proceed to establish 
the required institutions. 2 Now it is important to draw out the pro-
cesses which lead men to take this step. Three factors have been 
indicated as forces behind the move from the pre-legal to the legal 
world - uncertainty, the static nature of rules and inefficiency. At 
a certain stage of social development where society's structures or 
rules have become fairly complex, an individual may be uncertain about 
the rule which applies to him in any situation - perhaps with regard 
to conflict with another. To remove the uncertainty it would he use-
ful to have a tribunal which could interpret the rules and produce 
some order among them. Secondly, a complex society cannot adapt suffi-
ciently quickly to new circumstances unless there are agencies which 
have been authorised to alter the rules in accordance with new needs. 
1. On this process see H.L.A. hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, 
pp. 86-96. The nuotation appears on p.91. 
2. ibid., p.95. 
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Thirdly, and lastly, social complexity cannot tolerate the continuing 
use of 'diffused social power' for the purposes of deciding what 
rules have been broken and what form of punishment ought to be 
applied. 1 The complexity of social life produces the need for 
'rationalisation'. 
Now the development of an interethnic society creates the 
necessity for the move from the pre-legal to the legal condition. It 
is necessary that tribunals exist to decide whether or not a rule has 
been broken in the relations between an insider and an outsider (a 
distinction which is becoming increasingly irrelevant as the process 
continues), to decide the rules that apply to or create new rules for 
the occasion, and lastly to decide the right punishment for any offend-
er. 	What has to be established alongside the rules governing every- 
day behaviour is anew set of rules which authorise particular persons 
to apply and enforce the former, and additionally to change them when 
necessary. According to Hart's terminology, the existing primary 
rules already found in interethnic society need to be supplemented 
with a set of secondary rules, and these bring into existence the appar-
atus of the state. 2 Now with the establishment of this form of asso-
ciation among themselves, men are in a position to improve the condition 
that has resulted from their claim to conduct private, external rela-
tions. The shortcomings of this more inclusive society make it 
1. ibid., p.94. 
2. Secondary rules 'may all be said to be on a different level from 
the primary rules, for they are all abcut such rules; in the 
sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions 
that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules arc 
all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They specify the 
ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, 
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation 
conclusively determined.' ibid., p.92. 
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mandatory that men establish the state. And through its establishment 
they not only assist the development of stability and order but en-
able a coherent account to develop of the obligations a person has 
as a member of his natural society and as an individual member of that 
broader association, the state, which now incorporates it. Finally, 
the establishment of the state provides a focal point around which 
civic virtues can develop in importance. 
Let us conclude this section of the myth by reviewing some of 
the more important aspects of the development that has taken place. 
The myth began with a discussion of societies each of which was immer- 
sed within its own customs. Each society had an internal point of view 
based upon ethnocentrism and the ethical reference for the member of 
such a society was custom and tradition. The myth-then proceeded to 
discuss the implications of the individual's claim to have found a 
reference in his own thought and experience and to begin engaging in 
a variety of transactions with the members of other societies. In the 
course of these transactions a new condition of uncertainty resulted 
and men began to establish rules through the exercise of their rational 
powers. Two important consequences follow. First of all, societies 
take an important step forward when they are prepared to uphold a 
principle of justice for the benefit of an outsider, as previously 
moral claims had only been met between members of the same exclusive 
society. In the second place, a considerable advance takes place 
when it is believed that the highest level of moral experience can no 
longer be found in the uncritical enactment of customary obligations 
but only through the performance of the principles of a reflective 
morality existing between independent individuals. 	These two conse- 
quences make possible the incorporation of men's natural societies 
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within the state. Their capacity to move beyond their earlier inter-
nal points of view and take an external point of view where they are 
capable of consideriLg the ends of insiders and oul.:sIders leads them 
to sink their cultural differences in the formation of the state. 
According to the stage they have reached, men believe themselves to 
have established a higher association, one which expresses the inde-
pendence of the individual from his former cultural context and 
harmonises his ends with the ends of others through the establishment 
of a legal and political system. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
From the Separate State to  
International Society  
The process so far has been one in which men have moved from 
being members of ethnocentric societies to being citizens of that 
state. In an account of the predominant type of self-consciousness 
within the state, first priority must be given to the fact that men 
are aware of having liberated themselves from previous cultural 
restraints in order to pursue their individual ends. Men-understand 
themselves as possessors of private rights which it is the duty of 
the state to safeguard. 	The state, legal and moral rules are consid- 
ered to be means for the protection of individuals. Men do not think 
of themselves as being under a duty to belong to the state, for they 
understand it as a mechanism which removes a number of the uncertain-
ties of their previous condition. It is understood as the most ade-
quate solution to the predicament of those whose interests have become 
interdependent. 	Implicit in this, of course, is the idea that there 
would be no need to form a state with men with whom one had no inter-
dependence of interest. However, this thought need not find any arti-
culation at this stage since the state which does exist includes all 
known men. 
Although the above type of self-consciousness is predominant 
it does not exist alone. Some men, more attached to the value of moral-
ity in itself, attempt to impress upon their fellows some of the 
virtues to be developed in good men. These thinkers, who are the 
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custodians of a higher type of reflective morality, are concerned 
with reminding men that in addition to their private rights there 
are civic virtues and a common good for them to consider. For these 
thinkers in addition to the rules which harmonise the interests of 
individuals, and which underpin their present condition, there exist , 
 values which ought to be promoted by men simply as men. For them 
existing political society is not the consummation of man's moral 
development since it is capable of considerable improvement. And 
this would take the form of developing relationships and institutions 
which more adequately reflected their concept of man as a moral being. 
Let us imagine that in the course of things the state eventu-
ally comes into contact with other societies, an event which reveals 
to it that it is separate and that it has to consider what its rela-
tionship is to be with these newly discovered societies. Let us 
further assume that by the state's own criteria the newly discovered 
societies stand at a lower stage of social development. Now the 
problem of right conduct with these societies intensifies one of the 
main sources of division within the state. On the one hand, some 
citizens will be prepared to pursue their private interests within 
these societies, and will not be too concerned about the welfare of 
the people they come across. For these men the newly discovered 
societies are considered simple and primitive. They do not consider 
themselves to be bound by far-reaching obligations in their relations 
with them. On the other hand, those men who have been concerned to 
articulate the principles which should be observed by the good man 
oppose the views of those who feel unbound in their relations with 
outsiders. They see them as having 'formed a plan of geographical 
morality, by which the duties of men, in public and in private 
268. 
situations, are not to be governed by their relation to the great 
Governor of the Universe, or by their relations to mankind, but by 
climates, degrees of longitude, parallels, not of life, but of 
latitudes'. 1 They see in their actions the restatement of the 
internal point of view, albeit in a different formulation from the 
one which existed before, which is in conflict with their concept of 
a human morality. The discovery of outsiders brings to the surface 
one of the tensions at the heart of their political experience. 
Considerable moral progress would take place if the views of 
those who are opposed to the reformulation of the internal point of 
view should prevail. In the first place, their success would repre-
sent a triumph for the idea that men simply as men are possessors of 
rights.. This concept involves the idea of having duties to men with 
whom one has no interdependence. To fulfil moral obligations to 
simpler peoples, without expectation of benefit in return, signifies 
the autonomy of morality, the ability of men to be moral for its own 
sake. 	Secondly, the observance of such a morality represents the 
belief that simpler peoples possess moral equality and are as a result 
not to be treated merely as means. Thirdly, citizens of advanced 
-41 
societies who respect this morality impose these obligations upon 
themselves. 	It is simply the consequences of their own reason which 
constrain them. And lastly, the state can regard itself as belong-
ing to a wider moral community and as having the obligation to 
consider a more extensive common good. 
Now the condition reached indicates that the state is not the 
1. E. Burke, in The Philosophy of Edmund Burke (a selection 
from his speeches and writings) edited with an introduction 
by L.I. Bredvold and R.G.Ross, Michigan 1970, p.17. 
269. 
conclusion of man's moral development. The state did not commit 
itself to the idea that man qua man has rights, and it has only done 
so through interaction with simpler peoples. Previously, the state 
has been concerned with establishing justice for the purpose of main-
taining an order among individuals, and so it has not reached that 
stage where it advances the needs of a man unconditionally. 	However, 
now, in its relations with newly discovered outsiders, an uncondition-
al act of benevolence becomes an ordinary part of moral practice. Let 
us consider, for example, the state assisting simpler societies in 
distress by sharing its goods without expectation of benefit in return. 
This act, performed simply from a sense of duty to the unfortunate, 
represents one of the ways in which the state performs its obligations 
to fellow-men. 
With the discovery of simpler peoples the state for the first 
time makes more explicit the idea of rights and duties of men to each 
other rather than merely of the rights and duties of those who share 
- a status within an association. This change represents a considerable 
change of outlook since morality is seen to follow the 'parallels of 
life' rather than of 'latitudes'. In considering how best to assist 
others the state has to make 'the effort at identification' with the 
experience of other peoples. 1 It has to consider carefully the impact 
its actions may have upon another society in order to decrease the 
risks of causing unintended harm. Therefore, the experience of rela- 
tions with earlier societies will not only develop the state's sympathies 
towards outsiders; it will highlight some of the difficulties involved 
in acting from its 'good will'. 
1. A concept used by Bernard Williams, in The Idea of Equality, in 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series (ed. by Laslett 
and Runciman), Oxford 1967, pp. 110-131. 
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Now although this stage represents considerable progress on 
the way towards the development of the concept of rights and obligations 
of men, experience with earlier societies will not develop these ideas 
as far as they can be extended. For the range of relationships is 
relatively narrow and the transactions are without exception one-sided. 
Simpler societies are incapable of pressing far-reaching claims upon 
the state and are in the position of simply receiving from their bene-
factors. The relationship between the state and earlier peoples is 
too limited to allow a fuller development of what has already been 
recognised, namely that a man has rights and obligations by virtue of 
his being a man alone. 
A more serious test of the state's capacity for moral develop-
ment will take place in a condition where it is faced with associations 
capable of making quite far-reaching claims upon it. Let us imagine 
then that the state comes into contact with associations recognisably 
similar to itself, that is in possession of the legal and political 
apparatus of the state. With the emergence of this condition the state 
faces an entirely new set of moral and political problems and few 
parallels can be drawn with its experience with earlier societies. Its 
earlier experience differs substantially in that there the state acted 
upon earlier societies but could not be acted upon by them in return. 
But with the discovery of other political associations like itself this 
earlier situation no longer obtains as now the state can be acted upon 
by outsiders who owe their loyalty to a separate political association 
which is concerned with the protection of their private rights. For 
the first time the state has the status of being an object which can be 
acted upon by others who cannot as yet be trusted to regard it as an 
independently valuable form of association. 	With the development of 
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this phase men find themselves once again in a state of nature where 
it is necessary for them to solve the problem of how insiders and out-
siders are to be properly related. 
Now the state of nature before men in their separate, political 
associations varies considerably from the one known to members of 
ethnocentric societies. In the first place, men within existing states 
are not hostile to each other and derive no status within the group 
by injuring the welfare of outsiders. The separate state, and let it 
be assumed that all states are alike in this matter, is aware of a 
morality which is attached to the concept of being a man and has acted 
accordingly in its relations with earlier societies. On the other 
hand, its experience of acting upon earlier societies has made it 
aware of•the problems of translating a morality into action for the 
benefit of. men in different environments. It has experienced the 
frustration of its good intentions, and this will have taught it a 
certain caution when it comes to act and be acted upon by other states. 
In the second place, it becomes clear to it that states cannot avoid 
impinging upon one another, which was not the case when men knew only 
ethnocentric society._ In the present condition each state is to some 
extent dependent on the others. The security of any one state is no 
longer dependent on its actions alone but upon the intentions and 
actions of other states. With the emergence of the causal connection 
of political associations as a whole, each state comes to consider it-
self in possession of interests which it must preserve and promote in 
its relations -7ith others. The problem of the present state of nature 
is then the problem of separate associations capable of acting on their 
own independent judgments in a manner which is harmful to the interests 
of others. Men are capable of articulating a morality for their 
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condition, but they must first of all be certain that each state is 
prepared to regard the others as ends. 
Let us imagine that, as with the problem of how to deal with 
early societies, the state divides into two points of view regarding 
right conduct. One point of view adopts the position that citizens 
are obliged first and foremost to each other, that the state is 
essentially an instrument of their ends, and that while obligations 
to other states must exist, given that men have rights in themselves, 
these obligations cannot be discharged where they are in conflict with 
the state's important interests. Consequently, they argue that the 
state must attempt to ensure that its own interests will be protected, 
although,wherever possible, it must avoid harming the interests of 
other societies. However, this position is certain that wherever 
important. interests can only be safeguarded by imposing costs on out-
siders, it is the duty of the state's representatives to place the 
interests of the state first. 	In opposition to them are those who 
are inclined to begin their response to the problem of right conduct 
in this new context by reflecting upon the rights men owe to each other. 
They believe that alongside man's division into states is an underly-
ing capacity for morality which can be developed in the course of the 
historical development of inter-state relations. 	Consequently, expon- 
ents of this view argue that the state should not set out merely to 
promote its interests leaving obligations to the rest of humanity as 
a residual category. The state should be concerned first and foremost 
with receivinc' and granting a certain kind of recognition, one which 
understands the state as an agent for the realisation of the common 
good within a particular area. The first objective is then not the 
effort at receiving recognition as an agency for the promotion of 
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citizens alone, but rather as an agency which is concerned with a 
common good which is capable of being extended. 	For the exponents 
of this view man's capacity to ground his relations on moral prin-
ciples can be developed in the course of the relations between states. 
Let us consider then how the relations between states develop 
the process whereby men come to a fuller understanding of their moral 
universality. The present condition is one of uncertainty where states 
fear for their security, and so it is necessary for them to adopt meas-
ures which will preserve their security and welfare. Now the first 
action in the new condition will indicate, insofar as intentions can 
be read properly, the likely disposition of any one state tb the states 
around it. And since these others are concerned with gaining recog-
nition ftom others as agencies for the advancement of a particular 
common good they will be careful to react in a way likely to assist 
the granting of that recognition. Therefore, a state which pursues a 
course of action which ignores the interests of others will find that 
they react in a hostile manner in the light of this decision to dis-
count their ends. And in the process of so doing they indicate to that 
state the fact that they understand their ends to be of importance 
and wish them to receive consideration in the relations between states. 
Similarly, a state which finds its interests are taken into account, 
again assuming that intentions have been judged correctly, finds recog-
nition for the status it seeks, and can be expected to react accord-
ingly. Therefore, within the condition as described, states become 
involved in a kind of communication through action and reaction where-
by each state seeks acceptance of its required status - which is to be 
regarded as an end in the eyes of others. And, in so doing, they are 
demanding albeit in a limited way the extension of the area of the 
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\ common good. For what they are not prepared to accept is a condition 
where their interests are discounted for the sake of the interests 
of others. 	They are involved then in a process of claiming a certain 
kind of equality from each other, one where each other's interests 
receive recognition in any decision to act. And so, in the course of 
their relations, through conflict as well as co-operation, men demand 
some extension of the common good whereby states are prepared to recog-
nise the restraints of existing alongside other communities prepared 
to act in defence of their ends. 
By a process of action and reaction each state learns that 
others wish to affirm their existence as independent ends. The use 
of conflict indicates to others that the state as an agent for a parti-, 
cular common good will not let its ends go unconsidered. In the earlier 
stages of*the development of international relations states come to 
see each other as independently valuable ends, a recognition which is 
impressed upon them out of necessity. The recognition of other states 
as one's equal is extracted from the state partly through a pragmatic 
concern for its own interests since it !glows that what it claims for 
itself will be claimed by others or opposed by others where it is 
incompatible with the satisfaction of their independent ends. But 
this recognition is also granted through a respect for the fact that 
others are prepared to resist any move which deprives them of either 
their ends or their ability to attain them. 	The relations between 
states are designed at this stage to affirm the fact that each has a 
dignity which must not go unnoticed by the rest. 
Now in conceding that other states have this dignity, each 
state comes to see itself as part of a society of states. A society 
275. 
is formed in the sense that states consider themselves obliged to 
accept some fundamental rules in the conduct of their relations. 
Now these fundamental rules establish the independence of states and 
the equality of their independence. In the first place, through 
their interactions states have gained recognition for their territor-
ial rights and their right to decide upon the nature of their own 
governments. What is established is the equal sovereignty of all the 
states - their liberty, their right of non-intervention, their right 
of representation on any diplomatic forum. It is granted that all 
states have the capacity for rights and obligations as members of a 
society of free states. And the rights which they acquire reflect 
their membership of a society of equals. All states are agreed, 
furthermore, upon the right organisation of the world, which is that 
it be comprised of naturally free societies. 
The agreement upon the framework within which they act - defined 
as a society of free communities - places certain major restrictions 
upon the nature of the relations between states. It is necessary, 
for example, that states acknowledge the obligation of•refraining from 
attempting to eliminate one another and from subverting the internal 
processes of government elsewhere. There are rules which exclude 
the use of force for particular purposes. 	However, these purposes 
aside, states have not accepted any obligation to refrain from purSu-
ing their ends through the use of force, or to avoid certain means of 
conducting any war in which they might become involved. Their obli-
gation to respect each other's free status does not of itself estab-
lish the nature of right conduct with respect to these issues. Let 
us consider that at this stage states insist upon their rights to 
pursue reasonable interests (where reasonable refers to being 
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compatible with the general structure of their society) through the 
use of force and through whatever means are necessary to attain their 
ends. Now there are again two reactions to this condition, one of 
which maintains that the state might contract with others to either 
avoid the use of force altogether or to recognise various restraints 
in the conduct of war, the other of which asserts the existence of 
obligations to avoid the use of force other than for the purpose of 
self-defence or for the assistance of a victim of aggression, and to 
impose little costs on others in the conduct of war. For the latter, 
it is not sufficient merely to perform the obligations of membership 
in a society of free states; it is necessary to establish principles 
which define the. nature of reasonable recourse to force and propor- 
tionate use of it. Men, so it may be argued, are in a state of nature,. 
albeit one where men are agreed upon the fundamental structure of 
their society of states, but they are not entitled to cro as they wish 
with regard to matters set apart from the fundamental obligations 
they already have. They are obliged, once again recalling the re-
straints which surround them, to attempt to articulate rules for the 
• 
management of their particular relations hips, -those relationships which 
have no direct bearing upon the natural society of states but which 
are to be governed by justice nevertheless. For the point of view 
now considered, the next stage in the development of international . 
relations requires the elaboration of more specific principles for 
the regulation of greater areas of international life. 
Partly from enlightened self-interest and partly from a devel-
oping sense of international morality, states enter into a phase of 
formulating more precise social rules for the ordering of their rela-
tions. These rules consider states as equals, but govern a larger 
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sector of their lives. The emergence of such rules does involve, 
however, a qualitative change in the manner in which one state stands 
to another. Through a process of action and reaction states affirmed 
their nature as equals and this found expression in their claim to be 
sovereign and independent. Now while such ideas provided 'the start-
ing-point for the free organisation of an international society' by 
establishing definite limits upon one state in its relations with 
another, the refusal to 'budge from that point' may thwart the further 
development of an international society. 1 As we have noted, the 
principles of a society of sovereign states would not necessarily 
include consideration for the welfare of, for example, innocent per-
sons caught up in an international. conflict. The refusal of states 
to move beyond their sovereign equality, which was a fundamental ob- 
jective only in that early condition where states could not be certain 
their interests would be protected, inhibits the development of a more 
inclusive moral community. But when that right has been conceded 
states may move on to a concern for the elaboration of more specific 
rights and duties which take into account, as in the case of the rules 
of warfare, the welfare of the individuals wh6 comprise the political 
community. Sovereign-equality is for them a guarantee that some of 
their fundamental interests will not be ignored by others, at that 
stage of their social development where the state is the main agent 
for the promotion of their welfare. But unless the state is prepared 
to bend the principle of equality in order to secure the welfare of its 
citizens through recognition of specific rules, its attempts to have 
its status recognised as an agent of a particular common good will 
1. D. Mitrany, The Progress of International Government, 
London 1933, p.53. 
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have been meaningless. For then the principle of equality will stand 
in the way of the enhancement of that common good as well as others. 
If the separate state is to fulfil its nature as an agent for 
its particular common good, it will be necessary to seek to establish 
more particular principles for the state-system. In its effort at 
securing the welfare of its citizens the state adopts a changed per-
spective. In an earlier stage of the development of international 
relations, the state was involved in the search for recognition through 
action and reaction, stimulus and response. But now the basis of its 
'conversation' changes as the state is concerned tb secure recognition 
for social rules rather than for a particular status for itself. To 
this end the state must articulate the principle upon which it acts, 
or, in tCantian terms articulate the maxim of its action, in the 
attempt to secure recognition for a principle of international rela-
tions. And to the extent that all states act in this way, a dialogue 
is initiated through which states can articulate particular rules 
which they consider binding for future conduct. Through the communi-
cation of claims set in the form of general principles' states initiate 
a process of attempting to gain acceptance for certain customary 
rules which oblige them. 
International relations therefore develop the language of 
claims. With this stage, states are concerned to seek recognition for 
certain conditions and objectives to which they wish to have a right. 
However, for a state to possess a right other states must possess 
duties and be prepared to discharge them. For this reason, states do 
not assert that they have rights by virtue of their existence - other 
than the right of recognition as an instrument for the realisation 
of a common good - but only by virtue of the recognition of others. 
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Therefore, states advance claims, which are 'undecided rights' 1 for 
the consideration of others, and the appropriate channel for such 
communication is diplomacy. Now it is only possible to advance 
claims within a certain context, which is best seen through contrast-
ing claims with other modes of addressing appeals to others. To 
address another state in the form of a plea reflects the inequality 
of the parties; likewise, although in a different way, to address 
another in the form of a demand. While the demand assumes that the 
other has no right of refusal, and the plea assumes that the other has 
every right of refusal, the claim assumes that the .other is an equal, 
that he is capable of responding sensitively to the content of the 
claim and is, in short, capable of being in.a moral relationship with its 
author. The language of claims presupposes and seeks to develop rela-
. 
tionships which already possess some moral content - in the case of 
international relations in the present phase it presupposes and deve-
lops the moral status which states have secured in recognition of 
their status as sovereigns. However, now states are prepared to seek 
to enlarge their society through dialogue and diplomacy. 
Of fundamental importance in the developing phase is the idea 
*JP 
of reciprocity. By proceeding in accordance with a general principle 
of reciprocity states accept that their condition is one of equality 
and therefore no state should claim for itself what it would challenge 
if advanced by others. States are concerned with the language of 
claims in order to discover what is univelsalisable, what all states 
can accept given their condition. The rights they asserted in the 
first stage of inter-state relations were not then to be entrenched 
1. 	The idea that a claim is an undecided right is to be found 
in Hegel The German Constitution, in Hegel's Political 
Writings (translated by T.M. Knox and introduced by Z.Pekzynski), 
Oxford 1964, p.211. 
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in any and every future international order. They are not the 
natural rights of states, which they have inherent in them at all 
times. They are rather the rights upon which states must insist be-
fore they can proceed to conduct more sophisticated moral relation-
ships. They may then proceed to consider further rights and duties 
which 'are to be deduced, not from a hypothetical state of nature 
preceding the existenceof any community, but from that which the world 
community regards as 'natural' in the sense of being 'that which ought 
to be' in a particular stage in the development of the relations be-
tween the community and the states which constitute au essential 
element of its structure'.' They may then proceed to disc:iss more 
particular rights'and duties which are not 'absolute' and not 'self-
subsistent' but 'require restatement and modification as historical 
circumstances change ' . 2 By employing a principle of reciprocity 
states indicate a willingness to take into account the interests of 
others in formulating policy, to respond to their interests and be 
accountable to them. It is for this reason that states have recourse 
to more sophisticated diplomatic procedures at this point in their 
a- 
evolution. 
The sources of a concern for reciprocity may simply reflect, 
of course, the state's calculations concerning its interests. The 
observance of rules of reciprocity may encourage an atmosphere of trust 
which may lead, so it believes, to an environment in which it may more 
easily satisfy its future interests. Therefore, '... state A refrains 
from the assertion of a claim x and defers to the competing interest 
of state B in order to encourage state B (and possibly other states as 
1. C.W. Jenks, Law, Freedom and Welfare, London 1963, p.90. 
2. M. Ginsberg, op.cit., p.170. 
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well) to refrain from making a claim similar to x when A has a com- 
peting interest in its non-assertion'. 1  The willingness to respect 
a principle of reciprocity may simply reflect the fact that in a 
condition where each state impinges upon the interests of others some 
manner of constraint is essential. Despite its intentions, however, 
the state becomes involved in affirming that there is a distinction 
between reasonable and unreasonable behaviour and additionally criteria 
for their separation. 	And this in turn does give rise to 'community 
expectations about right action' which can hardly be infringed with 
impunity. 2  For 'the acceptance of this obligation to demonstrate 
the reasonableness of a controversial national claim is a .development 
of legal accountability that extends beyond the classical notion that 
a sovereign state is entitled to do whatever it is not forbidden from 
doing ' . 3 Furthermore, 'a refusal to satisfy the demands of minimal 
reasonableness discloses an unwillingness of a nation to acknowledge 
the will and welfare of the world community is an important determin-
ant of national policy'. 4 Whatever the intentions of the state, which 
chooses to express its claims in the form of reasonableness and recip-
rocity, the consequences of its actions are - within that stage where 
many states are concerned with advancing their society - to increase 
1. R. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International 
Legal Order, Syracuse 1964, p.45. 
2. R. Falk, The Status of Law in International Society, Princeton 
1970, p.34. The full quotation reads: 'Law provides a technique 
for narrowing controversial claims, for communicating the pre-
cise nature of the demand, for paying maximum respect to 
community expectations about right action, and for encouraging 
a rival to respond with arguments rather than weapons.' 
3. R. Falk, "World Law and Human Conflict", in E.B. McNeil, 
The Nature of Human Conflict, New Jersey 1965, p. 237. 
4. R. Falk, ibid., p.247. 
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the number of customary rules held to oblige 'sovereign' states. It 
is therefore the case that the state makes an appeal beyond the out-
comes of particular situations as these bear upon its own interests. 
Instead it makes its appeal to the implications, for the state-system 
as a whole, of the maxims upon which it proposes to act. 
With the development of the idea of reciprocity come two im-
portant consequences. In the first place, a distinction is evolving 
between actions which are the concern of the state alone and actions 
which affect other states to the extent that they ought to be allowed 
some say in what is to be done. The principle 'quod omnes tanget ab 
omnibus approbetur' develops into one of the more fundament:al assump-
tions of the state-system. In addition, the principle of reciprocity 
does involve states in considering the justice of their claims. They 
recognise that in matters which substantially affect the interests of 
other states it is important that they act upon a universalisable prin-
ciple. However, these two principles together cannot provide a suffi- 
- ciently precise definition of the justice of state claims. First of 
all, the state cannot be satisfied with referring its claim to 'commun-
ity expectations about right action', but must be concerned with the 
development of right expectations about conduct. The first formulation 
allows states an independence of judgment which the formulation of prin-
ciples of right conduct would remove. A more rational foundation for 
assessing the justice of state claims becomes essential. 	Secondly, 
the state cannot be satisfied with a principle of involving other states 
in decisions which affect their interests in a significant way where 
other states remain the sole judge of what has a significant impact 
upon their interests. Once again, more precise rational principles 
require formulation. Thirdly, the principle of reciprocity, although 
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indicative of a willingness to consider the entire state-system as 
an ethical reference point, is too formal to provide an adequate basis 
for the evaluation of the justice of state claims. For some states 
may in particular situations be prepared to universalise what is 
unreasonable conduct as seen from the vantage point of the state-system 
as a whole. They may be willing to act simply for the sake of their 
own national interests or for ideals while conceding that other states 
have the right to behave similarly. 1 For these reasons the state-
system has not acquired sufficiently precise rational criteria for the 
assessment of its members' claims. 
Reciprocity is instrumental in heightening the level - of responsi-
bility to the state-system, but it may becor.ie, like the principle of 
sovereig4 equality, an obstacle to change if states do not move beyond 
it. To move beyond reciprocity it is essential that states reach a 
higher awareness of the idea of justice, which is already contained 
within the idea of reciprocity, albeit in only a formal sense. There 
. is need of a shift from the obligation of the state to consider whether 
or not it ought to perform an action given the likely response of the 
state-system, to the question of whether or not it should perform the 
action given rational principles of morality. And the latter outlook 
1. Let us take for example the case of the fanaticism of the Nazi 
who is prepared to send himself and his family to the gas-chamber 
on the grounds that his Jewish ancestry has been discovered. 
Clearly, in this instance, an appeal to universalisability alone 
does not deter the Nazi from acting out his racialist beliefs. 
See R.M. Hare Freedom and Reason, Oxford 1963, ch.9, and especially 
p.184 where the author remarks that the Nazi 'will remain unshaken 
by any argument that I have been able to discover'. While Hare 
acknowledges 'a very great debt to Kant' (p.34), one of Hare's 
critics notes that on Kantian principles 'the Nazi would be obliged 
to desist in his persecutiots'. H.•. Curtler "What Kant night 
Say to Hare", Mind 1971, pp.295-297. It is for this reason that 
the present discussion moves beyond reciprocity to more precise 
rational criteria for assessing inter-state claims. 
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can succeed in relating the rationality of an action to the condition 
of international relations, or any part of it, at a particular time 
while removing the judgment of rightness from states themselves. The 
change here is from a concern for reciprocity, given that states can 
frustrate each other's ability to satisfy their interests, to a con-
cern for justice as worthwhile in itself. What is required for further 
development of international relations is a move from what the commun-
ity expects to what the community has the right to expect. 	It is an 
attempt then to articulate more precise rules of international relations 
formulated with regard to a rational morality. And this rational 
morality is concerned, so it will be argued, with doing justice to men 
as ends in themselves, as understood within Kant's moral philosophy. 
The present phase in the moral development of intersocietal 
life is characterised by the desire to do justice to the welfare and 
interests of different communities. In its relations with outsiders 
the state uses just principles which apply impartially to all parties. 
The separate state is therefore prepared not to have an outcome which 
would be most in its self-interest where such an outcome is in conflict 
Jr. 
with its desire that the interests of other states should have equal 
consideration. When men arrive at this phase, it is essential for them 
to search for an answer to this'question: 'Does there exist a reason-
able decision procedure which is sufficiently strong, or at least in 
some cases, to determine the manner in which competing interests should 
be adjudicated, and, in instances of conflict, one interest given pre-
ference over another; and, further, can the existence of this proced-
ure, as well as its reasonableness, be established by rational methods 
of inquiry? '1 Now the author of this remark, John Rawls, has 
1. 	J. Rawls, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" in 
J.T.Thomson and G. Dworkin, Ethics, New York 1968, p.59. 
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suggested one ingenious method for discovering just outcomes. And 
this method requires that men choose the principles which will govern 
them behind a veil of ignorance which deprives them of knowledge 
about themselves since such information is likely to lead them to 
select principles most favourable to their own personal interests 
and inclinations. 1— Now this veil of ignorance is of considerable use-
fulness with reference to the kind of outlook states need to adopt to 
ground their particular relations on just principles. For, if a state 
is to do justice to the interests of others where these are in con-
flict with its own, it is essential that it be prepared to judge from 
a perspective which will not favour its own interests. And to enable 
it to perform its task of acting justly, a state in conflict with 
another might well attempt to imagine what would be selected by the 
parties in dispute if neither knew its particular interests but knew 
what was at issue in the dispute between them. Such a procedure en- 
sures at least that states approach the resolution of their dispute with 
a spirit of impartiality. In any dispute then states choose an out-
come behind a veil of ignorance which removes their knowledge of their 
particular characteristics. To all intents and purposes, states form 
rt 
a more inclusive unit in order to find an outcome which does justice 
to their conflicting interests. As one author has suggested: 'When 
such a conflict occurs it can be resolved only by applying the contract 
argument to the unit, that is to that society which includes but is 
not included by the other. The interest Df every one who stands to be 
1. 	It should also be pointed out that Rawls expects men to adopt 
self-interested motivation within the veil of ignorance, an 
assumption that is discarded within the present argument. For 
this reason, the veil of ignorance seems of value principally 
as a heuristic device which symbolises features crucial to the 
Kantian understanding of morality. For some additional remarks 
on Rawls, Kant and the theory of international relations, see 
below pp. 319-324. 
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affected by the class of actions in question can be taken into 
account only by applying the argument to the including society ' . 1 
Choosing within the veil of ignorance is tantamount then to recognis-
ing that states are members of a more inclusive moral community, and 
that their interests cannot be pursued at the expense of the principles 
which members of that community must be expected to honour. 
Through the operation of such a decision making procedure states 
may be expected to gradually articulate the principles which ought to 
govern men simply as men. For, at the stage reached it is not perfect-
ly clear how men are to choose within their veils of ignorance. All 
that has emerged is the kind of constraint men must recognise when 
they come to choose. Let us assume then that in the course of employ-
ing such a decision procedure men come to think of themselves as beings 
who are bound to act on principles which other men could accept as 
rational creatures. 	They develop then a sense of their possession 
of a rational nature which underlies their division into separate cul-
tures and political associations. They come to think that the ends 
of others are to be considered equal to their own, that they have a 
At. 
duty to advance them insofar as they are compatible with the ends of 
others, and they further suppose that men are to be treated in accord-
ance with principles they could select for themselves - irrespective 
of the community to which they belong. 
There is one fundamental implication contained within the stage 
which has now been reached. When the state accepts that its ends are 
to be judged and perhaps invalidated by some decision-procedure 
similar to the veil of ignorance, it admits that there are situations 
1. G.H. Grice, The Grounds of Moral JudOent, Cambridge 1967, p.152. 
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where its citizens are obliged to recognise that the interests of 
another state have preference over its own. And indeed where the 
state refused to recognise the interests of another state as prior to 
its own, those of its citizens more sensitive to the moral issues 
involved would have the right to disobey the state. Such citizens, 
who are concerned that their obligations as members of a larger moral 
community be enacted, would be opposed to the state on the grounds 
that their allegiance in this situation is to a higher international 
morality. As the state comes to think of itself as belonging to a 
more inclusive moral community then so must citizens regard themselves 
as possessing the right of opposing their state. 1 For in addition 
to being citizens they consider themselves as moral agents with duties 
to the members of other societies. And therefore in addition to the 
idea that the world is a division of sovereign states there comes into 
• being the idea that it is a moral community whose ultimate members are 
not states but individuals. 	Such a realisation has major reper- 
cussions for the way in which one state can stand in relation to others. 
For now states not only have obligations to other states; which the 
initial steps in the development of international relations helped to 
establish, but additionally to the individual members of other states, 
just as those individuals have obligations towards them. The emerg-
ence of an identification with such a moral community will necessarily 
pose a challenge to areas of state sovereignty, other than those pre-
viously challenged, in, the attempt to narrow the range of areas where 
the state may decide without having to consider the interests of cthers. 
In the new phase men come co think of themselves as forming an 
1. This condition is clearly opposed to the internal point of view 
where the individual might be allowed a liberty but certainly 
not a right of disobedience. See above pp. 38-39. 
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‘international community of individuals. They hold the view that men 
are equal through the possession of fundamental moral rights. Now 
states have come to this perspective through their relations with one 
another and through a willingness to resolve their differences by a 
method which treats the interests of the parties impartially. In the 
present condition states do not take the view that all interests are to 
be treated impartially simply for the purpose of discovering a fair 
outcome in particular circumstances where they are in conflict with 
one another. 	Rather, the idea that all men, irrespective of state 
membership, have an equal right to have their interests considered in 
accordance with rational principles becomes a fundamental principle 
of inter-state relations. Now, it does give rise immediately to new 
circumstances where more radical claims can be made between states. 
For example, one state may claim of a richer neighbour that it should 
provide the former's population with economic assistance where it re- 
quires it. It might furthermore ask for assistance in order to remove 
a regime which does not respect the rights of its citizens, and, indeed, 
• other states may consider themselves under a duty to provide assistance, 
• other things being equal, in order to accomplish that end. For the 
condition reached is one where social relations 'have now advanced 
everywhere so far that a violation of right in one place of the earth, 
is felt all over it'. 1 
The emerging phase is one in which men are gradually coming to 
consider themselves as members of 'a kingdom of ends'. 	However, to 
discuss more fully the final stages in the moral development of inter-
societal relations, it is necessary to consider some of the changes 
1. 	Kant, see above, p.218. 
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which will have been produced within the state as the idea of moral 
equality has become established. In earlier stages the state symbol-
ised the individual's freedom from the constraints of his natural 
society and his liberty to promote his own interests. The state ap-
peared first of all as an instrument whereby men could pursue their 
interests within a legal and political order capable of establishing 
some important degree of security among them. They did not, at this 
stage, think of themselves as possessing moral duties which required 
them to live within the parameters of a state. The state was simply 
an instrument which men could establish if they wished in order to 
enjoy the capacity to pursue their individual interests. However, in 
the course of the myth, men have tome to emphasise their being moral 
agents capable of obeying universal laws in their relations. Now 
this capacity was simply latent in man's earliest attempt at social 
organisation, but in the course of seeking right relationships with 
outsiders, it has gradually become more manifest in man's changing 
definition of himself. Fundamental to this change of outlook is the 
view that men ought to stand to one another in a legal and political 
relationship as of duty. They take the-view'ihat the state is neces- 
sary not as a mechanism whereby men may satisfy their interests within 
a condition of relative security, but as a means of enhancing the 
moral order that can exist among them. They are here in agreement. 
with Kant's view that: 
'it is not experience that makes public 
lawful coercion necessary. The necessity 
of public lawful coercion does not rest 
on a fact, but on an a priori idea of 
reason, for, even if we imagine men to be 
ever so good natured and righteous before 
a lawful public state of society is estab-
lished, individual men, nations, and states 
can never be certain that they are secure 
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against violence from one another, 
because each will have his own right 
to do what seems just and right to him, 
entirely independently of the opinion 
of others. Consequently, the first 
decision that he must make, if he does 
not wish to renounce all concepts of 
justice, is to accept the principle 
that one must quit the state of nature, 
in which everyone follows his own judgment, 
and must unite with everyone else (with 
whom he comes in contact and whom he 
cannot avoid), subjecting himself to a 
public lawful external coercion; in 
other words he must enter a condition 
of society in which what is to be recog-
nised as belonging to him must be estab-
lished lawfully and secured to him by an 
effective power that is not his own, but 
an outside power. That is, before anything 
else, he ought to enter a civil society.' 
According to this view, the value of the state lies not in the bene-
fits brought to the individual (although benefits there will be) but 
in the fast that a moral agent ought to recognise a competent author-
ity with the capacity to protect the rights of men. The worth of 
the state follows from the fact that a moral agent cannot be satis-
fied qua moral agent with a condition where men's rights are insecure. 
And it is for this reason that men should recognise an obligation to 
belong to a civil society. 
In their earlier condition the state appeared as a mechanism 
which both symbolised the freedom of the individual from his natural 
society and protected the liberty of individuals to promote their 
interests. However, in the course of their history men have come to 
think of themselves as beings capable of evolving a rational morality 
which treats =.11 men as ends in themselves. In this condition they 
begin a process of judging the rationality of their interests through 
an appeal to a morality which is essentially Kantian. Significant 
1. 	Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op.cit., p.76. 
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\here is the emergence of the use of the idea of the social contract 
for the purpose of deciding valid laws within their society. 1 And 
the contract reflects the fact that men consider themselves as belong-
ing to a community, to what Kant called a 'kingdom of ends', through 
which men both establish right laws among themselves and further pro-
mote their status as members of a moral community. The use of this 
mechanism indicates the belief that right relationships should be 
grounded upon principles to which rational beings could willingly give 
their consent. Conversely, the right form of political association 
is one which expresses man's nature as a rational being capable of 
giving moral laws to himself. 
The use of this procedure has also made some appearance in the 
state's, conduct of its external relations. It was to some extent impli-
cit within the state's willingness to regulate its claims upon others 
by a principle of reciprocity. For there is a concept of justice 
involved in the willingness of the state to regulate its actions by 
such a principle. But since this principle is formal and since the 
• 
motive for its employment is a desire for creating community expecta- 
.- 
tions (so that the state will take account of the interests of others) 
.e. 
it can be regarded as having a place only within a 'transitional' phase 
in the development of international relations. 2 
	
It belongs to that 
stage of international relations where the state is concerned with 
securing greater consideration for the welfare of its own citizens 
1. On the social contract as a test of validity, 'an idea of 
reason', see above p.228. 
2. The idea of 'reciprocity' as a means for developing 'community 
expectations' during the 'transitional' phase of international 
relations is developed by R. Falk in The Role of Domestic Courts 
in the International Legal Order, op.cit., p.45: 'The possi-
bilities for order in a horizontal system depend upon how well 
mechanisms of reciprocity are used.' 
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\ than would be possible were states to remain with only the principle 
of sovereign equality to protect them. However, the use of the 
contract as a procedure for promoting just relations between states 
develops through the concern of states to secure just outcomes where 
their interests conflict with each other. And the veil of ignorance 
is symbolic of a willingness to seek an outcome which relies on prin-
ciples to which all parties could freely consent. But the progress 
of states in their movement towards a more inclusive moral community 
cannot be ended at that point where states apply the idea of a con- 
tract among rational men to only those relations where their interests 
have come into conflict. To be satisfied with the application of the 
contract on only an ad hoc basis would be to fail to explore all the 
possibilities of such a device for the promotion of a more inclusive 
moral community. 
The stage has been reached where 'the idea of humanity in the 
abstract has been attained as a moral ideal. But the political organ-
isation of this conception, its embodiment in law and administrative 
• 
agencies, has not been achieved'. I Now it will be clear to separate, 
political associations at this point that their own condition, which 
is a state of nature, is an obstacle to the development of a more 
inclusive community which possesses its own set of institutions. The 
state, rather like the ethnocentric society before, must recognise 
that the existence of obligations to outsiders requires that it give 
way to more inclusive associations more able to ensure the enactment 
of obligations to humanity. The fact that outsiders are ends by 
virtue of a universal morality requires states to come to an under-
standing whereby principles are formulated to enable them to live 
1. See J. Dewey and J.H. Tufts, Ethics, New York 1908, p.482. 
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\ together civilly. For.example, states ought to be prepared to sub-
mit to an international court with the power to lay down binding 
decisions on the issues involved in international legal disputes. 
The willingness to set aside sovereignty so that international legal 
institutions can develop jurisdiction over such matters is a neces-
sary condition of,the development of organisations with specific re-
sponsibilities for protecting obligations to humanity. 	Similarly, 
states ought to be prepared to enable international institutions to 
take decisions by majority vote with regard to matters affecting them 
all where possible. Such developments, in short, must be aimed at 
establishing a distinction between what belongs to the jurisdiction 
of the state and what belongs to the jurisdiction of international 
institutions, the ensuing condition being a federation of states where 
obligations to fellow-citizens and obligations to fellow-men both 
find expression in their respective sets of institutions. 	Now the 
establishment of such institutions may seem improbable, although it 
has been argued that: 
'Nothing could be more absurd, from the 
historic point of view,_than-to regard 
the conception of an international State 
of federated humanity, with its own laws 
and its own courts and its own rules for 
adjudicating disputes, as a mere dream, 
an illusion of sentimental hope. It is 
a very slight step to take forward compared 
with that which has substituted the author-
ity of national States for the conflict of 
isolated clans and local communities; or 
with that which has substituted a publicly 
administered justice for the regime of 
private war and retaliation.' 1 
The movement i,om a 'horizontal' order, one managed by states, to a 
'vertical' order, one shared by states and international institutions, 
1. 	ibid. 
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is no more impossible than the step from ethnocentric societies to 
the state itself. 1 And indeed it is no less desirable, if obligations 
between men are to be entrenched in adequate institutions. 
The main concern of following sections is not, however, with 
likely or desirable alternatives for future world order but with the 
principles which any theory of future world order might consider. The 
method for elaborating such principles draws upon the idea of the 
social contract as described in relation to the attempt both to find 
a just outcome for international disputes and to find a right order 
for the state itself. 	It is simply that the members of a state should 
test not only their acts but the nature of their association itself 
with reference to a 'universal' social contract. The members of any 
separate political association, by virtue of their rational nature 
• 
and the universal morality implicit within it, are obliged to test 
their actions with reference to the idea of a social contract which 
includes the whole of mankind, the most inclusive society possible. 
And in referring their actions to the test of such a contract, citi-
zens are having recourse to an 'idea' rather than to a'contract which 
is sociologically -observable. Citizens imaginethemselves as members 
of a 'kingdom of endS" not yet in existence but which they are obliged 
to bring into existence through their own efforts. 	The fiction of 
the universal social contract simply reflects the fact that citizens 
in addition to their membership of their separate political associa-
tions form a moral community as extensive as mankind itself:' It is 
1. For the distinction between 'vertical' and 'horizontal' 
order, see R. Falk, "International Jurisdiction: Horizontal 
and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order", Temple Law 
Quaterly 1958-59, pp. 295-320. 
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simply a fiction which makes possible the conduct of external rela-
tions in accordance with principles which, if universalised, would 
allow the organisation of world society to be grounded on principles 
which emanated from the rational nature of men and so reflected their 
moral freedom. 
The myth has developed to the stage where the members of a 
separate, sovereign state reconsider the status of their association 
in light of the idea that all men have fundamental moral obligations 
to one another. Recourse to a fictional universal social contract 
reflects the willingness to order the actions of the separate state 
by the obligations held to follow from belonging to the most inclusive 
kingdom of ends. The separate state does not propose to act as a 
particular group prepared to defend and promote its interests against 
the remainder of mankind. An appeal to a universal social contract 
indicates a willingness to set aside consideration of only its own 
particular state interests and to judge and limit these interests with 
regard to its universal moral obligations. The universal social con-
tract serves to prevent the state from claiming an unequal liberty 
against the rest of mankind. thereby avoiding a tension between the 
obligations citizens owe to one another and the moral obligations held 
to oblige all men. The awareness of these obligations places limit-
ations upon the kind of political association men can establish with 
reason at the 'local' level. This concept of obligation lias a crucial 
role to play in deciding the rationality of such an association. For 
once men have Arrived at the idea of universal moral obligations they 
cannot recognise as legitimate any association which would appear 
incompatible with the development of international institutions which 
can give obligations to humanity their conclusive form of expression. 
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the contract contains the idea that for a state tc be legitimate 
it must have satisfied not only 'internal' criteria - for example, 
reflecting the consent of its citizens -. but a set of 'external' 
criteria which are expressed in the contract. Let us now consider 
the way in which such criteria come to define the status of the 
separate political association, and articulate more specific prin- 
ciples for its external relations in relation to a more general view 
that as an association the state is to be surpassed by institutions 
more capable of expressing man's capacity to enlarge his moral 
community. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
The Universal Contract 
and the 
Principles of International Society 
The universal social contract is concerned with a number of 
rules and prohibitions which all men have an obligation to establish 
and preserve at the level of international relations. One author has 
remarked: 'If we are to speak of our obligations as members of a 
society of humanity as a whole, the theory requires that there are 
some classes of actions regarding which it is in the interest of every 
man on the surface of the earth to make a contract with each other'. 1 
The content cf such an agreement binds every man to every other irre-
spective of the society to which he belongs and places limitations on 
the nature of any political society that might be established at the 
local level. 	By this means any society that passes the test of the 
universal contract can be sure that the obligations asked of citizens 
will be compatible with the obligations they also have simply as men. 
Within such a society there ought not to be a tension between the 
obligations owed to citizens and the obligations owed to fellow-men, 
and no separate political society would have claimed an unequal liberty 
against outsiders. 
It will he recalled that for Kant the test (although not the 
essence) of a moral action is found by asking whether that action, if 
universally adopted, would bring nearer the realisation of the 'king-
dom of ends' - that condition where men were free to seek their ends 
within a harmonious community grounded upon rational laws expressive 
1. Grice, op.cit., r.152, 
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of human rationality. The universal contract is concerned precisely 
with this end - of ensuring that any separate political society that 
is established will i)e compatible with the future emergence of an 
international 'kingdom of ends'. 	It is concerned with testing that 
the principles upon which the separate society is founded will not 
prevent that condition where the members of different societies co-
operate to govern their international society with rational laws which 
treat all men as ends in themselves. Any political society which 
passes the test of the universal contract will therefore have satis-
fied other men that it is prepared to honour its international obli-
gations towards them and that it is, in principle, capable of taking 
its place within . a civil society for the whole of mankind. 
Let us now relate these remarks to the condition reached in 
the myth. We are to imagine the existence of a separate state which 
has in the course of its history come to regard itself as an agency 
for the rule of justice among men considered as ends in themselves. 
For this state the rule of justice is protected among its members alone 
simply on account of its historical development apart from other men. 
We may imagine that some other states will have established the rule 
of justice and wish to broaden the sphere of its application to in-
clude others. Other states, however, may not have reached this stage 
and may wish to preserve their liberty to act against outsiders. 
States which wish to expand their moral community face then complex 
problems in overcoming the state of nature which they -comprise. The 
problem of such states in this condition is to devise principles for 
guiding their external relations not only with similar societies but 
with those who are as yet unprepared to recognise fundamental inter-
national obligations. Such states judge the principles upon which 
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they will act by asking if a universal contract of rational men 
could consent to them, and the results of this method will establish 
for the state some fundamental principles to guide its conduct. Now 
it is not possible to consider a great variety of actions that might 
be so tested; but what is possible is the testing of more general 
principles under whlch a great variety of actions would fall. There-
fore, the universal contract can test some general ideas regarding 
the rights of states, the morality of private persons and statesmen 
and the theory of international co-operation - for these are the three 
areas upon which much of the earlier analysis has been grounded. It 
has also been argued that the internal and external points of view of 
obligations are separated in terms of the different approaches they 
take to these concepts. Now these two points of view are abstractions 
from the nature of the modern state. For both are found there; but 
they are also found in the nature of the state as understood within 
the myth. Throughout the states' developmenta possible tension between 
two points of view has been indicated at several junctures, the one 
wishing to maintain the right of the state and its members to pursue 
their interests, while the other wished to press for progress under-
stood in terms of the continuing expansion of moral community. Now 
such a division may be said to persist in the state in the present 
phase in the development of the myth. And in attempting to decide what 
stand that state should take with regard to the internal and external 
points of view, the following section indicates also . the position to 
be taken with regard to the conflicting recommendations made by these 
points of view to the citizen of the modern state. Let us now begin 
this task by considering the conclusions of the universal contract 
with reference to the rights of the state. 
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Members of a universal contract could not allow any group 
of individuals to consider the nature of the separate political assoc-
iation they will form without any reference to the remainder of 
humanity. The remainder of humanity would be concerned with the pro-
motion of its rights and could not allow these to be ignored by any 
particular group among them. The legitimacy of the separate politi-
cal association is not found in the fact that the association satis-
fies various 'internal' criteria, for example by being based on the 
actual consent of its citizens. 	Its legitimacy depends also upon 
having satisfied 'external' criteria - in this case the test of the 
universal contract. 	And this is necessarily true of the rights of 
the state also. These rights do not inhere in the state absolutely 
through for example the decision of citizens to transfer their rights 
to it. They are validated through their being compatible with the 
requirements of the universal contract. 
Let us now consider in more detail how the contract would treat 
some arguments for the rights of states. At a certain stage the state 
has to insist upon its right to sovereign equality since it wishes to 
be recognised by others as a legitimate agency concerned with the pro-
motion of a particular common good. The state, moreover, may have to 
use force to establish this status - for example, to defend itself 
against aggressors - in order to ensure that other associations are 
prepared to take its ends into account. Now the right to use force 
does not stem from some original right once possessed by individuals 
and now transferred to thr_ sovereign in perpetuity. Indeed, the uni-
versal contract could not validate the right of the state to use force 
on its own judgment and for its own interests. For this places the 
rights of other persons in an arbitrary condition where they are made 
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'dependent upon the subjective judgment of a particular political 
association. It would be impossible for the state to establish it-
self as a self-interested association since the universal contract 
could not permit a group to act only on behalf of its interests alone. 
What it can permit, however, is the right of the state to use force 
in an earlier condition to preserve itself as an agent for the pro-
motion of the welfare of its citizens considered as ends in themselves. 
For this end, unlike the previous one, is compatible with the develop-
ment of a universal kingdom of ends, or, would be if the state is 
prepared to treat men other than its own citizens a's ends in themselves. 
If the universal contract permits the state the right to use 
force to defend its particular good, it is partly with an eye to that 
state eventually regarding itself as part of a more inclusive kingdom 
of ends. 	For the universal contract regards the state as a trustee 
for a portion of humanity, preserving its good until it is possible 
for its inclusion within a more inclusive association . But it is not 
obvious that every state will be prepared to be included within such 
an association. A community might argue, for example, that due to its 
shared history and common ways it would prefer to remain separate from 
others. The universal contract could permit some institutional ex-
pression for defined regions and cultures, but it could not pass the 
idea that a group has the right to preserve a legal and political 
system only among its own kind while it remained in the state of 
nature with those who have a different history and distinct cultures. 
Legal and political institutions exist to protect the rights of human-
ity and therefore a refusal to consider some form of association with 
outsiders simply on cultural terms would be illegitimate. It may be 
said that 'there is no convincing reason why the fact that people 
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\ speak the same language or belong to the same race should, by itself, 
entitle them to enjoy a government exclusively their own. For such 
a claim to be convincing, it must also be proved tnat similarity in 
one respect absolutely overrides differences in other respects'. 1 
It would also have to be shown that the rights of other men could be 
ignored simply on the basis of their not sharing a common history or 
language or culture. Rational men'in a universal contract would be 
unable to consent to this claim since the protection of the rights of 
men cannot be set aside on the grounds that some men can evidently 
associate more easily with some rather than with others. While it is 
reasonable that regions and cultures should possess their own politi-
cal institutions it is unreasonable that such institutions should be 
sovereign and exclusive. 
A state which refused to recognise any institutions other than 
its own sovereign ones would not be compatible with the continuing 
advancement of moral community. For the state has the obligation of 
submitting first of all to international legal institutions with the 
authority to deliver binding decisions. And this objective, which all 
rational men would desire, must override any claims to belong to a 
sovereign state in perpetuity. 
The obligation to submit international legal disputes to an 
international agency is a function of the fact that a state's claims 
cannot be imposed on others unilaterally, but require the validation 
of the international community through its procedures operating in 
accordance with rational principles. Actions are therefore referred 
to the international community to which the state is accountable. Now 
1. E. Kedourie, Nationalism, London 1960, p.80. 
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\the state is not simply accountable for those of its actions which 
belong to its foreign policy while it retains domestic jurisdiction 
over matters of primary concern to itself. For this distinction is 
impossible to establish in any hard and fast fashion within an inter-
national society. Let us consider two areas with regard to this 
point - the distribution of economic resources and the protection of 
the citizen's human rights. According to the principles underlying 
diplomatic society the state retains jurisdiction over its economic 
resources, and has the sovereign right of deciding how its resources 
are to be used. Limitations upon its capacity to do as it pleases 
exist either on account of interdependence or the decision to share 
responsibility with particular states or institutions in order to 
improve the state's condition. However, if the state. is permitted an 
absolute jurisdiction over its economic resources outsiders would have 
no right to receive assistance, but could only make claims for aid 
which potential donors could recognise or reject according to their 
own subjective judgment. 	As a result, poverty and its avoidance 
would depend upon an arbitrary fact - whether one happened to be born 
in a rich or a poor society and whether one's society was capable of 
extracting minimal or considerable levels of the world's resources. 
But members of a universal contract could not allow their ends to be 
dependent upon such natural facts for those who have to concentrate 
on 'mere animal survival are barred from the realisation of any of 
their uniquely human potentials'. 1 Every man is therefore obliged 
to every other to provide assistance in order that all rational ends 
may be pursued. Consequently, any local political society must be 
considered obliged to place at the disposal of international 
1. 	Murphy, op.cit., p.146. 
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\institutions sufficient resources to enable it to fulfil this funda-
mental obligation. In the second place, with regard to the rights 
of its own citizens the state is a trustee accountable to the inter-
national community for the common good of a portion of humanity. 
The manner in which it treats its citizens is not merely a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction, but is of interest to the whole of humanity 
since members of a universal contract would wish their ends to be 
protected against the illegitimate actions of the state to which they 
belong. 
In conclusion, the state deserves the recognition of others as 
an agent for a particular common good, and it derives rights by virtue 
of its status of promoting the welfare of a portion of humanity. But 
the area of the common good is capable of extension and the state must 
not claim rights which would come into conflict with the duty of its 
citizens to form part of a universal kingdom of ends. For this reason 
the state's political rights must be tested by a universal contract in 
order to ensure that they do not stand as an obstacle in the way of a 
civil society for the whole of mankind. 
Secondly, the universal contract, which tests the legitimacy 
of the state, must clearly be concerned with the roles and obligations 
of citizens and statesmen. Now the contract denies the state the 
liberty of being an autonomous unit in world society and consequently 
implies the denial of legitimacy to any roles which presuppose that 
the state can have this status. The universal contract therefore places 
limitations on the rights and obligations citizens can expect of each 
other and of those who act for them. Given their obligations to one 
another, men would have an interest in contracting neither to regard 
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the welfare of the state as the supreme law nor to authorise parti-
cular individuals to act only on its own behalf. And this is nec-
essarily the case given that men are governed by a single structure 
of obligation. 
In the early phase of international relations states are at 
liberty to use force in order to secure recognition from others of 
the importance of their ends. In this condition the state is not in-
volved in the pursuit of its interests at all costs but rather in 
securing consideration for its reasonable ends - a recognition which 
in turn requires greater international co-operation in order to ground 
the relations of states on just principles. For this reason the 
statesman is not entitled to employ 'morally dubious means' 1 to en-
sure satisfaction of the state's interests and he is not entitled to 
contrast his role with that of the private person who, unwilling to 
engage in such 'sacrifices of value', is allegedly obliged to turn 
his back on politics. 
It is not the case that in these early stages one morality 
exists for the statesman while another morality exists for the private 
person. This view presupposes what has already been shown to be un-
acceptable, namely that the state is an autonomous entity. The dis-
tinction between the two moralities often extends this idea in the 
form that while, for example, pacifism may be a reasonable choice for 
the private person it cannot form part of the morality of the role of 
the statesman. Here, however, pacifism.is judged in terms of its con-
sequences for the state understood as an autonomous entity rather than 
in terms of its inherent rationality or irrationality. 	If hOwever 
pacifism were shown to be inherently irrational then it could not 
1. A phrase used by Weber, op.cit., p.121. 
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be an adequate position to adopt whether a private person or a public 
person selected to live by it. 	Now it has been shown that if it is 
held to be absolutely evil to take life paradoxes inevitably follow. 
For, if one man is about to kill another, and if the pacifist can 
only save the victim through taking the life of the attacker, then no 
matter what the pacifist does he will infringe his fundamental prin- 
ciple. To defend the victim involves taking life, while not to defend 
him allows the taking of life which might otherwise be avoided. 1 In 
addition, not to defend the victim against an unjust attack upon his 
life involves an infringement of an elementary principle of justice 
since the pacifist allows the guilty to survive at the cost of the 
innocent. 
It is not the case then that the statesman has a public moral-
ity divorced from the morality of private men. Nor is it the case 
that in the early phase of international relations the statesman would 
be allowed to act disproportionately. 	Action in the state of nature 
need not proceed on morally autonomous lines and, indeed, cannot if 
any further extension of moral community is to be possible. This 
principle simply reflects the fact that there is a morality which em-
braces all rational agents. Now while the content of that morality 
cannot be exactly similar for different persons with different roles 
to perform no role-morality can stand unconnected with that morality 
which embraces all rational agents. Therefore, the specific charact- 
eristics of any role-morality must be governed by particular principles 
which all rational persons could accept. There is, in other words, 
only one rational morality with highly specific principles for the 
purposes of its application to detailed roles and circumstances, and 
1. J. Narveson, Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis in R.A. Wasserstrom, 
War and Morality, Belmont California 1970, pp.63-77. 
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not a morality for private persons which statesmen are at liberty 
to depart from. 
When the sovereign has a duty to the people to secure recogni- 
tion of its rights to consideration he simply discharges his obliga-
tion of protecting the welfare of a particular portion of humanity. 
But to the extent that the state comes to think that all members of 
humanity have rights the more necessary is its involvement in co-oper- 
ating with other communities to develop rules for the conduct of inter-
national relations. While all men are governed by a single rational 
morality it is the particular responsibility of the representatives 
of states to attempt to formulate precise rules which apply that moral-
ity to the stage international relations has reached. 1 Where there 
is a conflict between the morality of the statesman and the moral ambi-
tions of the private person this arises not through any inherent con-
flict. It will arise simply on account of the fact that wherever 
states have unfinished business, wherever their moral community remains 
imperfect, citizens may come into conflict with their states should 
they believe progress is slower than it might be. And 'such tensions 
will always be likely until men decide that the pace of change or the 
ultimate condition reached is in harmony with their own moral objectives. 
The members of a universal contract are concerned with estab-
lishing recognition for principles which will respect them as ends in 
themselves. The autonomous state is not acceptable to such members 
1. On account of the diversity of political systems and cultures 
it is perhaps preferable to refer to the stages rather than the 
stage international relations has reached. Given that inter-
national relations are not merely one-dimensional any state 
which articulates an external point of view will have to formu-
late highly specific rules and principles in response to the 
varied nature of its external relations. 
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since it is not grounded upon principles to which the members of the 
universal contract could consent. Similarly, the members of a uni-
versal contract couic not allow 'public persons' the liberty of de-
parting at their will from the morality held to oblige all rational 
persons. In the first place, to do so would be to allow that the 
state of nature need not be regulated by certain principles of pro-
portionality prior to a more detailed elaboration of principles for 
regulating interstate claims. The representatives of states owe an 
obligation not only to certain minimal principles of morality but to 
the need for co-operation whereby further rules are established for 
their relations. The members of a universal contract must require 
that the representatives of states perform a 'double function', name-
ly protecting the particular good of people while seeking to extend 
the area of the common good. In this way each person ensures that 
his ends are taken into account by the remainder of humanity in accord-
ance with rational principles. 
It was noted earlier in the discussion of Pufendorf, Vattel 
and Kant that the principles according to which the state is estab-
lished are connected to the way in which it will conduct its external 
relations - the theory of the state implying as it does a theory of 
international relations. If the state is based upon a contract among 
potential citizens alone then its external relations can be expected 
to be conducted with a view to advancing first and foremost the inter-
ests of insiders. A universal contract on the other hand confers 
legitimacy only upon those states which are prepared to discharge obli-
gations indicative of their willingness to be included within a more 
inclusive moral community. The legitimate state has as a result certain 
international obligations built into its very nature. 	And in 
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particular the legitimate state is one which looks on international 
co-operation as a fundamental obligation as opposed to an option which 
states might explore when it seems advantageous to do so. Let us 
now further examine the nature of the agreements men would make re-
garding co-operation between them. 
Universal contractors are concerned with the development of an 
international 'kingdom of ends'. Now this idea requires the co-oper-
ation of states in order to formulate principles and rules which will 
bring this condition nearer. The process of formulation and revision 
is necessarily an ongoing one whereby states establish a more complete 
set of rules for the purposes of grounding their relationships upon 
right principles. 	In addition, it is necessarily a co-operative one 
since states must acquire the habit of taking the role of each other 
by a process of consultation and indeed conflict whereby essential 
ends are asserted, validated or invalidated, and if accepted protected 
by rules which all are bound to accept. 	In this phase states conduct 
a conversation not through a process of action and reaction, or through 
willingness to acknowledge reciprocal principles, but through a joint 
'effort at identification' whereby principles are established for the 
purposes of treating men as ends in themselves. 
This conversation develops mainly through the fact that states 
are in a position to affect each other's interests. It is necessarily 
the case that their actions, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
have an impact on others in many ways. Now the formulation of prin-
ciples of international relations does not develop in a vacuum, but 
in response to actual relationships. It is for this reason that 
Maritain has critised that theory of international relations which 
is concerned with the establishment of international government in 
310. 
abstraction from the actual relations of states. That theory which 
has as its objective the establishment of powerful international 
institutions which replace state institutions operates 'artificially'. 
To think within the parameters of such a theory is 'to contemplate 
a process developed artificially, and against the grain of nature, 
resulting in a state without a body politic, or political society 
of its own, a world brain without a world body; and the World Govern-
ment would be an absolute Super-state, or a superior state deprived 
of body politic and merely superimposed on and interfering with the 
life of the particular states - even though it were born of popular 
election and representation.' ) 	It is for this reason alone that 
world government schemes have an air of unreality and appear so super-
ficial. In their stead Maritain maintains that 'the whole issue is 
not simply World Government. It is World Political Society'. 2 The 
domestic state arises not in a vacuum but in the midst of a 'multi-
plicity' of 'particular societies which proceed from the free initi-
ative of citizens and should be as autonomous as possible': to which 
Maritain gives the name 'body politic ' . 3 	Of the domestic state 
Maritain remarks that it is 'that part of the body politic especially 
concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common 
welfare and public order, and the administration of public affairs. 
The state is that part which specialises in the interests of the whole'. 4 
This idea has already been embodied in an earlier phase of the myth 
where the state was understood as a response to a particular degree 
of social development. And far from cancelling earlier associations 
the state simply requires that they reconsider the principles which 
1. J. •aritain, Man and the State, Chicago 1956, p.203. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid., p.11. 	 4. ibid., p.12. 
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have previously governed them before it integrates them within a 
new type of social order. Similarly, at the international level the 
objective of theory is not the description of institutions which 
states are immediately obliged to establish. It is rather to argue 
that by way of a response to intensified international and transnation-
al relations - designed to promote the ends of men - further institu-
tions of an international nature become both possible and desirable. 
The objective of bringing into existence an international kingdom of 
ends is necessary in order that men can fulfil their obligations to 
the remainder of mankind. And in seeking to translate this idea into 
practice states establish among themselves a body politic which in 
turn will produee the need for the strengthening of their internation-
al institutions. 
As was noted earlier the emergence of a kingdom of ends requires 
that states are prepared to assist each other's populations escape the 
sole search for 'mere animal survival' in order to promote a greater 
range of human ends. Now while this objective may be carried out most 
efficiently by separate states acting on a unilateral basis there are 
still important reasons why such a task should be shared with inter-
national institutions. To assign such a task to international insti-
tutions is not merely to concede that there are areas of political 
action which can be better managed by international institutions - a 
view which takes only an instrumental approach to international co-
operation and the role of such institutions in international society - 
but to express the fact that there are fundamental international obli-
gations owed between all men. The fact that men recognise these obli-
gations as important becomes convincing where they establish institu-
tions with the specific function of discharging them. The irportance 
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\ of these obligations does not receive the same endorsement where the 
responsibility for their discharge remains solely in the hands of 
associations traditionally concerned with the advancement of a parti-
cular common good. In addition, it is necessary that institutional 
arrangements should arise in the wake of international transactions - 
which the functionalists have argued so forcefully - so that the inter-
ests of peoples receive fair consideration. In particular here the 
establishment of judicial agencies with compulsory jurisdiction is 
one of the mechanisms by which states can both discharge international 
obligationS through discovering the rules which should govern them and 
introduce new rules which further extend the community between them. 
II 
The preceding sections which have discussed the three aspects 
Of the internal and the external points of view from the perspective 
of a Kantian ethic conclude the major part of the analysis of this 
thesis. It has been argued that the major tension at the heart of the 
modern state may be reconciled by such an ethic in conjunction with a 
historical myth in favour of obligations to humanity. The state then 
is understood as an agency which protects the common good of moral 
equals and which has in addition the obligation of continuing the pro-
cess of enlarging the moral community through working for a more in-
clusive moral community at the level of international relations. Given 
this argument it is essential to say that a separate political assoc-
iation, which claims absolute sovereignty against the rest of mankind, 
is illegitimate if understood to be anything other than a temporary 
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phase whereby lesser associations are incorporated within the state 
itself. For the validity of the state, so it has been argued, depends 
on certain external criteria of legitimacy which include ideas about 
the nature of the association, the roles of private and public persons 
and the approach to international co-operation. Any state which does 
not satisfy these criteria cannot be regarded as legitimate since its 
underlying principles - the maxims upon which it is grounded - cannot 
be chosen by the members of a universal contract concerned with gain-
ing satisfaction for the idea that men are to be treated as ends in 
themselves. 	And this, it is alleged, is not only an idea for the 
evaluation of right conduct in international relations; it is a 
condition which states are obliged to bring into existence. 
This last remark requires some final observations about the 
place of political philosophy in the theory of international relations. 
It is not the role of political philosophy to attempt to establish 
highly detailed principles for the regulation of international rela-
tions. 	This is not on account of the fact that political philosophy 
should avoid more detailed normative dimensions of international rela-
tions, but because the development of detailed principles belongs to 
a quite different enterprise. It is impossible to proceed to deduce 
a set of highly specific principles which states should recognise 
without considerable attention to the empirical nature of the circum-
stances in which they find themselves. Political philosophy can only 
establish some of the more general principles which have a place in 
international conduct. It is involved, as one writer has put it, with 
developing a strategy composed of concepts and principles which have 
some necessary foundation - in the case of this thesis a necessary 
foundation by virtue of their rationality. 	But it is not the 
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business of political philosophy to develop the tactics which need 
to be followed to bring these objectives into existence. ) Naturally, 
political philosophy is involved in critically as%essing the tactics 
that states might employ in the context of the overall strategy, 
although as we have seen this is not a task it can accomplish alone. 
Within the parameters of this thesis this strategy has been involved 
with the principles underlying two.points of view which have been 
analysed and evaluated in abstraction from their place in the modern 
state. The strategy has involved a process of argumentation about 
these principles both through the study of their role in the thoughts 
of earlier theorists of international law and international relations, 
and from the vantage point of a moral philosophy and a myth which have 
attempted to establish some priority among these various principles. 
This method of analysis is to be judged then solely in relation to the 
articulation of a strategy for the elaboration of more detail requires 
political philosophy to work in conjunction with the empirical 
approaches to international relations. 
1. P.P. Nicholson, 'Political Philosophy and Political Action', 
Political Studies, 1973, pp. 467 -480. 
APPENDIX I. 
Some Further Notes on the Development  
of International Relations Theory. 
By way of a brief conclusion let us now consider some issues 
which have not received any attention in this thesis but which are 
germane to any fuller discussion. These issues can be divided into 
two groups, the first-of which concerns the point made at the end of 
the last section, namely the way in which political philosophy can 
combine with empirical approaches to international relations in order 
to give a fuller' account of the rules which states might follow, the 
second of which concerns issues which are more closely related to the 
philosophical arguments in this thesis. Let us consider the first 
group of issues. 
There appear to be two areas for further analysis, areas which, 
without comprising political philosophy itself, may work with it in 
order to offer more detailed prescriptive international' relations 
theory. In the first place, it would be enormously useful to have 
detailed studies of the applications of moral and political philosophy 
to particular case-studies. It is true that such studies do exist al-
though the tendency has been for a concentration upon issues arising. 
in the conduct of war. To this there might be added further studies 
which focussed upon international disputes, attempts at co-operation 
and so forth. Such studies would involve initial claims about moral 
principles, but they would require considerable empirical understand-
ing of some international transaction or event in order to produce 
reasonable conclusions about the principles that might be or have been 
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followed. Such understanding would be important not only by way of 
applying moral principles directly to political facts, but by way of 
clarifying what is possible for states in the circumstances which 
face them. Furthermore, these studies would not only assist the de-
velopment of general principles and their application to particular 
circumstances. An opposite flow could take place whereby reflection 
upon more particular issues could assist the development of more 
general international relations theory. 
In the second place, and also involving empirical knowledge, 
there is the need for more detailed consideration of the role of inter-
national institutions. What kinds of international institution and 
based upon what kinds of principle could best serve the development 
of a more inclusive international community? What areas of inter-
national life might they seek to regulate? A more normative approach 
to international institutions would have the effect of clarifying the 
types of economic, political and legal institutions which might contri-
bute to the development of an international 'kingdom of ends'. And 
this in turn would assist the understanding of the kind of institu-
tion which would in the middle-term provide reasonable objectives. 
To turn to the second group of questions: it is true that the 
arguments in this thesis are based ultimately on modes of analysis 
and concepts which are predominantly Western in their origins. Indeed, 
many of them - individualism, rights and autonomy for example - belong 
to that group of concepts which characterise the modern social out-
look. If this is so, it is necessary to ask how far a theory based 
upon such concepts could go in constructing a strategy for the whole 
of international relations rather than for that part of them which are 
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'Western or Western.-influenced. It has been an important part of at 
least one author's work to indicate that Western approaches to law 
are, as an example, substantially different from the approaches found 
in other civilisations. 1 There are certainly two things to consider 
and one thing to do. In the first place, it might be possible to 
argue that Western concepts of man, morality and politics are substant-
ially correct and that alternatives - are therefore substantially in-
correct. However, to proceed in this way is to eliminate one possible 
area of inquiry which is that of exploring the possibility that other 
cultures and civilisations may share the experience contained in 
Western thought although they may choose to represent it in alternative 
ways. With this in mind, it would be interesting to know how far, for 
example, the division between obligations to mankind and obligations to 
fellow-citizens or fellow-members is represented in one form or another 
in the theory and practice.of other civilisations. 
Quite apart from this inquiry lie a number of questions concern-
ed with issues raised in the myth in this thesis. It was asserted 
that the myth sought merely to plot different societies on a scale 
using a Kantian ethic and considering the ways in which such societies 
chose to think of insiders and outsiders. 	Now the idea of so chart- 
ing the social world is not a new one although in most versions it 
occupies a place within a philosophy of history. According to the 
latter perspective the point of charting the social world is not merely 
to distinguish between societies for its own sake. 	Its function is 
part of a larger method of inquiry which is concerned with patterns or 
meaning in history. For such an approach the distinguishing of stages 
1. 	A.D. Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World, 
Princeton 1971. 
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is a prelude to attempting to show how one stage is inferior to the 
others and why it must give way to a higher and more complete stage. 
The different stages are then not unrelated but indeed bound together 
by constituting an actual process of history whereby one stage gives 
way of necessity to successively higher stages. Now the myth in this 
thesis has not been so ambitious as to claim to represent a philosophy 
of history. 	It has sought rather'to chart a mythical development of 
the concept of autonomy as applied to the external relations of separ-
ate societies. In addition, it is clear that the move from the first 
to the second phase of the myth was purely contingen't on account of 
the fact that one group happened to require the assistance of another. 
But it has been argued that the remaining phases of the myth are 
connected so as to constitute a kind of necessary development. It is 
not. implausible however to wonder if this claim could he advanced - 
namely that these stages are not isolated from their historical con-
text in order to be assigned a place in a hierarchy established within 
a particular moral and political philosophy, but that the stages are 
themselves necessarily connected in history itself. 	However, the 
issues involved in attempting to discuss this more fully certainly 
lie outside the scope of the present analysis. 
APPENDIX II. 
John Rawls and the Theory 
of 
International Relations. 
The idea of a universal contract grounded upon Kantian prin-
ciples raises the question of the relationship of the method of this 
thesis to the method of John Rawls. 1 For Rawls employs social con- 
tract theory in a manner clearly related to Kant. Rawls maintains 
that 'one does not take men's propensities and inclinations as given, 
whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfil them. Rather 
their desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the 
principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men's systems 
of ends must respect'. 2 This view is typical of the Kantian element 
in Rawls' work. It is also, as we have seen, of considerable import-
ance in the argument of this thesis against the reasoning and con-
clusions found in Pufendorf and Vattel. Rawls also maintains that 
' once a morality of principle is accepted, however, moral attitudes 
are no longer connected solely with the well-being and approval of 
particular individuals and groups, but are chosen by a conception of 
right chosen irrespective of these contingencies ' . 3 Once again, this 
suggests an idea that has played a prominent part in this thesis, 
namely the idea of moral freedom or autonomy as understood by Kant. 
Now if these similarities occur it is necessary to provide some account 
1. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard 1971. 
2. ibid., p.31. 	3. 	ibid., p.475. 
319. 
320. 
of the reasons why this thesis has not simply drawn upon Rawls' ap-
proach to the social contract, seeking to extend it to produce rational 
principles of international relations. No doubt every student of 
political theory must now address himself to Rawls but this obligation 
is especially required of anyone prepared to adopt a contractarian 
theory which like Rawls' draws so much from Kant, 
Rawls' political theory, like so many before it, relegates the 
international dimension of political life to a lesser place. Although 
Rawls does not wish to exclude international relations altogether, it 
is not without interest that he should believe the theory of the state 
can be decided in advance of any theory of international relations. 
Rawls therefore confines his veil of ignorance and social contract to 
the members of a particular community. Of this decision, Brian Barry 
has written: 'The odd thing about Rawls' treatment of the question 
how a particular community is to be defined for the purpose of the 
theory of justice is that he does not discuss it ... Rawls, by making 
it clear that as far as he is concerned the community already exists 
and its members have merely forgotten their place withill it, may be- 
lieve that he can dodge the question how the community is to be defined. 
But it seems to me that this is an arbitrary move that cannot be de-
fended within the theory , . 1 The first reason for rejecting Rawls' 
social contract is that it takes the separate, sovereign state as given. 
And this, as we have seen, is precisely what is under contention in the 
theory of international relations. 
Given Rawls' method, which is to begin with the theory of the 
state and then to proceed to the theory of international relations, 
1. 	B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, Oxford 1973, 
pp. 128-129. 
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his conclusions are not surprising. 	For if the separate state is 
assumed to be a legitimate mode of association then the theory of 
international relations is concerned with the elal ,oration of principles 
which are designed to place the seal of approval upon this status. 
Rawls maintains that representatives from different nations 'choose 
together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims 
among states' behind a veil of ignorance. Their conclusions, which 
Rawls himself declares contain 'no surprises', are that there ought 
to be a principle of the equal liberty of states and the right of self-
determination, the duty of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of others, the right to form defensive alliances, and, finally, the 
principle that agreements ought to be kept. 1 Commenting on this list, 
Barry writes: 'first, Rawls does not and cannot defend the assumption 
that principles will be chosen in the original position by me?; as 
members of pre-existing societies rather than by men as men who may 
wish to form sovereign states or may wish to set up an overriding 
universal state. 	Second, even on Rawls' own account of the way in 
which principles governing the relations between states would be chosen 
in the original position, his minimal liberal principles of non-
interference and non-aggression are no more than a fraction of what 
would be agreed upon, if indeed they would not be superseded altogether 
by agreement on an effective system of collective security'. (my 
emphasis) 2 	D.A.J. Richards argues for a principle of intervention 
in order to protect the rights of citizens infringed by the state, a 
principle which goes some way towards recognising that there may be 
1. Rawls, op.cit., pp. 378-379. 
2. Barry, op.cit., p.133. 
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international obligations which override the sovereignty of the 
particular state. ' But this is still rather limited and does not 
appear to he accompanied by any radical challenge zo the division of 
humanity into separate, sovereign states. Neither Rawls nor Richards 
cares to argue for international legal institutions or powerful insti-
tutions for the taking of decisions in areas where states are inter-
dependent. A second reason for rejecting Rawls' approach is that by 
beginning with the state, as he does, the theory is unable to derive 
far-reaching international obligations. And, indeed, if Rawls is 
concerned with political institutions which respect the rights of men 
as men and preserve their autonomy something rather more adventurous 
would be required than the list of principles mentioned above. 
It must be said in defence of Rawls that he is concerned with 
institutions and principles which can operate. For this reason his 
contractors are armed with a knowledge of social psychology, economics 
and so forth so that the institutions they select will be ones which 
ordinary human beings can operate successfully. It is possible then 
that Rawls does not believe men capable of accepting international 
institutions radically different from the rather limited ones they 
already possess. This is not an unreasonable position, but it would 
require argument in its defence especially if the contractors do not 
know 'the level of culture and civilisation' their society has been 
able 'U.: achieve'. 
Furthermore, an elaboration of Rawls' principles for the right 
1. A Theory of Reasons for Action, Oxford 1971, p.138: " it is 
perfectly natural that the contractors may approve the 
destruction of a certain nation, if it severely frustrates 
the interests of its populace." 
2. Rawls, op.cit., p.137. 
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prdering of a domestic society suggests that with suitable assumptions 
his theory could derive more radical conclusions about the right 
relationships between states. For example, men would accept, accord-
ing to Rawls, a minimum standard of living below which no man should 
fall. If therefore, the contract was applied to the whole of humanity 
rather than merely to the members of an already existing society it 
might be used to argue for a substantial redistribution of the world's 
resources - if, that is, Rawls is correct in his belief that rational 
men would decide upon an economic floor beneath which no person should 
fall. 
There may be, in other words, resources which Rawls has not 
fully used, and which might give rise to additional (and even differ-
ent) conclusions were Rawls' contract applied first of all to the 
whole of humanity. Nevertheless, there are other doubts about Rawls' 
approach which lead this reader to depart from his method. Although, 
as we have seen, Rawls employs the language of Kant, his theory can 
hardly be regarded as fully Kantian. 1 For Rawls wishes to introduce 
• 
other assumptions which are drawn from a different tradition of moral 
and political thought. In particular, Rawls' contractors are to act 
from self-interest without any knowledge of the good, as he calls it, 
but with the thought in mind that their future place in society might 
be assigned to them by their worst enemies. The introduction of these 
assumptions leads Rawls' theory to become a curious blend of Kantian 
and Hobbesian ideas. It is not at all clear why Rawls should wish to 
1. 	A point made by N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls, Oxford 1975, 
p.4. Daniels points out that Rawls' contractors choose their 
imperatives in the knowledge that there are certain 'primary 
goods' which each man would want irrespective of his other goals, 
and this entails that their imperatives are merely hypothetical 
rather than categorical. 
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introduce Hobbesian ideas. Is it not possible to derive the prin-
ciplesof a just society from Kantian moral philosophy alone? What-
ever the answer to this might be, Rawls' blend of 1.antian and Hobbe-
sian ideas can lead to problems which would have been avoided had 
Rawls decided to work within only one of the two traditions to which 
these ideas belong. For example, it is not perfectly clear if the 
decision to establish some minimum standard within a society is arrived 
at through the desire that other men's ends be regarded as equal to 
one's own or through the fear that once the veil of ignorance is 
lifted one might discover that one belonged to one of the less privi-
leged groups in society. And these uncertainties arise simply through 
Rawls' desire to include both Kantian and Hobbesian ideas in his 
theory. 
For this reason, the decision simply to apply Rawls' contract 
to the whole of humanity rather than to the members of a separate 
community does not hold the answer to the question of what are the 
right principles for the organisation of international society. In 
the method employed in this thesis the contract certainly operates at 
the universal level, but it operates with Kantian assumptions alone. 
For while Rawls' contract is applied on too narrow a basis, the 
assumptions upon which it is based appear too broad. 
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